Thesis

The Royal Air Force and Operation JUBILEE, the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 

Rationale and Aims of the Thesis: 

In his 1992 work Dieppe Revisited John P Campbell mused about the need for another book about Operation JUBILEE. Now sixteen years later the same question could be posed about the perceived need for another thesis on the same subject seeing as Hugh Henry’s 1996 doctoral thesis covered a significant amount of ground relating to planning of the raid. For a raid that only lasted one day, and that was within the context of Second World War operations an only small raid, a substantial body of literature has been built up over the past seventy-five years. Research has varied from the early journalistic accounts of the raid produced during and just after the war to modern scholarly political analyses into the decision to mount the raid. More recently, there has been research into how the raid was reported to the Canadian public. 

However, despite all of this research there has been a dispirit lack of analysis of how Dieppe fitted into British Combined Operations doctrine and how the various elements involved in the raid performed on the day. Only recently has some attention been directed at the operational and tactical level of the operation and the effectiveness of the various services involved in this the largest of all British raids of the Second World War. The most notable analysis of tactical level lessons has been Will Fowler’s Commandos at Dieppe. Thus, there is a need to re-analyse the operation at an operational and tactical level to fully understand if there were lessons learnt from the operation, as the official and orthodox accounts argue, and to analyse the effectiveness of the forces involved. 

Air power during the raid has received little attention from the foremost analyses of the raid. What attention has been paid to it has concentrated on strategic level planning and has paid scant attention to what role the forces actually deployed for the raid played. Captain Hughes-Hallett’s London Gazette Dispatch, initially submitted to Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth on 30 August 1942, and only spent ten lines describing the role of the air force in the raid. While it is true that Norman Franks has produced a history of operation on the day, The Greatest Air Battle, there are several failings with his work. Franks’ account is wholly narrative and makes little attempt to analyse the effectiveness of air power during the operation. There is also little attempt to place the role of air power into its doctrinal and operational context. Thus, there is a need for this to be re-evaluated and an analysis made to see how effective the forces involved actually were and what lessons were found from the operation. 

The thesis has several key aims which it seeks to answer. The first aim is what role does the RAF play in the development of Combined Operations doctrine in the inter war years. This will enable the analysis of the effectiveness of air power during the raid to be placed into its doctrinal context. The main sources for this are papers relating to the development of Combined Operations during the inter-war era, most notably papers relating to the Manual of Combined Operations and the various exercises conducted by the Staff Colleges and the lesson learnt from these. A key source is David Massam’s 1996 doctoral thesis that examined the development of Combined Operations doctrine. 

The second aim of the thesis is to examine the role and influence the RAF played in the planning of the raid.  It will look at the role of Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh Mallory in the planning of the operation, as a starting point his personal papers. It will inspect what was his relationship to the other force commanders and with Mountbatten. It will also examine the decision making process and Leigh Mallory’s own planning for the RAF on the day. A key aspect to be examined is how the RAF viewed the operation. Did they see it as an operation to support to a Combined Operation or did they view it as an opportunity to bring the Luftwaffe to battle, thus, fitting into RAF fighter strategy since the end of the Battle of Britain. It shall also look at what, if any, role the Army Co–Operation command played in the planning. The decision not to use heavy bombers has also been heavily criticised, notably by Villa. This decision will be scrutinised and placed within its strategic context.  

The third and key aim of the thesis is to examine RAF operations on the day of the raid and evaluate their operational and tactical effectiveness and how and if this fitted into the Combined Operations doctrine of the era. This section will seek to provide an operational analysis and evaluation of the RAF’s performance on the day of the raid. It will look at the key aspects of the use of air power on the day. The first key area to examine will be the command and control of what was the largest RAF force to be deployed in support of any operation up to this date. It will also look at the primary role of the force on the day, air defence, and how successful was the force in this respect. It shall also examine the effectiveness of the tactical air support on the day and the usefulness of the limited force of medium bombers during the operation. Tactical reconnaissance and its usefulness to fluidic operation such as this will be examined though an examination of command and control structure and how the reporting system brought effective forces into play. A comparison of the operation in line with doctrinal works will be made to ascertain to what extent the operation fitted in the doctrinal context. 

The final aim, and inherently linked to the third, were any lesson’s learnt from the operation. If they were how were they put into effect in support of future operations. Did they make their way into doctrine in preparation for the allied re-entry into Europe then it can be considered that the raid, from an air power perspective, was a limited success. However, if these lessons were ignored as more pertinent ones were being made elsewhere this will bring a question mark over the raids validity. Also, hopefully, some conclusion can be made over some of the key question brought up previously by historians of the raid about the RAF’s involvement. This will seek to lie to rest the myths relating the use of strategic bombers and Leigh Mallory’s interpretation of the raid’s purpose. A conclusion will also be made as to what degree did the raid’s execution on the part of the RAF fit into pre-war doctrine on Combined Operation and the perceived role of air power in such operations.