Air Power and Planning Operation RUTTER/JUBILEE

Just another section from my thesis. This time it deals with some of the issues thrown up during the planning for Dieppe.

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The genesis of Operation JUBILEE lay in a decision on 14 June 1940 to appoint Lieutenant-General Alan Bourne as ‘Commander of Raiding Operations on coasts in enemy occupation and Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations.’[1] This appointment was made in the aftermath of a series of memorandum written by the Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, to his Chief of Staff, Major-General Ismay on 4 and 6 June 1940. In these memorandums, Churchill called for the ‘…joint Chiefs of Staff to propose me measures for a vigorous, enterprising and ceaseless offensive…’ against German held territory.[2] Bourne had under his command six independent commando companies that had been formed for the Norway campaign. Unfortunately for Bourne the first raids under his command were described by Churchill as a ‘…silly fiasco…’[3] Churchill, displeased with these early failures, replaced Bourne with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations on 17 July 1940.[4] Keyes had been the architect of the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918.[5]

Over the next year, raiding became an inherent part of British strategy in the war against Germany and a series of raids were launched against enemy held territory. However, Keyes faced problems in the planning and implementation of operations and on many occasions during 1941 these problem came to a head with the Chiefs of Staff Committee.[6] Eventually in the aftermath of a disastrous exercise in August 1941 he brought his concerns to the attention of with the Chiefs of Staff; especially the concern of who was to issue orders to force commanders. In the ensuing debates Keyes had a new directive drafted for his role and was re-titled Advisor on Combined Operations.[7] However, Keyes could not accept this and on 27 October 1941, Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced him.[8] Mountbatten, with the backing of Churchill, began to conduct larger and larger raids against the enemy coasts, most notable at St Nazaire and Bruneval.[9] Thus, by early 1942, despite a tumultuous background, raiding and combined operations had become a distinct part of British military operations against the Axis powers.

The origins of the raid on Dieppe lay in an Anglo-American strategic decision taken in April 1942 to increase the scale and frequency of raids.[10] The decision had a clear impact upon the RAF as it meant that as operations increased in scale they would require greater support, specifically in the form of air cover. The increase in scale also had the advantage of allowing the Fighter Command to continue its policy of offensive air operations against the Luftwaffe. While this may at first appear a selfish decision the motive can be viewed, through an understanding of Combined Operation doctrine, as altruistic, because if the RAF sought an aerial battle it would aid it in the aim of providing air cover for the assaulting forces. However, even before this decision was made raids had in general become larger in scale. For example, at the end of 1941 Operation ARCHERY, the raid on Vaagso Island, had seen the first truly combined operation undertaken by COHQ.[11] In terms of RAF participation, the operation had the support of bomber and fighter aircraft. In terms of forces structure, much like at Dieppe, fighters were predominant with five squadrons of long range Bristol Beaufighters’ and Blenheims’ being utilised. In terms of bombers there were twenty-nine Handley Page Hampdens supplied by Bomber Command.[12] The key role during the operation was to cover the operation and maintain air cover over the battlespace. ARCHERY illustrated the importance of air cover to the success of Combined Operations and that attrition in providing cover would be expensive for fighters with eleven aircraft lost.[13] Thus, in general by March/April 1942 raids on the continent were becoming ever larger in size and scope of their objectives. It is in this background that the raid on Dieppe emerged.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in 1942 General Officer Commanding Southern Command and involved in the planning for Operation RUTTER, the precursor to JUBILEE, noted about the planning of the raid that:

‘My own feeling about the Dieppe raid is that there were far too many authorities with a hand in it; there was no single operational commander who was solely responsible for the operation from start to finish, a Task Force Commander in fact.’[14]

Montgomery’s comment on the planning of the Dieppe Raid would appear on the surface prescient if was not written some fourteen years after the raid and seen through his experience of Operation OVERLORD, where an overall commander was in place. Unfortunately, this teleological view of the planning of Dieppe has persisted in the historiography of the raid and has distorted our understanding of some of the key issues raised during the planning process.[15] The 1938 Manual of Combined Operations discussed the merits of three systems of command in Combined Operations, these were, Joint Command, Unified Command and Command by One Service.[16] Early on in the planning process, it was decided that the system of command would by either Joint Command or Command by One Service.[17] While this decision maybe seen by Montgomery as having been the root cause of the problems at Dieppe it does highlight the difficulty of planning for larger raids that faced COHQ in early 1942. Up until this point, the majority of raids had been small and there was little experience on which to make a decision on the system of command. Thus, by early May, Leigh-Mallory was appointed the air force commander in a joint system of command alongside Major-General Roberts as military commander and it was proposed the Vice-Admiral Baille-Grohman as naval commander.[18] With the exception of the change of Captain Hughes-Hallett for Baille-Grohman, this would be the command structure in place when JUBILEE was remounted in late July.

The planning for RUTTER/JUBILEE has opened up several issues concerning air power, as there were two key changes to the plan between the cancellation of RUTTER and the remounting of JUBILEE; namely the use of a preliminary bombing raid and the use of airborne force to attack gun batteries on the flanks of the assault. The lack of Bomber Command involvement has becoming a major point of contention with Brian Loring Villa noting that, ‘Without heavy air bombardment, the disparity in fire-power proved fatal to the Canadian and British invaders.’[19] This theme has continued with Robin Neillands claiming that Leigh-Mallory’s decision to remove the support of bombardment was the result of loyalty that pressed him ‘…to accept a decision that fundamentally undermined the possibilities of success at Dieppe.’[20] However, both of these accounts are viewing JUBILEE from the viewpoint of the invasion of Normandy and they fail to appreciate the implication of utilising heavy strategic bombers for what amounted to a small-scale operation within the context of the Second World War. They also do not take account of the prevailing doctrinal view on the use of aerial bombardment in the support of Combined Operations. The Manual of Combined Operations noted that only ‘Under certain conditions support of the landing by air bombardment will be of value.’[21] However, the Manual of Combined Operations notes that:

‘To what extent this support can be provided will depend on the number of aircraft available and other operations required of them. In most cases the general struggle for air superiority, local operations in defence of the landing against enemy aircraft, and spotting and reconnaissance duties will have prior claims.’[22]

Thus, even before the war began it was laid down in Combined Operations doctrine that while it would be advantageous to have access to the use of aerial bombardment it should not be counted on due to other ongoing operations. Before RUTTER/JUBILEE, aircraft from Bomber Command had been utilised in both the raid on St Nazaire, Operation CHARIOT, and Vaagso, Operation ARCHERY, and, for example, at St Nazaire the use of aircraft had been used to try to divert attention away from the assault. However, their strange action over St Nazaire, where they circled and dropped single bombs, alerted the garrison to a possible attack on the town, and at midnight the garrison received orders to repel a possible parachute attack.[23] Thus, the use of Bomber Command in diversionary operations may have compromised the success of this operation. Also as already noted above bomber operations during Operation ARCHERY were expensive in terms of effort given and results achieved. It is, therefore, more surprising that in the initial planning for RUTTER that bombing appeared. It should be considered that given the nature of operations that were to occur over Dieppe and the order Leigh-Mallory received from Douglas on 13 April the decision not to include bombers did not divert attention from the primary aim of air cover during the raid; the provision of effective air cover. As early, as 14 April aerial bombardment was planned as a precursor to the landings with it being noted that the target will be the town generally.[24] However, it was noted in Mountbatten’s appreciation given to the Chiefs of Staff that the approval for bombardment was required from the War Cabinet due to the standing directive that covered the use of bombers over occupied territory.[25] However, by the planning meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory argued that bombing would not add anything to the operation and it would denude the element of tactical surprise.[26] Another factor leading to this decision was Harris’ contention that bombers could not be used before twilight, thus, leaving only a window of five minutes for bombers before the start of the operation.[27] Leigh-Mallory’s decision was also affected by the conclusion of the War Cabinet reference the use of aerial bombardment, which stated that it should only be used when accurate attacks could be guaranteed.[28] Mountbatten would attempt to modify this directive but as seen by the meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory had concluded that it would not be effective anyway.[29] While Villa has contended that Leigh-Mallory’s decision to cancel the bombing was based upon prescient analysis of its effect upon the landing force and Harris’ intransigence it is clear that he states his objection to their effectiveness at the 5 June meeting.[30] Villa also points out on the issue of surprise that Dieppe had been bombed several times earlier; however, it is difficult to see how this relates to the issue of support for a Combined Operation.[31] Villa’s reliance on the analysis of the official historians, C P Stacey and Stephen Roskill, who stated that while the problems were difficult but not insurmountable raises the question of their understanding of the use of air power in support of combined operations.[32] Prevailing doctrine clearly stated that bombing should be used where possible but was not the overriding concern of the air force commander during operations.[33] In addition, recent research has explored the problems of using aerial bombardment in support of ground operations, which clearly recognises the problems inherent with their use; therefore, while Villa has made a case for their use and the reasons why they should have been used it does not stand up well to scrutiny.[34] Thus, while much has been lamented over the lack over bombers support it can be argued that this decision was taken four months before JUBILEE took place and three months before RUTTER was due to occur and that the decision was based upon sound advice from the relevant commanders with experience of air power. When combined with Leigh-Mallory’s standing orders from Douglas, the issue of tactical surprise and Harris’ orders on bombing occupied territory it is understandable to that bombing of Dieppe was cancelled.

The other key area that requires some explanation is the decision to replace the airborne attack on the flanks with Commandos. This was, in hindsight, the right decision as both No. 3 and 4 Commando achieved the most success on the ground during the raid. Indeed, No. 4 Commandos’ success would form the basis of a British Army doctrinal pamphlet on attacking gun positions.[35] However, the reasons for this change lay in the state of Britain’s airborne forces in 1942 and their lack of effective means to deploy a sizable force accurately.[36] From the very start, it was envisaged that airborne troops were to be used to protect the flanks of the operation and cut enemy communications.[37] It was intended that the 1st Parachute Battalion, reinforced to the strength of one and a half battalions, be dropped near Beneval-le-Grand in order to neutralise gun batteries either side of Dieppe.[38] However, even at this stage question were raised with Mountbatten’s AACO questioning the advisability of using parachute troops in this manner.[39] Army Co-Operation Command was responsible for the control of squadrons tasked with dropping airborne forces and during May and June, the problem of squadron allocation and usage become an operational issue for RUTTER. At a staff meeting on 11 May Harris informed Mountbatten that due to overriding operational requirements Nos. 12 and 142 Squadrons were required by Bomber Command.[40] Much of this is set against the background of Operation MILLENIUM and Harris’ large raids of mid-1942. The loss of these squadrons led to a cut-down in the size of the airborne force for the raid, in particular the loss of glider troops. The loss of squadrons was a key issue of concern for Mountbatten who appealed to Portal on 26 May to release the squadrons. Mountbatten was particularly concerned that if the squadrons suffered heavy casualties then this would put at risk the use of these squadrons for the lack of experienced aircrew.[41] Portal urged Mountbatten to discuss the issue with Barrett at Army Co-Operation Command as no command had been obliged by the air ministry to support Bomber Command’s operations.[42] Barrett, who had been on leave, wrote to Portal to state that that he was exercising his prerogative, outlined in Portal’s reply to Mountbatten on 27 May, and recalling the two Whitley squadrons from the planned Bomber Command operation. In the letter he states that he loaned two Blenheim squadrons and the Whitleys to Harris on the advice of DBO, however, the prospect of jeopardising RUTTER meant their recall from operations.[43] However, the lack of effective airframes continued to beleaguer the use of airborne troops in light of the operational needs of other commands. Thus, by 1 June the planned forced was reduced to one battalion.[44] Considering the operational difficulties facing Britain’s nascent airborne force it is understandable that when RUTTER was re-launched as JUBILEE the decision to replace them with Commandos appear in the light of their success a prophetic decision. The decision enabled a concentrated force, rather than a possibly dispersed force, to be landed and assault the position with success.[45] The problem of timings would also have made concentration difficult for airborne force to complete the task successfully. However, the saga of squadron allocation does highlight the difficulties inherent in Combined Operations and the need to prioritise operations.

In preparation for RUTTER two exercises, YUKON I and II, were planned to take place during June. Both of these exercises were deemed failures and must rank as one of the contributing factors in the cancellation of RUTTER.[46] Due to operational commitments there was little involvement from the RAF in YUKON I, however, for YUKON II seven fighter squadrons were tasked with participating in the exercise.[47] The squadrons were to replicate the proposed actions of the RAF during the operation; fighter cover and Tac R. Leigh-Mallory was anxious for the RAF to play its part and to test the process of calling up air cover during the course of the operation.[48] The key concern for Leigh-Mallory in the aftermath of YUKON II was issues of communication between Uxbridge and the area headquarters at Portsmouth. For Leigh-Mallory, this gave concern over communication with the force headquarters during the raid.[49] He was assured that this was being looked into; in fact, earlier in the year at inter-service committee had been formed to examine the issue of communications during Combined Operations.[50]

Despite this concern and the two prominent issues of bombing and airborne troops, planning for JUBILEE ran into few problems from an air power perspective. By the time of JUBILEE, the plan had been simplified to concentrate on air cover with close support a secondary consideration and in this respect, it closely followed the principal outlined in Combined Operations doctrine. The plan called for fighter cover and general protection to the landing force to be provided all through the daylight hours with the most intensive operations coming during the landing and withdrawal. While air cover was provided, low-level fighter and bomber attacks would support the landing troops and provide smoke laying where appropriate. Tac R was to be provided by aircraft from Army Co-Operation Command within both the battle area and the lines of approach to Dieppe. While no bombing was to be used on the town, diversionary raids were planned to attack the airfield at Abbeville by aircraft of the US 8th Air Force.[51] It was estimated that in the area of Northern France the Germans could deploy approximately two-hundred and sixty fighters and one-hundred and twenty bombers. Against this Leigh-Mallory was able to deploy seventy squadrons, thus allowing him to deploy overwhelming superior numbers as laid out in his operational orders of 13 April.[52] Control of the air battle was to be exercised from No. 11 Group headquarters at Uxbridge and through the normal command and control system of sector control.[53] The HQ Ships HMS Fernie and Calpe provided control of close support aircraft with links to Leigh-Mallory at Uxbridge; Air Commodore Cole on the Calpe represented Leigh-Mallory.[54]Cole was instructed to liaise with the other force commanders and direct operation at low-level, for example, Tac R aircraft from RAF Gatwick that performed reconnaissance along the approaching roads. The system utilised for control of low-level aircraft was the system developed by Army Co-Operation command and based upon forward and rear air links with a tentacle controlling aircraft from the headquarters ship. Reconnaissance was one area where air power aided in both the planning and conduct of JUBILEE. During preparations for RUTTER/JUBILEE RAF reconnaissance aircraft were involved in gathering intelligence of the positions in and around Dieppe. It was responsible for discovery caves in the cliff faces of the two headlands either side of the town. This enabled target identification for the destroyers offshore.[55] Reconnaissance also informed planners of the suitability of the area designated as a sanctuary for landing craft and that in the opinion of both the pilots and Leigh-Mallory the size of the anchorage needed to be reduced in order to present it as a target for bombers.[56] In light of this information, Baille-Grohman examined the possibility of modifying the plan. During the course of the raid, it was planned to make use of Tac R through the communication tentacle in HMS Calpe to co-ordinate air support. Some seventy-one sorties were flown and this was considered lavish in a report written after the raid.[57] There is justification to this claim as when compared to the number of operation conducted by the Western Desert Air Force (WDAF) at the same time the number of sorties for one day equalled half of those being flown by WDAF.[58] Thus, by the time of the issuing of operational orders to squadrons in mid-August the RAF had overcome issues relating the effective use of air power.


[1] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 47, Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Expedition (London: Aurum Press, 2006) p. 25

[2] Cited in Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 47

[3] Cited in Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 26

[4] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 27, Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 52. Fergusson suggests that the title Director went to Keyes head and that he believed he was responsible to the Minster of Defence, Churchill, and not the Chiefs of Staff. This issue was to follow him until his replacement by Mountbatten.

[5] Mark Karau, ‘Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 2003) pp. 455 – 481

[6] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 70-85

[7] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 83

[8] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 89

[9] Anon, ‘Combined Operations’ in I C B Dear (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 198

[10] Charles Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume I – Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955) p. 324

[11] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 44; Niall Cherry, Striking Back: Britain’s Airborne and Commando Raids, 1940-42 (Solihull: Helion, 2009) pp. 130-163

[12] Appendix X ‘Naval and Military Reports relating to Operation ARCHERY’ in Cherry, Striking Back, p. 337

[13] Appendix XII ‘RAF Losses on Operation Archery’ in Cherry, Striking Back, pp. 349-351

[14] Cited in Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 85

[15] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 86

[16] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ pp. 20-22

[17] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘RUTTER – Planning’ p. 8

[18] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Extracts from Chiefs of Staff Meeting No. 42’ 13 May 1942

[19] Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid, 1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

[20] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 273

[21] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[22] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[23] C E Lucas Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, Pan Edition (London: Pan Books, 2000) p. 129

[24] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Conclusions of Meeting Held at COHQ on Tuesday 21st April’

[25] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Extracts from Chiefs of Staff Meeting No. 42 dated 13.5.42’

[26] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Minutes of Meeting of Council and Advisers to CCO and Combined Force Commanders with Lieutenant-General Montgomery in the Chair, 5.6.42’

[27] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 11 May 1942

[28] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 19 May 1942

[29] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 1 June 1942

[30] Villa, Unauthorized Action, pp. 152-153

[31] Villa, Unauthorized Action, p. 153

[32] Villa, Unauthorized Action, p. 153; C P Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: Queen’s Printers 1948) p. 62; Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume II: The Period of Balance (London: HMSO, 1954) p. 241

[33] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[34] See Ian Gooderson, ‘Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Close Air Support Role During World War II?’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No.3, (September 1992.)

[35] TNA, WO 208/3108 ‘Notes from Theatres of War No. 11: Destruction of a German Battery by No. 4 Commando during the Dieppe Raid’ 1943

[36] On the early years of Britain’s airborne force and the various institutional and organisational problems that faced them see; William Buckingham Paras: The Birth of British Airborne Forces from Churchill’s Raiders to 1st Parachute Brigade (Stroud: Tempus, 2005)

[37] TNA, AIR 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at Combined Operations Headquarters at 1100 Hours 14.4.42 to Discuss Operation “RUTTER” 16 April 1942

[38] TNA, DEFE 2/549 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Operational Orders for 1st Parachute Battalion’ 2 July 1942

[39] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 14 April 1942

[40] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at 1200 on 11th May 1942 at Combined Operations Headquarters to Discuss Operation “RUTTER”’

[41] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CCO to CAS’ 26 May 1942

[42] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CAS to CCO’ 27 May 1942

[43] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CAS to CCO’ 27 May 1942; AIR 8/895 ‘Letter from AOC-in-C Army Co-Operation Command to CAS’ 29 May 1942

[44] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Minutes of 1st Meeting of Combined Force Commanders at Combined Operations Headquarters on 1st June 1942’ 4 June 1942

[45] On the success of No. 4 Commando see Will Fowler. The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day (London: Collins, 2002); On 3 Commandos role see Brereton Greenhous. ‘Operation FLODDEN: The Sea Fight off Berneval and the Suppression of the Goebbels Battery, 19 August 1942’ Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2003) pp. 47-57. It is useful to compare the performance of the Commandos at Dieppe with similar airborne operation during D-Day. The 9th Parachute Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Terence Otway was to attack the Merville Battery with strength of six hundred. However, due to scattering this force was reduced to one hundred and fifty. They took the battery with heavy casualties.

[46] Villa, Unauthorized Action, pp. 12-13

[47] TNA, ADM 179/223 ‘Exercise YUKON II: Outline of RAF Participation’ 20 June 1942, p. 2

[48] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at COHQ at 1400 hrs on Monday, 15th June 1942, to discuss certain points concerning Operation “RUTTER”’

[49] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’

[50] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’; AIR 20/832 ‘Inter-Service Committee on Communications in Combined Operations Interim Report No. 2: Support Communications in Combined Operations’ 14 January 1942

[51] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ pp. 118-119; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[52] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 119; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[53] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 120; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[54] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 120; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[55] Michael Shoeman ‘Air Umbrella – Dieppe’ Military History Journal of the South African Military History Society, Vol. 1, No. 5. Accessed at www.rapidttp.com

[56] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’

[57] TNA, DEFE 2/333 ‘Army Air Support and Tactical Reconnaissance during Operation “JUBILEE”’ p. 2

[58] TNA, DEFE 2/333 ‘Army Air Support and Tactical Reconnaissance during Operation “JUBILEE”’ p. 2

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