Thesis Rationale

The Royal Air Force, Combined Operations Doctrine and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942

Thesis Rationale, Aims and Limitations

Considering the amount of ink that has been spilt over JUBILEE it could be argued what is the need for another examination of the operation. Many words have been written about a raid, which in the context of the Second World War was a small operation.[1] However, much of the historiography has been driven by Canadian nationalism in trying to explain the problems that faced their troops at Dieppe. Research on Dieppe has been varied from early journalistic accounts to thorough scholarly explanations and subjects have been just as diverse with more recent research being conducted into how JUBILEE was reported.[2]

However, there has been a distinct lack of analysis of how Dieppe fitted into prevailing Combined Operations doctrine and how effective were the various elements of JUBILEE. There has been some attempt to shift the focus of the historiography away from the contentious issues of blame to a discussion of effectiveness with High Henry’s work on the Calgary Tanks and Will Fowler’s work on Operation CAULDRON, however, this needs to be taken further.[3] Therefore, there is a need to shift the historiography to an analysis of effectiveness in order to assess whether or not any lessons were truly learnt from JUBILEE. The role of air power during JUBILEE has received little serious attention about the role it actually played on the day; much has centred on higher strategic discussions, for example, in his despatch on the operation, Hughes-Hallett spent only ten lines describing the role of the RAF.[4] Norman Franks’ narrative of the operation did little to attempt to analyse the effectiveness of the forces deployed.[5] Thus, it is the rationale of this thesis to seek to re-contextualise the debate about Dieppe and concentrate on its relevance as a military operation by examining the place of air power in its doctrinal and operational context. In doing this it will analyse the effectiveness of the forces deployed and the links between JUBILEE and subsequent operations.

In analysing the role of air power during JUBILEE there are several research questions that will be explored. First is an exploration of the RAF’s role in the development of Combined Operations doctrine during the inter-war years and how the RAF saw the use of air power in this type of operations. Second, an examination of the operational context of the RAF in the period 1940-1942 and an assessment of the role the RAF played in the planning for JUBILEE. A key aspect of this is an examination of how the RAF viewed the operation and how support for a Combined Operations fitted in with the RAF’s offensive fighter strategy of the period. Third, the thesis will seek to examine the impact of JUBILEE by examining the effectiveness of the support provided through both qualitative and quantitative sources. It will examine the usefulness of air power on the day of JUBILEE and the costly nature of providing offensive air cover over enemy territory. In examining its impact, the thesis will examine the role JUBILEE had in shaping discussion on the command and control of air power in Combined Operation and the on the issue of fire support. Overall, by placing Dieppe into it doctrinal and operational context its impact upon air power operations can be examined and compared to the lessons being learnt in other theatres of war, therefore, contextualising its effectiveness in the short-term rather than long-term as was suggested by Earl Mountbatten of Burma.[6]

In order to examine these research questions this thesis will utilise a chronological conceptual model in order to frame the discussion. This will roughly split the thesis into three key periods, first, 1918-1939, second, 1940-1942 and finally, 1942-1944. Framing the discussion in this manner has aided in the assessment of JUBILEE’s effectiveness by producing an understanding of what came before and after JUBILEE.

Primarily the research has drawn upon archival sources at the National Archives, Kew, the Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon and the Canadian Military Headquarters Reports (CHMQ) from the Department of History and Heritage, Ottawa Canada.[7] Due to poor historical records left on Dieppe it has been necessary to widen the scope of records examined by seeking out records from a variety of departments; a full list of documents consulted can be found in the bibliography. This plurality of archival material has aided in strengthening the conclusions reached and has been backed up by a variety on non-contemporary sources on issues such as the development of Combined Operations doctrine and air power theory.

For example, archival sources have included an examination of the papers of the RAF Staff College in order to assess the RAF’s thinking on the subject backed up by Air Ministry files on the writing of the Manual of Combined Operations (MCO). These are backed up with key work on Combined Operations doctrine such as David Massam’s 1996 doctoral thesis.[8] In addition to Massam’s thesis, key non-contemporary sources on Combined Operations have included Kenneth Clifford’s Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920 and Bernard Fergusson’s The Watery Maze, though these must be treated with caution as Clifford in a former US Marine Corps officer and Fergusson is the former Director of Combined Operations (DCO).[9]

In addition to key works on Combined Operations there are also several important works on air power that have helped inform the interpretations present in this thesis. Most important has been Ian Gooderson’s work on tactical air power Air Power at the Battlefront.[10] Gooderson’s work has been important in re-focussing the debate about the effectiveness of bombers as a tactical support weapon; one of the key arguments present in revisionist accounts of JUBILEE. David Ian Hall’s work on British tactical air doctrine, Strategy for Victory, is important for shifting interpretations away from the perception of the RAF being a force that concentrated solely of aerial bombardment; it is within this revisionist interpretation that this thesis falls.[11]

Despite the scope of research undertaken there are several areas that, because of limitations of time and the span of the work, have been avoided due to the attempt to focus on operational and tactical issues. First, strategic level discussions surrounding the RAF’s role, in particular the argument that the RAF were not interested due to its desire to prosecute the strategic bomber offensive, though by default this thesis does show that this is not a clear as some historians have argued.[12] Second, it does not explore the importance of radar to JUBILEE as John Campbell in Dieppe Revisited has dealt with this effectively.[13] Research also opened several areas that could not be explored but to the word limit; this included the use of balloons in Combined Operations and the RAF’s participations in providing meteorological advice for Combined Operations.[14] If this work were expanded, it would be envisaged that the scope of archival sources would be increased to include various personal papers at assorted institutions and to expand the German perspective using the Bundesarchiv at Freiburg.

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[1] See, Villa, Unauthorized Action; Campbell, Dieppe Revisited; Atkin, Dieppe, 1942; Hugh Henry, ‘The Planning, Intelligence, Execution and Aftermath of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942’ PhD Thesis (University of Cambridge, 1996)

[2] Timothy Balzer, ‘ ‘In Case the Raid is Unsuccessful…’: Selling Dieppe to Canadians’ The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 2006) pp. 409-430

[3] Henry, Dieppe; Hugh Henry, ‘The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe’ Canadian Military History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1995) pp. 61-74; Fowler, Commandos at Dieppe

[4] Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, ‘Dieppe Raid: Despatch on the Raid, 18-19 August 1942’ The London Gazzette, 12 August 1942, p. 3823. The dispatch was originally submitted on 30 August 1942 and published after the war. Villa, Unauthoriszed Action, passim

[5] Franks, The Greatest Air Battle, passim

[6] Earl Mountbatten of Burma, ‘Operation Jubilee: The Place of the Dieppe Raid in History’ Journal of the Royal United Service Institution for Defence Studies Vol. 119 No. 1 (1974)

[7] The CMHQ Reports, and its successor the Army Headquarters Reports (AHQ) are available online at http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/index-eng.asp

[8] David Massam, ‘British Maritime Strategy and Amphibious Capability, 1900 – 40’ DPhil Thesis (Oxford University, 1996)

[9] Kenneth Clifford, Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920 (New York: Edgewood, 1983); Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations (London: Collins, 1961)

[10] Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support, 1943-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Ian Gooderson, ‘Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Close Air Support Role During World War II?’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No.3, (September 1992)

[11] David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Greenwood, CT: Praeger, 2007); David Ian Hall, ‘The Long Gestation and Difficult Birth of the 2^nd Tactical Air Force (RAF)’ Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 2002) pp. 20-33; David Ian Hall, ‘Creating the 2^nd Tactical Air Force RAF: Inter-Service and Anglo-Canadian Co-Operation in the Second World War’ Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 2003) pp. 39-45

[12] See Villa, Unauthorised Action, pp.

[13] Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, passim

[14] TNA, AIR 2/7999, Balloons for Combined Operations; AIR 2/4833, Combined Operations: Co-Ordination of Meteorological Advice; AIR 2/4845, Combined Operations Organisation: Meteorological Services