A Few Additions…

Couple of additions to the library arrived this past week…

Christina Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force’s Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1995) – An important contribution to the history of the RAF and in particular its contribution to maritime air power.

Vincent Orange, Tedder: Quietly in Command (London: Routledge, 2006) – A useful addition to Orange’s biographies of RAF airmen. Tedder is one of the most important airmen in the history of the RAF. Serving as deputy commander in Europe and then as the first CAS of the post-war RAF he often dealt with numerous difficult problems and personalities. It is interesting to note that he hasn’t dealt with Leigh-Mallory or Douglas, but that is an issue I will deal with at a later date.

I have also added a few e-books to the collection. The Canadian Directorate of Heritage and History has a download section with various publications. Of interest to those of us interested in air power are the RCAF’s official history of the Second World War and there are a few interesting titles on the development of naval aviation in Canada. There are also copies of the Canadian official history of both the First and Second World War.

Some Qualitative Observations of Air Power at Dieppe…

One of things I looked at in the course of my research was the contemporary qualitative view of the effectiveness of Air Power over Dieppe. This was easily classified into fours areas; political, command, operational and German views of the raid.

At an operational level a useful source was the Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Reports compiled by C P Stacey during the course of the war. Many of these were based upon oral accounts given by either surviving or released soldiers in the period 1942-1945. Therefore, they do not suffer from many of the issues related to oral testimony. Though Stacey’s motive must be born in mind as he was quite happy to confront Mountbatten over what he perceived as the problems of the raid. One of the more interesting things to come out of the accounts below was the issue of identification. Indeed by the D-Day it was common to see aircraft with the so-called ‘D-Day stripes’, however, these were certainly used during Operation STARKEY in 1943 and I have seen some reference to their use at Dieppe. Indeed I have seen a picture of a Free French Spitfire with bands applied over the cowling, however, I can’t find a standing order for this.

Anyway here is what I wrote on this source…

While at a political and command level it can be argued that RAF’s operations over Dieppe were viewed as a success, it is useful to see how those on the beach and on the supporting ships viewed it. Given that the RAF’s primary mission was air cover, their opinion helps to frame whether or not that support was successful from their perspective. The CMHQ reports compiled by C P Stacey form a useful basis for such an analysis.[1] In terms of air power, the views are mixed, varying from negative opinions on the issue of supporting bombardment to positive views on the overall impact of air power. For example, Captain G A Browne of the Royal Canadian Artillery, who served as a Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with the RRC, commented on the cancelling of the aerial bombardment to preserve the element of surprise that;

Further, is surprise easier to obtain, than the preparatory heavy air bombardment which in our case would quite probably have succeeded where surprise, or rather the hope of surprise, failed?[2]

This rather negative view can be contrasted with that of Lieutenant J E R Wood of the Royal Canadian Engineers, who was captured on RED/WHITE beach, commented after the war that

Some of our people later claimed they never saw the Air Force. Of course they didn’t. They were too busy up top keeping the Luftwaffe off us. I can truthfully say we were not machine gunned on that beach except by our own people after we’d folded up. That means the R.A.F. did its stuff.[3]

Two accounts highlight one of the key problems found during JUBILEE; the identification of friendly aircraft and friendly fire due to issues of command and control. Both Captain James Runcie of the QOCHC and Private Maier of the Essex Scottish both discuss the issue of friendly fire on Canadian positions on RED/WHITE beach.[4] However, neither account is critical of the RAF; for example, Maier noted that a late-arriving Landing Craft Tank caused the incident he witnessed, in his opinion.[5] All the force commanders in their reports highlighted the issue of recognition with Roberts noting that ‘A much higher standard of air recognition is required.’[6] This was reiterated by Hughes-Hallett in the ‘Lessons Learnt’ report.[7] The problem of control was noted in an army report in December, which praised the directing of close support aircraft, but noted that the delay imposed by the system then in place needed work.[8]

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[1] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 89 – The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Personal Stories of Participants, 31 December 1942; CMHQ Report No. 90 – The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Further Personal Stories of Participants, 18 February 1943; CMHQ Report No. 142 – Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42, Further New Information, 18 July 1945.

[2] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 89, p. A-9.

[3] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 142, para. 15.

[4] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 89, p. H-6; CMHQ Report No. 90, p. D-3.

[5] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 90, p. D-3.

[6] TNA, DEFE 2/551, The Dieppe Report (Combined Report,  October 1942), p. 143.

[7] TNA, ADM 239/350, Lessons Learnt, p. 1.

[8] TNA, WO 106/4195A, File 24 – Lessons to be Learned from the Dieppe Raid.

Some Concluding thoughts…

Here are some of my general thoughts on the effectiveness of the RAF during the raid on Dieppe. If I was to pull out one general point it would be that unlike what Mountbatten argued i.e that Dieppe provided vital lessons for OVERLORD, for the RAF Dieppe is one pillar of development that feeds in to 1943 but that it had to be understood in context with developments from other theatres.

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In the build up to and during JUBILEE, the RAF showed the degree to which as a service it was willing to integrate into Combined Operations. The fact that in the inter-war years the RAF called for a holistic Combined Operations doctrine illustrates that the RAF was aware of the need to consider inter-service cooperation on operations. That this did not happen was largely down to the other services, especially the RN which wished to keep the focus on amphibious operations. The RAF was aware of the key role it was to play in any Combined Operation and by the start of the war the pre-requisite of air superiority was accepted by all the services. By 1942, the RAF had made a vigorous attempt to integrate itself into the Combined Operations organisation with the setting up of No. 1441 Flight at the CTC. This would eventually become No. 105 Wing, which would have an important role in controlling the crews required for the HQS and FDTs from 1943 onwards. This organisation from 1942 onwards would train squadrons from Fighter, Bomber and Army Co-Operation Commands in the principles relating to the support of Combined Operations. This occurred alongside their normal operations with which they were tasked. That this occurred despite the protestations of Harris, illustrates the importance that the Air Staff placed upon integration and co-operation.

During the course of JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory, as the senior RAF officer, played a full part in the advising and operational decision-making process and during the course of the battle sought to control air operations with a representative onboard the HQS. That Leigh-Mallory was not on board himself highlights the difficulty of commanding air power and the need to be at a central command node to effectively control air assets. This would still be the overall situation in 1944, though eased by the development of the FDT. Leigh-Mallory also illustrated a willingness to work with Mountbatten on future operations when it showed the opportunity to attain his primary goal of air superiority, even though these would become strategic dead end.

The parallel development of Combined Operation doctrine and the operational objectives of Fighter Command merged to give that command its primary mission during JUBILEE. Normally viewed as a selfish act by the RAF, an understanding of Combined Operations doctrine shows that the opposite is actually the case. That the RAF’s view of the role of air superiority had developed to include fighter operations by the time of JUBILEE helps to explain its role. The fact that it aided its Fighter Command’s role in 1942 should not be seen negatively. It illustrates the flexibility of air power in the face of changing operational conditions. The need for air superiority from fighter aircraft had been illustrated in numerous campaigns before JUBILEE, prevented German attempts to gain air superiority in 1940.

That the RAF’s modus operandi during JUBILEE fitted in with Fighter Commands role should as be noted viewed positively. The RAF was seeking to do its best to prevent the Luftwaffe from interfering with the operation. In this, it was generally successful. That the RAF suffered more than the Luftwaffe is not an indication that it was out fought on the day as the detailed analysis above illustrates that many of the airframes were returned to service and many pilots were rescued. This would be a telling factor for the Luftwaffe whose inability to replace losses would cost them in the air battles of the 1943 and 1944. However, the RAF was able to maintain and effective strength in 1943 with a well-trained cadre of pilots. The Luftwaffe was not able to do from 1942 onwards due to poor training and the high rate of losses it was suffering on all fronts.

Possibly the one area where problems occurred in the aftermath of JUBILEE was in the belief held by Leigh-Mallory and Mountbatten that a similar operation could be launched in order to wear down the Luftwaffe by forcing it to fight, even the RAF was forced to admit that the method was a one shot strategy and without the actual landing of significant forces there was unlikely to be a repeat performance. However, given the strategic situation of late 1942 and early 1943 it was perhaps not wrong for it to be tried. Both AFLAME and COLEMAN were strategic dead ends and this was realised by members of the Air Staff who vetoed the operations as far as they could. That they stayed on the agenda may well be explained by Mountbatten’s attempts to garner more power for COHQ, as was seen in the preparation for JUBILEE. However, Leigh-Mallory must not be excused for not seeing the fallacy of this strategy. Despite the failures of late 1942 the strategy was revived as part of deception plans in 1943, however, once again it did not succeed in the aim of bringing the Luftwaffe to battle.

In terms of the direct impact of air power on JUBILEE, it can be argued that with the exception of the loss of HMS Berkeley and some landing craft the cover provided by Fighter Command was useful in preventing the full weight of the Luftwaffe attacking the beaches. It was noted by eyewitness that some of the losses, while regrettable, were not the fault of the RAF as in the midst of battle craft were arriving late and caught in the maelstrom. The loss of HMS Berkeley was primarily the fault of the failure of command and control systems then in place to deal with RAF aircraft flying below three thousand feet. This meant that Luftwaffe aircraft under this height became the RN’s responsiblity, therefore, the loss must be put down to the RN’s AA defences. In general, the direct support provided was very useful. For example, the attacks on the Hess Battery aided No.4 Commando’s operation. Smoke laying was found to be very useful and was most welcome in the withdrawal phase of JUBILEE. The most disappointing aspect was the provision of Tac R which were left with little to do, as the Germans did not send in reserves. However, the battle was costly for the RAF, with aircraft on the direct support mission suffering the most. Nevertheless, the RAF was willing to accept these losses.

Traditional arguments relating to the effectiveness of JUBILEE usually relate to its importance in providing lessons that contributed to the success of OVERLORD. This is certainly the argument made by Mountbatten in his later life and supported by Hughes-Hallett. From an air power perspective, it is hard to support this position. That JUBILEE served a purpose is certainly true. It fitted in with the prevailing view of air power in support of Combined Operations and aided Fighter Command’s key operational objectives; however, these lessons did not last into 1944. By 1943, it became apparent to the Allies that the battle for air superiority in preparation for OVERLORD would have to be fought closer to Germany and due to the technical limitation of Fighter Command’s equipment; this battle would be primarily fought by the 8AAF.

Therefore, if the lessons of JUBILEE were not important in the preparation for OVERLORD, were they as useful elsewhere? The answer to this is that JUBILEE’s importance lay in the impact it had upon events in 1943. JUBILEE acted as an enabler of change. It illustrated problems that had to be resolved if air power was to be fully effective in Combined Operations. The problems the occurred in the command and control of air power during JUBILEE, noticeably the loss of HMS Berkeley, led to the development and refinement of a command and control system that played a useful role in the Mediterranean and come to fruition at Normandy. Had the war gone on beyond 1945 it is also likely that the further development of the FDT concept into ocean going FDS would have been useful to SEAC. The ability to control air power within the area of fleet AA defence during OVERLORD overcame the primary problem encountered during JUBILEE.

JUBILEE also illustrated the need for some form of aerial bombardment in support of Combined Operations, though its exclusion was for valid reasons. In order to deal with this contentious issue, as illustrated by Harris’ unwillingness to allow Bomber Command aircraft to bomb civilian targets in France, the formation of the inter-service committee on fire support was encouraged by discussions emanating from JUBILEE. This committee, led by the RAF examined the issue and made suggestions that would aid the planners of OVERLORD where aerial bombardment was used fully. Indeed the choice of Graham as chair was a perceptible one due to his pre-war experience in Combined Operations doctrine. However, as JUBILEE was an enabler it should be recognised that much practical experience in this issue and the development of the FDT concept came from the Mediterranean, which proved to be a training ground for ideas being developed. The Graham Report that appeared in December 1943 would form one source of information for the planners of OVERLORD. In providing this source of information the RAF illustrated its flexibility and willingness to work with other services on joint issues.

The thesis has sought to re-frame the debate surrounding the RAF at Dieppe by taking a progressive examination of both its operational and doctrinal context. Then it has sought to examine what impact JUBILEE had on air power in Combined Operations. Generally, it can be argued the RAF performed well on the day and that while losses were high these were either replaceable or repairable. Its impact upon on the Luftwaffe is more difficult but it can be said that their losses were more difficult to replace. While losses to the assault force occurred, it can be argued that had the RAF not been fighting for air superiority, thus, providing air cover, they would have been worse. The impact of JUBILEE on future operations is more difficult to assess. Certainly JUBILEE enabled discussions to occur but whether this had a direct link to OVERLORD is debatable given the vast amount of experience be gained in the Mediterranean. Thus, this thesis has hopefully refocused the debate on JUBILEE to an examination of the operational effectiveness of the RAF and the impact on developments in 1943 not 1944.

Additions to the Library

A few additions to the library this past week.

Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (Macmillan, 1989). A useful analysis on the limit of airpower as a coercive weapons. Also fits in with my recent foray into the Vietnam War.

Randall T Wakelam, The Science of Bombing: Operations Research in RAF Bomber Command (University of Toronto Press, 2009). Hopefully a work that will explore the use of operational research in informing the use of Bomber Command during the Second World War. I wait to see what it adds to the debates surrounding the effectiveness of Bomber Command. Useful I suspect for anyone teaching this subject.

Robert Kershaw, Tank Men: The Human Story of Tanks at War (Hodder, 2009). A history of the men who crewed these vehicle and their thoughts about their lives.

Lloyd Clark, Arnhem: Jumping the Rhine, 1944 and 1945 (Headline, 2009). Another history of Arnhem but one that also looks at the use of airborne forces in crossing the Rhine as it examine Operation VARSITY too. A useful addition to the historiography of Arnhem and airborne warfare.

Well I had to indulge it is my birthday!

Raiding as an Intruder Strategy, 1942-1943

Another section of my thesis. This concentrates of the efficacy of the policy of using raids as the basis of the the intruder startegy.

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The perceived success of Operation JUBILEE would lead to the belief that raids would bring the Luftwaffe to fight, therefore, producing the means to battle them for air superiority over Northern France. In many respects, the emergence of this strategy, at the behest of Leigh-Mallory who in November 1942 replaced Douglas as AOC-in-C of Fighter Command, can be seen as a continuation of the offensive fighter sweep policy that was Fighter Commands main role in the 1941-1942. In conjunction with the developments that were to come into being in 1943, this scheme of combining raids with an attempt at offensive air action would become an important element of Operation COCKADE; the elaborate camouflage and deception plan aimed at keeping the German guessing as to when and where an invasion would take place.[1] In the year after JUBILEE, there would be various attempts at launching such scheme with varying degrees of success. The three main operation that made it as far as the planning stage, and one would take place, albeit in a slightly different form, were Operations AFLAME, COLEMAN and STARKEY.

As early as 22 August 1942 Leigh-Mallory was writing to Mountbatten saying that ‘I feel that we might profitably conduct a future operation on rather different lines.’[2] In terms of ‘different lines’ Leigh-Mallory suggested the use of commando’s as the assaulting force and in particular he cites the tactical success of Lord Lovat’s No. 4 Commando against the Hess Battery during JUBILEE.[3] Leigh-Mallory contends that one of the disappointing aspects of JUBILEE was the paucity of opportunity for his close support squadrons to attack German reserves, as they were not thrown into the battle. He argued that if a small force were landed on a quiet stretch of coast then this would force the German’s to utilise reserves, therefore, allowing his close support squadron the opportunity to inflict ‘heavy casualties’ upon the enemy.[4] He also noted the role that this type of operation would play in the conduct of the war as a whole as it would aid in the general degradation of the Luftwaffe’s striking force and would contribute to its final defeat.[5] Based upon the information then available to Leigh-Mallory these conclusions are hard to fault, however, it should be considered that in order to reproduce the effect that he was thinking about then a large fighter force relative to the size of the operation would have to be provided to protect the direct support aircraft that were to support the assaulting force. He also fails to appreciate that the sizes of the assaulting force would have to be of such a large size in order to draw in German reserve. Considering that this did not occur at Dieppe it is hard to see what effect a single commando unit would have upon German reserves in order to achieve the effect that Leigh-Mallory was seeking.

However, despite this failure to understand the military requirement of such an operation the idea obviously received the support on Mountbatten who convened a meeting on 7 September at COHQ to examine the feasibility of such an operation.[6] At this meeting, it was outline that the primary purpose of the operation was to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. In terms of naval support it was proposed that a similar number of Hunt class destroyers as used at Dieppe be utilised, however, there was no discussion of ground forces to be used. It was decided, however, that the plan appeared sound and that planning should proceed with the plan to put to the Chiefs of Staff and another meeting to be held on 17 September.[7] Mountbatten submitted a minute to the Chiefs of Staff on 16 September outlining the operation. In this minute, Mountbatten made the claim that it may not even be necessary to land any troops in order to bring the Luftwaffe to battle.[8] Again, it is hard to see the reasoning for this claim based upon the experience of JUBILEE. Despite this Mountbatten also made the claim that AFLAME may have a larger strategic role to play as part of Operation OVERTHROW, the deception plan for Operation TORCH assuming that approval was forthcoming in order to allow the operation to take place in October.[9]

From an air power perspective it is hard to ignore the fact that it appear that Dieppe had been an unqualified success when Leigh-Mallory received reports stating that the Germans were in the process of reinforcing certain position along the French and Norwegian coastline.[10] However, by the time of the second planning meeting Mountbatten had decided that no military force would be landed and that he was seeking the use of a light cruiser from the Admiralty in order to add to the deception. This brought concerns from Leigh-Mallory representative, Air Commodore Harcourt-Smith, who stated that the deception provided had to be strong enough to bring the Luftwaffe to battle; the primary objective of the operation.[11] In order to aid the deception plan it was again decided to make use of a small force of bombers on the night preceding the operation and to make use of dummy parachutists in order to convince the Germans of the operation veracity.[12] In terms of the support to be provided by Bomber Command Air Chief Marshal Harris was supportive but asked that the targets were both more realistic considering the lack of success during JUBILEE and also less politically sensitive. As Harris pointed out to Douglas, his directive from the War Cabinet dictated that only strictly military targets are attacked in occupied territory.[13] Douglas pointed this out to Leigh-Mallory in letter on 26 September, which garnered a response that stated that the suggestions made by Harris had already by considered and rejected and that in particular the bombing of docks was something that the Germans were used to, and unlikely to achieve the results desired.[14] It is evident that despite Harris’ rational objection the nature of the deception bombardment did not change and the town of Berck remained its target.[15] On this issue, Harris received the support of Douglas who laid the fault for this situation at Mountbatten over zealous attitude and hoped that Harris would still ‘play.’[16] ALFLAME was scheduled to take place between 4 and 16 October depending on the weather and primarily it was seen as a virtual repeat of JUBILEE without the ground forces.[17] Thankfully, however, the weather did play its part and ALFAME was postponed indefinitely. It is hard to see how the force involved could have induced the Luftwaffe to come to battle with the RAF. However, this did not stop planning for a similar operation-taking place.

By early October, Mountbatten was again seeking authorisation launch an operation with the objective of inducing a favourable air battle for Fighter Command.[18] In his covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten admits to the operation being similar in conception to AFLAME, therefore, by default JUBILEE, and that it were complementary to the ongoing CROSSBOW deception for Operation TORCH.[19] In effect, many elements that were prevalent in the planning for AFLAME re-appear in COLEMAN such as Mountbatten insistence that night bombing was vital to the operations success. In preparation for the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 22 October to consider the plan ACAS (P) was asked to prepare a summary of the viability of the operation. To enable this to occur both the Directors of Fighter and Bomber Operations were asked for their comments on the plan.[20] The memorandums illustrate the difficulties of inter-service co-operation. The Director of Fighter Operation (DFO) commented that the plan produced by Mountbatten illustrated the usual ‘…hurried sort of operation…’ that he had become known for.[21] The DFO noted that in his covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff he claimed to have had discussions with the heads of Fighter and Bomber Command about the operation. However, the DFO notes that this was certainly not the case with Harris who had first heard of the plan on 19 October when he was asked to examine the outline plan.[22] DFO does not refer to Douglas or Leigh-Mallory, who due to their involvement with AFLAME, were most likely aware of plans to re-launch it. Despite this the tone of the memorandum is one of frustration at Mountbatten’s tactics in trying to force the operation through the planning and approval process without due diligence of the procedures; an issues that was prevalent during the decision to re-launch Dieppe.[23] The DFO noted that if Mountbatten wanted the support of the RAF he should be careful to work within the appropriate channels.[24] The Director of Bomber Operations (DBO) backs this up by confirming that until 19 October no one at Bomber Command had seen the plan. In veiled terms, DBO claims that Mountbatten lied on the outline to the Chiefs of Staff.[25] This was of course a major issue for commands who were involved in constant operations. However, this was not, as already noted, the first time Mountbatten had attempted to circumvent the system, however, the opinions of the DFO and DBO would be brought forward to the Chiefs of Staff through the memorandum prepared by ACAS (P) for the 22 October meeting.[26]

At an operational level both DFO and DBO were concerned about the timings and appropriateness of the operation. The DFO noted that from Fighter Command’s perspective the decision to seek a battle for aerial superiority was a good idea, however, prevailing weather condition for November, when the operation was due to take place, would not aid the aim of the operation.[27] DFO was particularly concerned about the affect the weather would have on issues such as bombing accuracy and the fact that cloudy conditions would hinder offensive fighter operation due to the enemy’s ability to use cloud cover to escape.[28] DFO was also concerned about the level of support that Mountbatten was expecting from No. 2 Group’s light bombers and it was pointed out that support from the Americans would be needed and that even if this were possible high casualties were to be expected.[29] This was supported by the DBO who pointed out that at Dieppe the limited actions of No. 2 Group had caused a high rate of wastage and that if the required numbers could be collected then the same would occur.[30] On the issue of night bombing, the DBO re-iterated the concerns that Harris raised during AFLAME over the issue accuracy and civilian casualties. DBO contended that given the probable weather conditions night bombing should be considered incidental to the operation.[31] These views were summarised by ACAS (P) and submitted to the Chiefs of Staff for consideration with the caveat that the plan was a weak one given the prevailing operational issues that faced the air force in an attempt to gain a favourable victory.[32] In the aftermath of this appreciation and the Chiefs OF Staff meeting on 23 October Mountbatten was ordered to re-evaluate the plan in light of the navy’s decision not to provide him with six Hunt class destroyers and Portal’s decision to not allow fighter aircraft for close support operations.[33] Therefore, by late 1942 the attempt to draw the Luftwaffe to battle using raiding as bait for air action had ended. In many respects in highlighted a strategic dead-end, though not one that was not worth examining. Dieppe was in many respects the intruder strategy of 1941 writ large, therefore, the AFLAME and COLEMAN can be considered Dieppe writ large. However, they illustrate the degree to which Dieppe had been a one shot operation and that the likelihood of success a second time was unlikely especially so soon after Dieppe given the prevailing operational condition of the time.

Despite the apparent failure of using raiding as a means to bring the Luftwaffe to battle, due to opposition and unsatisfactory conditions, this strategy would receive renewed vigour under the auspicious of the planning for the invasion of Europe during 1943. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, discussion took place concerning the nature of operation during the forthcoming year. In a report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was decided that there were three possibilities for cross-channel operations during 1943. These were categorised as raids, operations with the purpose of seizing a bridgehead and an uncontested return to the continent.[34] The purpose of any future raids was described as provoking a major air battle and inflicting causalities on the enemy, therefore, a degree of continuity can be seen in the planning of raids in late 1942 and in 1943.[35] These proposed operations would eventually evolve into Operations COCKADE, OVERLORD and RANKIN.[36] It was assumed that by August 1943 there would be sufficient air power resources for the purpose of either of these operations, however, it was noted that the home based operational commands of the RAF would require re-organisation in order to make offensive air operations more effective.[37] This re-organisation, based on lessons in Europe and out in the Mediterranean, would lead to the eventual formation of the RAF’s 2^nd Tactical Air Force. In a report by the Combined Commanders to the Chiefs of Staff, it was made clear that from an air power perspective it was crucial that sufficient aircraft were available for maintaining air superiority.[38]

A key element in the preparations for the invasion of Europe was Operation COCKADE, which was conceived as a deception plan with the purpose of pinning German forces in the west for fear of possible large-scale operations against the continent.[39] COCKADE consisted of three subsidiary operations, STARKEY, WADHAM and TINDALL. Both STARKEY and WADHAM were to be inter-dependent with STARKEY acting as the main assault and WADHAM as a follow-on force landing on the Brittany peninsula.[40] Of these operations STARKEY is most important for consideration in this thesis as inherent to it planning was the desire to draw the Luftwaffe to battle.[41] The outline plan for STARKEY noted that it was ‘…primarily designed to compel the German Air Force over a prolonged period to engage in air battles of attrition…’[42] Thus, it becomes apparent that in terms of effectively deceiving the German of the Allies intentions in 1943 raiding with the purpose of forcing an air battle had become an important element of preparations for the invasion. In its basic conception, STARKEY sought to feign the movement of a large number of troops and to suggest to the Germans that a major operation was to take place in the area of Boulogne. As these movement took place a crescendo of air operations would take place in the vicinity in an attempt o bring the Luftwaffe to battle. Then in the final phase of the operation, it was intended to demonstrate amphibious force of the French coast but not to actually land them. In all the operation, unlike JUBILEE, was to last for a period of three weeks with air operations reaching their peak by early September 1943.[43] As with previous planned operations and JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory, now promoted Air Marshal and AOC-in-C Fighter Command, was to take control of the air force during the operation. Due to the planned scale of STARKEY, planning was spread over several months from March to August 1943. The air plan called for the use of significant amount of Allied air power from both the RAF and the United States Army Air Force. In this respect General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Army Air Force (8AAF), aided Leigh-Mallory in the planning process.[44] From an air power perspective, the planning for STARKEY was similar in many respects to the operation that had gone before it. This should come as no surprise due to the involvement of Leigh-Mallory. However, one area where it did divert from previous operations was in the use of large numbers of bombers. Previously issues over accuracy and the possibility of civilian casualties had led to the abandonment of their use. However, at the time of JUBILEE, this was not considered a major issue due to the factor of tactical surprise. Yet for STARKEY their use was considered vitally important to the deception plan. This does not mean that there were not questions raised over the use of bombers. Harris again questioned the viability noting that the initial level of bomber support to be provided was ‘…just the sort of thing an idol army dotes on…’ he was supported in this view by Eaker who was not willing to waver from the Pointblank Directive that had been issued to both himself and Harris.[45] Thus, while bomber forces were to be used they were not used on the levels intended.

The air plan called for three phases of operations, first, the preliminary phase was to call for the reinforcement of Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group between 16 and 24 August, second, the preparatory phase called for a increase in operation with reconnaissance over the target area and bombardment of key installations between 25 August and 7 September, finally, the culminating phase called continually attacks on vital installation such as coastal batteries in preparation for the sailing of the naval force that was to demonstrate of Boulogne. The naval force was to be protected by an air umbrella in an attempt to lure the Luftwaffe up.[46] As already, noted significant forces were tasked to take part in STARKEY with No. 11 Group reinforced to seventy-two squadrons. For the culminating phase by 8AAF and Bomber Command, promised three hundred sorties each when available.[47] The issues of availability came around because Bomber Command had just begun its assault upon Berlin, thus, Harris complained to the Chiefs of Staff that this interfered with his primary mission. However, he was ordered to make a portion of aircraft available for STARKEY, thus illustrating the importance placed on this operation.[48]

In general operation proceeded as planned over the period of the operation and during the period of D-Day, 7/8 September Fighter Command flew some seventeen hundred sorties on fighter cover duties. Despite the air effort the Germans did not respond in the manner hoped for with only small forces engaging the attacking bombers and fighters that were over the battlespace. By this time, the Luftwaffe in northern France had standing orders to avoid combat where numbers were unadvantageous and the Air Historical Branch narrative comments this was probably a lesson learnt from Dieppe.[49] However, despite this apparent disappointment, lessons were learnt and they were able to be refined in preparation for the invasion in 1944. Much like at Dieppe concerns were still being uttered concerning the command and control of forces during the operation. It was noted that the Headquarters ship was not positioned advantageously for the control of fighters and that communications with airfields was far from good. This was an issue, as seen below, that was already being examined in light of Dieppe and operation elsewhere. It was also noted that in terms of strategic reconnaissance for the operation had been inadequate had this been an active operation.[50]

In other areas, STARKEY aided allied preparations for Normandy, for example, in the area of deception, Campbell has argued that lessons learnt during STARKEY affected FORTITUDE SOUTH. It had been intended that FORTITUDE SOUTH take a similar form to STARKEY but upon examining the results of STARKEY this plan was revised.[51] The issue of bombing during STARKEY has remained a point of contention with Cumming’s work concentrating on this aspect of the operation.[52] Considering the similarities between JUBILEE and STARKEY and the key issue raised by Villa over the lack of aerial bombardment, it is interesting to compare this with a work that is at odds with the efficacy of bombing. A possible explanation for this divergence arrives from the issue that unlike JUBILEE STARKEY did not actually land any troops, therefore, for it is difficult to understand there use. However, despite this, there is a link between doctrine, which did state bombardment should be used where possible but was not an overriding concern, and attempts to consider the use of bombing in raids such as STARKEY after Dieppe. From an air power perspective, STARKEY helped shake the belief that air superiority could be won over the invasion area during the operation, a belief that had existed from Dieppe in 1942 and exemplified in the planned operations of that autumn.[53] This led to the precondition that air superiority was a direct pre-requisite for OVERLORD’s success. Thus, by 1943 it can be contended that the attempts at combining feint raids with the desire to engage the Luftwaffe had not had the effect of drawing down German strength but had instead aided in learning lessons for 1944 in the area of deception and the necessity of air superiority. In many respects, the issue of air superiority had long been understood and that operational experience brought home the realties of inter-war doctrine of its importance in Combined Operations. For example, the Manual of Combined Operations had noted that where possible and using advanced landing ground air superiority should be gained in advance of any planned operation.[54]

 

---

[1] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘The Air Defence of Great Britain: Vol. V – The Struggle for Air Supremacy, January 1942 – May 1945’ p. 274

[2] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[3] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[4] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[5] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[6] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 1A – Minutes of Meeting to Consider Operation “AFLAME”’ 7 September 1942

[7] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 1A – Minutes of Meeting to Consider Operation “AFLAME”’ 7 September 1942

[8] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Minute to the Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Combined Operation reference Operation AFLAME’ 16 September 1942

[9] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Minute to the Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Combined Operation reference Operation AFLAME’ 16 September 1942

[10] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 3A – Message from COHQ to Leigh-Mallory’ 18 September 1942

[11] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 4A – Minutes of a Meeting of the Force Commanders of Operation “AFLAME”’ 17 September 1942, p. 2

[12] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 6A – Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 23 September 1942

[13] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 11B – Letter from Harris, AOC-in-C Bomber Command, to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 25 September

[14] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 11A – Letter from Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command, to Leigh-Mallory’ 26 September 1942; AIR 16/762 ‘File 12A – Letter from 11 Group to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 28 September 1942

[15] TNA, AIR 16/763 ‘Operation “AFLAME’ – Royal Air Force Operation Order No. 1’ p. 1

[16] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 13A – Letter from Harris, AOC-in-C Bomber Command, to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 30 September 1942

[17] TNA, AIR 16/763 ‘Operation “AFLAME’ – Royal Air Force Operation Order No. 1’ p. 1

[18] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Operation “COLEMAN” – Outline of the Operation’ 18 October 1942

[19] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Covering Letter to Outline of Operation “COLEMAN”’ 18 October 1942

[20] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942; AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942

[21] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[22] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[23] On the issue of re-launching Dieppe and Mountbatten’s role in changing procedure see, Peter Henshaw, ‘The British Chief of Staff Committee and the Preparation of the Dieppe raid, March-August 1942: Did Mountbatten really evade the Committee’s authority?’ War in History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 197-214

[24] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[25] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942

[26] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Memorandum by ACAS (P) on Operation “COLEMAN” for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting on 22 October 1942’ 20 October 1942, p. 1

[27] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2

[28] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, pp. 1-2

[29] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[30] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2

[31] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2

[32] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Memorandum by ACAS (P) on Operation “COLEMAN” for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting on 22 October 1942’ 20 October 1942, p. 2

[33] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Extract from the Chiefs of Staff’s 239^th Meeting, 23^rd October’ 24 October 1942

[34] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 1

[35] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 1

[36] John Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY, 1943: ‘A Piece of Harmless Playacting’?’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1987) p. 92

[37] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 2

[38] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the Combined Commanders – Some Basic Factors Concerning and Opposed Landing in France and the Low Countries’ 22 March 1943, p. 1

[39] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 274

[40] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 93; TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 274

[41] The most useful works on STARKEY are, Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ and Michael Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice: The Allied Bombing of Le Portel, 1943 (Stroud: Sutton, 1996)

[42] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, p. 1

[43] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 275; AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 1-2; Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice, pp. 25-31

[44] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 275

[45] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ pp. 95-96

[46] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 2-3

[47] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Appendix ‘A’ – STARKEY Order of Battle in Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 1-4

[48] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 276

[49] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 280

[50] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp.28-30

[51] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 107

[52] Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice, passim

[53] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 107

[54] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 121

Hawker Hurricane II

I have been playing around a bit more and have now figured out how to insert video.

This is an interesting piece from the Second World War showing the new Hawker Hurricane II in mock combat with a captured Junkers Ju88. It also has some interest shots of attacks against shipping in the channel

An update…

I have been away from the blogoshpehere for a while because of various reasons. The most pressing of which has been my work. It is that time of year again in education and I have been busy marking coursework for submission and preparing and running revision sessions. I sure some of you can imaging the joy of marking the same 3,000 word essay over and over again. The other pressing reasons was because I was preparing a symposium paper for uni and preparing a submission for a conference that is coming up in July. Also I have been trawling through the 2000 or so pics I took at the National Archives at Easter.

My symposium paper, delivered at the Postgraduate Symposium for the Centres for First and Second World War Studies, was entitled ‘The Embattled History of Operation JUBILEE.’ The paper sought to explore some of the various reasons why the writing about the raid on Dieppe has been so divisive over the past sixty years. As I mentioned at the symposium if one does a search on the British Library database for Dieppe Raid it brings up about 30 books dedicated to the raid. This is quite a lot for an operation that did not even last a full day. If we compare it the Normandy Campaign that has about 330 books dedicated to it and that is a 90 day campaign. Also we must bare in mind that many of these books on Normandy will also include a discussion of Dieppe as the traditional argument for the raids purpose was as a necessary precursor for OVERLORD. I brought out several stands which for me showed the problems that have surrounded the writing about the raid. These were as follow: (Sorry Gavin should have written this early to go in the carnival!!)

• Nationalism

This concentrated on the role nationalism play in forming our national myths and in particular I concentrated on the role that C P Stacey had played in forming the national myths of Canada in his CMHQ reports and the Canadian official history. I also touched upon some of the difference between the accounts of Canadian historians and British historians.

• Narrative Vs. Analytical

This area detailed some of the critical difference that have occurred over the writing of the raid. The most notable difference is the the narrative works details the actions of the raid where as the analytical works only deal with issues of planning and the aftermath of the raid. As such we still do not have a holistic work of the raid that merges both the planning issue and the operational and tactical problems occurred during the the operation.

• Amateur Historian Vs. Professional Historian

This then led me on to consider why this has happen and in my eyes the difference comes very much from the audience the works have been written for and by whom. The narrative works, going all the way back to the early piece written after the raid, have tended to be written by non-academics, and in many cases journalists, this has show up in the concentration on the ‘face’ and experience of the battle and skimping over some of the larger issues. For the more analytical pieces there has been a tendency to concentrate on documentary evidence and the use of sources to come up with an analysis of the raid. Thus, there remains a dichotomy between the two strands and in my minds brings up the questions of is it the case that the narrative historians have produced that type of work because a lack of training?

• Official Vs. Revisionist

I also explored the problems that occurred when writing about the raid and the pressure placed upon the official historians by Mountbatten to produce his version of events and the control he placed over the Ministry of Information over the writing of the Combined Operations pamphlet in 1943. This is a position that has now been heavily challenged by historians.

I finished the piece by looking at some of the operational issue that came out of the raid and the posited the questions of whether there was a need for another analysis of the raid, thus, playing devils advocate to my own thesis. Obviously, my answer is yes, as there is a need for a more operationally orientated history. Hopefully more people will agree with this.

Of the other papers at the symposium 2 that I really enjoyed were Air Commodore Peter Gray’s piece of Strategic Leadership in Bomber Command. Peter is trying to create an understanding of the relationship between Harris and his superiors using contemporary leadership theory and pushing this theory further by utilising a historical case study. Also I enjoyed Trevor Harvey’s piece on the formation of the CEF in the First World War. This was particular interesting because of my discussion of Canadian nationalism in the planning of Dieppe. This theme also resonates in Trevor’s piece with relation to the formation of the CEF.

The other thing that I have been playing with was a submission for a paper for an upcoming conference at KCL and the IWM in July. The conference is on Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942 – 1945. The conference will explore the following key themes:

Tactical effectiveness: doctrine, training and experience; combined arms tactics; urban and mountain warfare; technology; morale and combat psychology.

Operational art; command, control and communications; logistics.

The war in the air: the counter-air battle, the employment of tactical airpower; the effectiveness of air-to-ground operations.

Naval operations, specifically the development and evolution of amphibious technique.

Intelligence, propaganda, partisans and irregular warfare.

Inter-Allied cooperation and aspects of coalition warfare.

I put a proposal in entitled ‘A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation: The Western Desert Air Force and the Battle of the Mareth Line, 19 – 29 March 1943′ I am pleased to say it was accepted so I have now got to prepare that. I hope to explore the following key issues:

• To examine the role the Western Desert Air Force (WDAF) played in Operations PUGILIST and SUPERCHARGE II
• To understand the affect that WDAF planning had upon the conduct second half of the battle around the Mareth Line, Operation SUPERCHARGE II
• To examine the operations in their operational and tactical context
• To examine the affect of the operations on the future conduct of the air war, specifically in North-West Europe

I have obviously continued buying and these are some of the more recent title that have landed on my doorstep, I must get another bookshelf at some point.

1. Richard Overy The Air War, 1939 – 1945
2. C P Stacey Six Years of War
3. Henry Probert “Bomber” Harris
4. David Mets and Harold Winton (Eds.) The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941
5. Randolph Bradham To the Last Man: The Battle for Normandy’s Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany
6. Hugh Henry Dieppe Through the Lens of the German War Photographer
7. William Slim Unofficial History
8. James Corum The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-40
9. Geoffrey Till (Ed.) The Development of British Naval Thinking

Blogging the Second World War

I have just gotten involved with a new project led by Jeff Demers called Blogging the Second World War. It was announced on H-War last November and I am pleased to be getting involved with this new venture in Second World War history. It is a new way of promoting scholarly debate and discussion and should be supported by both academic and non-academics alike. Many of us run blogs but unfortunately they are sideshows to our main research. However, this blog is being funded and supported, which is a very positive sign. The first post should be going up very soon.

Jeff has stated that:

The goal of the project will be to create an on-line community (and presence) that promotes the study of the war and tracks the latest trends in research. The website will feature book, film and journal reviews, insights into ongoing scholarly debates, explorations of contributors’ research, and general commentary on a whole host of issues relevant to the study of the war.

War Cemetries

On a recent trip to Northern France with the RAF I got the opportunity to visit a German Military Cemetery. This is something, which I have not had the chance to do before and the difference between British, American and German cemeteries of the Second World War is quite stark. I think that the design and layout of these cemeteries tend to reflect our national opinion on the war itself.

American cemeteries are managed by the American Battle Monument Commission and there are only 24 cemeteries worldwide. The reason for this is that the American policy is to place as many dead soldiers in one big cemetery as exemplified by the Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial. This is extremely triumphalist in design. Not only is it large with 9387 graves but there is a grand memorial to the war. To me this represents the American image of their war and their victory and that they wish to celebrate it as much as possible, similar to how the Second World War is portrayed in Hollywood films. While this is no bad thing I do believe it is representative of the American image of the Second World War.

British war graves are maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and certainly in terms of the Second World War the British policy is to bury soldiers as near to where they fell as possible this has lead to there being 116 graves in the Calvados region. Many of these cemeteries are quite small. The biggest is Bayeux with over 3000 graves. To me this shows the understated nature of British remembrance to the Second World War. It represents the idea that it was a war we had to fight but not one that was any good for the nation. There are no grand monuments to the war. Yes there are some monuments but nothing that is similar to the American cemetery over Omaha.

 

The most stark example of the national attitude to the war must come from the few German cemeteries in France. When in Normandy I had opportunity to visit the cemetery at Maringy. It was very sombre and understated with the cemetery itself encased in trees so that it can not be seen from the road. There is nothing triumphalist about this in the least. It almost says to the visit that we are sorry that we are here and to that end the cemetery tries to make as little impact upon the landscape as possible as the photos show of the grave stone. It was quite an experience. 

 

 

 

This is an interesting topic, which I think needs to be explored more. Quite a lot has been written on the subject with reference to the First Worlds War but I do think that memory and memorialising needs to be examined in the context of the Second World War.

Commonwealth War Graves Commission – www.cwgc.org

American Battle Monuments Commission – www.abmc.gov

German War Graves Commission (Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge) – http://www.volksbund.de/