Another section of my thesis. This concentrates of the efficacy of the policy of using raids as the basis of the the intruder startegy.
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The perceived success of Operation JUBILEE would lead to the belief that raids would bring the Luftwaffe to fight, therefore, producing the means to battle them for air superiority over Northern France. In many respects, the emergence of this strategy, at the behest of Leigh-Mallory who in November 1942 replaced Douglas as AOC-in-C of Fighter Command, can be seen as a continuation of the offensive fighter sweep policy that was Fighter Commands main role in the 1941-1942. In conjunction with the developments that were to come into being in 1943, this scheme of combining raids with an attempt at offensive air action would become an important element of Operation COCKADE; the elaborate camouflage and deception plan aimed at keeping the German guessing as to when and where an invasion would take place.[1] In the year after JUBILEE, there would be various attempts at launching such scheme with varying degrees of success. The three main operation that made it as far as the planning stage, and one would take place, albeit in a slightly different form, were Operations AFLAME, COLEMAN and STARKEY.
As early as 22 August 1942 Leigh-Mallory was writing to Mountbatten saying that ‘I feel that we might profitably conduct a future operation on rather different lines.’[2] In terms of ‘different lines’ Leigh-Mallory suggested the use of commando’s as the assaulting force and in particular he cites the tactical success of Lord Lovat’s No. 4 Commando against the Hess Battery during JUBILEE.[3] Leigh-Mallory contends that one of the disappointing aspects of JUBILEE was the paucity of opportunity for his close support squadrons to attack German reserves, as they were not thrown into the battle. He argued that if a small force were landed on a quiet stretch of coast then this would force the German’s to utilise reserves, therefore, allowing his close support squadron the opportunity to inflict ‘heavy casualties’ upon the enemy.[4] He also noted the role that this type of operation would play in the conduct of the war as a whole as it would aid in the general degradation of the Luftwaffe’s striking force and would contribute to its final defeat.[5] Based upon the information then available to Leigh-Mallory these conclusions are hard to fault, however, it should be considered that in order to reproduce the effect that he was thinking about then a large fighter force relative to the size of the operation would have to be provided to protect the direct support aircraft that were to support the assaulting force. He also fails to appreciate that the sizes of the assaulting force would have to be of such a large size in order to draw in German reserve. Considering that this did not occur at Dieppe it is hard to see what effect a single commando unit would have upon German reserves in order to achieve the effect that Leigh-Mallory was seeking.
However, despite this failure to understand the military requirement of such an operation the idea obviously received the support on Mountbatten who convened a meeting on 7 September at COHQ to examine the feasibility of such an operation.[6] At this meeting, it was outline that the primary purpose of the operation was to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. In terms of naval support it was proposed that a similar number of Hunt class destroyers as used at Dieppe be utilised, however, there was no discussion of ground forces to be used. It was decided, however, that the plan appeared sound and that planning should proceed with the plan to put to the Chiefs of Staff and another meeting to be held on 17 September.[7] Mountbatten submitted a minute to the Chiefs of Staff on 16 September outlining the operation. In this minute, Mountbatten made the claim that it may not even be necessary to land any troops in order to bring the Luftwaffe to battle.[8] Again, it is hard to see the reasoning for this claim based upon the experience of JUBILEE. Despite this Mountbatten also made the claim that AFLAME may have a larger strategic role to play as part of Operation OVERTHROW, the deception plan for Operation TORCH assuming that approval was forthcoming in order to allow the operation to take place in October.[9]
From an air power perspective it is hard to ignore the fact that it appear that Dieppe had been an unqualified success when Leigh-Mallory received reports stating that the Germans were in the process of reinforcing certain position along the French and Norwegian coastline.[10] However, by the time of the second planning meeting Mountbatten had decided that no military force would be landed and that he was seeking the use of a light cruiser from the Admiralty in order to add to the deception. This brought concerns from Leigh-Mallory representative, Air Commodore Harcourt-Smith, who stated that the deception provided had to be strong enough to bring the Luftwaffe to battle; the primary objective of the operation.[11] In order to aid the deception plan it was again decided to make use of a small force of bombers on the night preceding the operation and to make use of dummy parachutists in order to convince the Germans of the operation veracity.[12] In terms of the support to be provided by Bomber Command Air Chief Marshal Harris was supportive but asked that the targets were both more realistic considering the lack of success during JUBILEE and also less politically sensitive. As Harris pointed out to Douglas, his directive from the War Cabinet dictated that only strictly military targets are attacked in occupied territory.[13] Douglas pointed this out to Leigh-Mallory in letter on 26 September, which garnered a response that stated that the suggestions made by Harris had already by considered and rejected and that in particular the bombing of docks was something that the Germans were used to, and unlikely to achieve the results desired.[14] It is evident that despite Harris’ rational objection the nature of the deception bombardment did not change and the town of Berck remained its target.[15] On this issue, Harris received the support of Douglas who laid the fault for this situation at Mountbatten over zealous attitude and hoped that Harris would still ‘play.’[16] ALFLAME was scheduled to take place between 4 and 16 October depending on the weather and primarily it was seen as a virtual repeat of JUBILEE without the ground forces.[17] Thankfully, however, the weather did play its part and ALFAME was postponed indefinitely. It is hard to see how the force involved could have induced the Luftwaffe to come to battle with the RAF. However, this did not stop planning for a similar operation-taking place.
By early October, Mountbatten was again seeking authorisation launch an operation with the objective of inducing a favourable air battle for Fighter Command.[18] In his covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten admits to the operation being similar in conception to AFLAME, therefore, by default JUBILEE, and that it were complementary to the ongoing CROSSBOW deception for Operation TORCH.[19] In effect, many elements that were prevalent in the planning for AFLAME re-appear in COLEMAN such as Mountbatten insistence that night bombing was vital to the operations success. In preparation for the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 22 October to consider the plan ACAS (P) was asked to prepare a summary of the viability of the operation. To enable this to occur both the Directors of Fighter and Bomber Operations were asked for their comments on the plan.[20] The memorandums illustrate the difficulties of inter-service co-operation. The Director of Fighter Operation (DFO) commented that the plan produced by Mountbatten illustrated the usual ‘…hurried sort of operation…’ that he had become known for.[21] The DFO noted that in his covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff he claimed to have had discussions with the heads of Fighter and Bomber Command about the operation. However, the DFO notes that this was certainly not the case with Harris who had first heard of the plan on 19 October when he was asked to examine the outline plan.[22] DFO does not refer to Douglas or Leigh-Mallory, who due to their involvement with AFLAME, were most likely aware of plans to re-launch it. Despite this the tone of the memorandum is one of frustration at Mountbatten’s tactics in trying to force the operation through the planning and approval process without due diligence of the procedures; an issues that was prevalent during the decision to re-launch Dieppe.[23] The DFO noted that if Mountbatten wanted the support of the RAF he should be careful to work within the appropriate channels.[24] The Director of Bomber Operations (DBO) backs this up by confirming that until 19 October no one at Bomber Command had seen the plan. In veiled terms, DBO claims that Mountbatten lied on the outline to the Chiefs of Staff.[25] This was of course a major issue for commands who were involved in constant operations. However, this was not, as already noted, the first time Mountbatten had attempted to circumvent the system, however, the opinions of the DFO and DBO would be brought forward to the Chiefs of Staff through the memorandum prepared by ACAS (P) for the 22 October meeting.[26]
At an operational level both DFO and DBO were concerned about the timings and appropriateness of the operation. The DFO noted that from Fighter Command’s perspective the decision to seek a battle for aerial superiority was a good idea, however, prevailing weather condition for November, when the operation was due to take place, would not aid the aim of the operation.[27] DFO was particularly concerned about the affect the weather would have on issues such as bombing accuracy and the fact that cloudy conditions would hinder offensive fighter operation due to the enemy’s ability to use cloud cover to escape.[28] DFO was also concerned about the level of support that Mountbatten was expecting from No. 2 Group’s light bombers and it was pointed out that support from the Americans would be needed and that even if this were possible high casualties were to be expected.[29] This was supported by the DBO who pointed out that at Dieppe the limited actions of No. 2 Group had caused a high rate of wastage and that if the required numbers could be collected then the same would occur.[30] On the issue of night bombing, the DBO re-iterated the concerns that Harris raised during AFLAME over the issue accuracy and civilian casualties. DBO contended that given the probable weather conditions night bombing should be considered incidental to the operation.[31] These views were summarised by ACAS (P) and submitted to the Chiefs of Staff for consideration with the caveat that the plan was a weak one given the prevailing operational issues that faced the air force in an attempt to gain a favourable victory.[32] In the aftermath of this appreciation and the Chiefs OF Staff meeting on 23 October Mountbatten was ordered to re-evaluate the plan in light of the navy’s decision not to provide him with six Hunt class destroyers and Portal’s decision to not allow fighter aircraft for close support operations.[33] Therefore, by late 1942 the attempt to draw the Luftwaffe to battle using raiding as bait for air action had ended. In many respects in highlighted a strategic dead-end, though not one that was not worth examining. Dieppe was in many respects the intruder strategy of 1941 writ large, therefore, the AFLAME and COLEMAN can be considered Dieppe writ large. However, they illustrate the degree to which Dieppe had been a one shot operation and that the likelihood of success a second time was unlikely especially so soon after Dieppe given the prevailing operational condition of the time.
Despite the apparent failure of using raiding as a means to bring the Luftwaffe to battle, due to opposition and unsatisfactory conditions, this strategy would receive renewed vigour under the auspicious of the planning for the invasion of Europe during 1943. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, discussion took place concerning the nature of operation during the forthcoming year. In a report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was decided that there were three possibilities for cross-channel operations during 1943. These were categorised as raids, operations with the purpose of seizing a bridgehead and an uncontested return to the continent.[34] The purpose of any future raids was described as provoking a major air battle and inflicting causalities on the enemy, therefore, a degree of continuity can be seen in the planning of raids in late 1942 and in 1943.[35] These proposed operations would eventually evolve into Operations COCKADE, OVERLORD and RANKIN.[36] It was assumed that by August 1943 there would be sufficient air power resources for the purpose of either of these operations, however, it was noted that the home based operational commands of the RAF would require re-organisation in order to make offensive air operations more effective.[37] This re-organisation, based on lessons in Europe and out in the Mediterranean, would lead to the eventual formation of the RAF’s 2nd Tactical Air Force. In a report by the Combined Commanders to the Chiefs of Staff, it was made clear that from an air power perspective it was crucial that sufficient aircraft were available for maintaining air superiority.[38]
A key element in the preparations for the invasion of Europe was Operation COCKADE, which was conceived as a deception plan with the purpose of pinning German forces in the west for fear of possible large-scale operations against the continent.[39] COCKADE consisted of three subsidiary operations, STARKEY, WADHAM and TINDALL. Both STARKEY and WADHAM were to be inter-dependent with STARKEY acting as the main assault and WADHAM as a follow-on force landing on the Brittany peninsula.[40] Of these operations STARKEY is most important for consideration in this thesis as inherent to it planning was the desire to draw the Luftwaffe to battle.[41] The outline plan for STARKEY noted that it was ‘…primarily designed to compel the German Air Force over a prolonged period to engage in air battles of attrition…’[42] Thus, it becomes apparent that in terms of effectively deceiving the German of the Allies intentions in 1943 raiding with the purpose of forcing an air battle had become an important element of preparations for the invasion. In its basic conception, STARKEY sought to feign the movement of a large number of troops and to suggest to the Germans that a major operation was to take place in the area of Boulogne. As these movement took place a crescendo of air operations would take place in the vicinity in an attempt o bring the Luftwaffe to battle. Then in the final phase of the operation, it was intended to demonstrate amphibious force of the French coast but not to actually land them. In all the operation, unlike JUBILEE, was to last for a period of three weeks with air operations reaching their peak by early September 1943.[43] As with previous planned operations and JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory, now promoted Air Marshal and AOC-in-C Fighter Command, was to take control of the air force during the operation. Due to the planned scale of STARKEY, planning was spread over several months from March to August 1943. The air plan called for the use of significant amount of Allied air power from both the RAF and the United States Army Air Force. In this respect General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Army Air Force (8AAF), aided Leigh-Mallory in the planning process.[44] From an air power perspective, the planning for STARKEY was similar in many respects to the operation that had gone before it. This should come as no surprise due to the involvement of Leigh-Mallory. However, one area where it did divert from previous operations was in the use of large numbers of bombers. Previously issues over accuracy and the possibility of civilian casualties had led to the abandonment of their use. However, at the time of JUBILEE, this was not considered a major issue due to the factor of tactical surprise. Yet for STARKEY their use was considered vitally important to the deception plan. This does not mean that there were not questions raised over the use of bombers. Harris again questioned the viability noting that the initial level of bomber support to be provided was ‘…just the sort of thing an idol army dotes on…’ he was supported in this view by Eaker who was not willing to waver from the Pointblank Directive that had been issued to both himself and Harris.[45] Thus, while bomber forces were to be used they were not used on the levels intended.
The air plan called for three phases of operations, first, the preliminary phase was to call for the reinforcement of Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group between 16 and 24 August, second, the preparatory phase called for a increase in operation with reconnaissance over the target area and bombardment of key installations between 25 August and 7 September, finally, the culminating phase called continually attacks on vital installation such as coastal batteries in preparation for the sailing of the naval force that was to demonstrate of Boulogne. The naval force was to be protected by an air umbrella in an attempt to lure the Luftwaffe up.[46] As already, noted significant forces were tasked to take part in STARKEY with No. 11 Group reinforced to seventy-two squadrons. For the culminating phase by 8AAF and Bomber Command, promised three hundred sorties each when available.[47] The issues of availability came around because Bomber Command had just begun its assault upon Berlin, thus, Harris complained to the Chiefs of Staff that this interfered with his primary mission. However, he was ordered to make a portion of aircraft available for STARKEY, thus illustrating the importance placed on this operation.[48]
In general operation proceeded as planned over the period of the operation and during the period of D-Day, 7/8 September Fighter Command flew some seventeen hundred sorties on fighter cover duties. Despite the air effort the Germans did not respond in the manner hoped for with only small forces engaging the attacking bombers and fighters that were over the battlespace. By this time, the Luftwaffe in northern France had standing orders to avoid combat where numbers were unadvantageous and the Air Historical Branch narrative comments this was probably a lesson learnt from Dieppe.[49] However, despite this apparent disappointment, lessons were learnt and they were able to be refined in preparation for the invasion in 1944. Much like at Dieppe concerns were still being uttered concerning the command and control of forces during the operation. It was noted that the Headquarters ship was not positioned advantageously for the control of fighters and that communications with airfields was far from good. This was an issue, as seen below, that was already being examined in light of Dieppe and operation elsewhere. It was also noted that in terms of strategic reconnaissance for the operation had been inadequate had this been an active operation.[50]
In other areas, STARKEY aided allied preparations for Normandy, for example, in the area of deception, Campbell has argued that lessons learnt during STARKEY affected FORTITUDE SOUTH. It had been intended that FORTITUDE SOUTH take a similar form to STARKEY but upon examining the results of STARKEY this plan was revised.[51] The issue of bombing during STARKEY has remained a point of contention with Cumming’s work concentrating on this aspect of the operation.[52] Considering the similarities between JUBILEE and STARKEY and the key issue raised by Villa over the lack of aerial bombardment, it is interesting to compare this with a work that is at odds with the efficacy of bombing. A possible explanation for this divergence arrives from the issue that unlike JUBILEE STARKEY did not actually land any troops, therefore, for it is difficult to understand there use. However, despite this, there is a link between doctrine, which did state bombardment should be used where possible but was not an overriding concern, and attempts to consider the use of bombing in raids such as STARKEY after Dieppe. From an air power perspective, STARKEY helped shake the belief that air superiority could be won over the invasion area during the operation, a belief that had existed from Dieppe in 1942 and exemplified in the planned operations of that autumn.[53] This led to the precondition that air superiority was a direct pre-requisite for OVERLORD’s success. Thus, by 1943 it can be contended that the attempts at combining feint raids with the desire to engage the Luftwaffe had not had the effect of drawing down German strength but had instead aided in learning lessons for 1944 in the area of deception and the necessity of air superiority. In many respects, the issue of air superiority had long been understood and that operational experience brought home the realties of inter-war doctrine of its importance in Combined Operations. For example, the Manual of Combined Operations had noted that where possible and using advanced landing ground air superiority should be gained in advance of any planned operation.[54]
[1] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘The Air Defence of Great Britain: Vol. V – The Struggle for Air Supremacy, January 1942 – May 1945’ p. 274
[2] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1
[3] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1
[4] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1
[5] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1
[6] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 1A – Minutes of Meeting to Consider Operation “AFLAME”’ 7 September 1942
[7] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 1A – Minutes of Meeting to Consider Operation “AFLAME”’ 7 September 1942
[8] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Minute to the Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Combined Operation reference Operation AFLAME’ 16 September 1942
[9] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Minute to the Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Combined Operation reference Operation AFLAME’ 16 September 1942
[10] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 3A – Message from COHQ to Leigh-Mallory’ 18 September 1942
[11] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 4A – Minutes of a Meeting of the Force Commanders of Operation “AFLAME”’ 17 September 1942, p. 2
[12] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 6A – Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 23 September 1942
[13] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 11B – Letter from Harris, AOC-in-C Bomber Command, to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 25 September
[14] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 11A – Letter from Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command, to Leigh-Mallory’ 26 September 1942; AIR 16/762 ‘File 12A – Letter from 11 Group to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 28 September 1942
[15] TNA, AIR 16/763 ‘Operation “AFLAME’ – Royal Air Force Operation Order No. 1’ p. 1
[16] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 13A – Letter from Harris, AOC-in-C Bomber Command, to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 30 September 1942
[17] TNA, AIR 16/763 ‘Operation “AFLAME’ – Royal Air Force Operation Order No. 1’ p. 1
[18] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Operation “COLEMAN” – Outline of the Operation’ 18 October 1942
[19] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Covering Letter to Outline of Operation “COLEMAN”’ 18 October 1942
[20] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942; AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942
[21] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1
[22] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1
[23] On the issue of re-launching Dieppe and Mountbatten’s role in changing procedure see, Peter Henshaw, ‘The British Chief of Staff Committee and the Preparation of the Dieppe raid, March-August 1942: Did Mountbatten really evade the Committee’s authority?’ War in History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 197-214
[24] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1
[25] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942
[26] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Memorandum by ACAS (P) on Operation “COLEMAN” for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting on 22 October 1942’ 20 October 1942, p. 1
[27] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2
[28] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, pp. 1-2
[29] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1
[30] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2
[31] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2
[32] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Memorandum by ACAS (P) on Operation “COLEMAN” for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting on 22 October 1942’ 20 October 1942, p. 2
[33] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Extract from the Chiefs of Staff’s 239th Meeting, 23rd October’ 24 October 1942
[34] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 1
[35] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 1
[36] John Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY, 1943: ‘A Piece of Harmless Playacting’?’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1987) p. 92
[37] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 2
[38] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the Combined Commanders – Some Basic Factors Concerning and Opposed Landing in France and the Low Countries’ 22 March 1943, p. 1
[39] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 274
[40] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 93; TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 274
[41] The most useful works on STARKEY are, Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ and Michael Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice: The Allied Bombing of Le Portel, 1943 (Stroud: Sutton, 1996)
[42] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16th August-9th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, p. 1
[43] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 275; AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16th August-9th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 1-2; Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice, pp. 25-31
[44] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 275
[45] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ pp. 95-96
[46] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16th August-9th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 2-3
[47] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Appendix ‘A’ – STARKEY Order of Battle in Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16th August-9th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 1-4
[48] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 276
[49] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 280
[50] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16th August-9th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp.28-30
[51] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 107
[52] Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice, passim
[53] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 107
[54] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 121
