The proposed title for my thesis is as you can see above about the RAF’s role in the raid on Dieppe in 1942. Dieppe has always held a bit of a fascination for me, not really sure why though, and I have never been fully satisfied with the explanation that Mountbatten was fully to blame for its failure. Therefore, I am hoping to show that, form the point of view of the RAF at least, the failure was more due inherent differences between the services and the evolutionary nature of air power at the time, which led to the problem of 19 August 1942.
Thus, my principal aims have been set out as;
1. Examine the reasons for the failure of the Royal Air Force during the raid on Dieppe in August 1942.
2. Place the failures into their historical context especially looking at aspects British Air Power Strategy and Tactics in the early years of the Second World War, especially with reference to RAF Fighter Command.
3. Examine the lessons learnt from the raid on Dieppe and whether these were integrated into RAF doctrine in preparation for the Invasion of Europe or were the lessons necessary learnt elsewhere.
If anyone has any thoughts, ideas or comments please let me know.