Some Concluding thoughts…

Here are some of my general thoughts on the effectiveness of the RAF during the raid on Dieppe. If I was to pull out one general point it would be that unlike what Mountbatten argued i.e that Dieppe provided vital lessons for OVERLORD, for the RAF Dieppe is one pillar of development that feeds in to 1943 but that it had to be understood in context with developments from other theatres.

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In the build up to and during JUBILEE, the RAF showed the degree to which as a service it was willing to integrate into Combined Operations. The fact that in the inter-war years the RAF called for a holistic Combined Operations doctrine illustrates that the RAF was aware of the need to consider inter-service cooperation on operations. That this did not happen was largely down to the other services, especially the RN which wished to keep the focus on amphibious operations. The RAF was aware of the key role it was to play in any Combined Operation and by the start of the war the pre-requisite of air superiority was accepted by all the services. By 1942, the RAF had made a vigorous attempt to integrate itself into the Combined Operations organisation with the setting up of No. 1441 Flight at the CTC. This would eventually become No. 105 Wing, which would have an important role in controlling the crews required for the HQS and FDTs from 1943 onwards. This organisation from 1942 onwards would train squadrons from Fighter, Bomber and Army Co-Operation Commands in the principles relating to the support of Combined Operations. This occurred alongside their normal operations with which they were tasked. That this occurred despite the protestations of Harris, illustrates the importance that the Air Staff placed upon integration and co-operation.

During the course of JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory, as the senior RAF officer, played a full part in the advising and operational decision-making process and during the course of the battle sought to control air operations with a representative onboard the HQS. That Leigh-Mallory was not on board himself highlights the difficulty of commanding air power and the need to be at a central command node to effectively control air assets. This would still be the overall situation in 1944, though eased by the development of the FDT. Leigh-Mallory also illustrated a willingness to work with Mountbatten on future operations when it showed the opportunity to attain his primary goal of air superiority, even though these would become strategic dead end.

The parallel development of Combined Operation doctrine and the operational objectives of Fighter Command merged to give that command its primary mission during JUBILEE. Normally viewed as a selfish act by the RAF, an understanding of Combined Operations doctrine shows that the opposite is actually the case. That the RAF’s view of the role of air superiority had developed to include fighter operations by the time of JUBILEE helps to explain its role. The fact that it aided its Fighter Command’s role in 1942 should not be seen negatively. It illustrates the flexibility of air power in the face of changing operational conditions. The need for air superiority from fighter aircraft had been illustrated in numerous campaigns before JUBILEE, prevented German attempts to gain air superiority in 1940.

That the RAF’s modus operandi during JUBILEE fitted in with Fighter Commands role should as be noted viewed positively. The RAF was seeking to do its best to prevent the Luftwaffe from interfering with the operation. In this, it was generally successful. That the RAF suffered more than the Luftwaffe is not an indication that it was out fought on the day as the detailed analysis above illustrates that many of the airframes were returned to service and many pilots were rescued. This would be a telling factor for the Luftwaffe whose inability to replace losses would cost them in the air battles of the 1943 and 1944. However, the RAF was able to maintain and effective strength in 1943 with a well-trained cadre of pilots. The Luftwaffe was not able to do from 1942 onwards due to poor training and the high rate of losses it was suffering on all fronts.

Possibly the one area where problems occurred in the aftermath of JUBILEE was in the belief held by Leigh-Mallory and Mountbatten that a similar operation could be launched in order to wear down the Luftwaffe by forcing it to fight, even the RAF was forced to admit that the method was a one shot strategy and without the actual landing of significant forces there was unlikely to be a repeat performance. However, given the strategic situation of late 1942 and early 1943 it was perhaps not wrong for it to be tried. Both AFLAME and COLEMAN were strategic dead ends and this was realised by members of the Air Staff who vetoed the operations as far as they could. That they stayed on the agenda may well be explained by Mountbatten’s attempts to garner more power for COHQ, as was seen in the preparation for JUBILEE. However, Leigh-Mallory must not be excused for not seeing the fallacy of this strategy. Despite the failures of late 1942 the strategy was revived as part of deception plans in 1943, however, once again it did not succeed in the aim of bringing the Luftwaffe to battle.

In terms of the direct impact of air power on JUBILEE, it can be argued that with the exception of the loss of HMS Berkeley and some landing craft the cover provided by Fighter Command was useful in preventing the full weight of the Luftwaffe attacking the beaches. It was noted by eyewitness that some of the losses, while regrettable, were not the fault of the RAF as in the midst of battle craft were arriving late and caught in the maelstrom. The loss of HMS Berkeley was primarily the fault of the failure of command and control systems then in place to deal with RAF aircraft flying below three thousand feet. This meant that Luftwaffe aircraft under this height became the RN’s responsiblity, therefore, the loss must be put down to the RN’s AA defences. In general, the direct support provided was very useful. For example, the attacks on the Hess Battery aided No.4 Commando’s operation. Smoke laying was found to be very useful and was most welcome in the withdrawal phase of JUBILEE. The most disappointing aspect was the provision of Tac R which were left with little to do, as the Germans did not send in reserves. However, the battle was costly for the RAF, with aircraft on the direct support mission suffering the most. Nevertheless, the RAF was willing to accept these losses.

Traditional arguments relating to the effectiveness of JUBILEE usually relate to its importance in providing lessons that contributed to the success of OVERLORD. This is certainly the argument made by Mountbatten in his later life and supported by Hughes-Hallett. From an air power perspective, it is hard to support this position. That JUBILEE served a purpose is certainly true. It fitted in with the prevailing view of air power in support of Combined Operations and aided Fighter Command’s key operational objectives; however, these lessons did not last into 1944. By 1943, it became apparent to the Allies that the battle for air superiority in preparation for OVERLORD would have to be fought closer to Germany and due to the technical limitation of Fighter Command’s equipment; this battle would be primarily fought by the 8AAF.

Therefore, if the lessons of JUBILEE were not important in the preparation for OVERLORD, were they as useful elsewhere? The answer to this is that JUBILEE’s importance lay in the impact it had upon events in 1943. JUBILEE acted as an enabler of change. It illustrated problems that had to be resolved if air power was to be fully effective in Combined Operations. The problems the occurred in the command and control of air power during JUBILEE, noticeably the loss of HMS Berkeley, led to the development and refinement of a command and control system that played a useful role in the Mediterranean and come to fruition at Normandy. Had the war gone on beyond 1945 it is also likely that the further development of the FDT concept into ocean going FDS would have been useful to SEAC. The ability to control air power within the area of fleet AA defence during OVERLORD overcame the primary problem encountered during JUBILEE.

JUBILEE also illustrated the need for some form of aerial bombardment in support of Combined Operations, though its exclusion was for valid reasons. In order to deal with this contentious issue, as illustrated by Harris’ unwillingness to allow Bomber Command aircraft to bomb civilian targets in France, the formation of the inter-service committee on fire support was encouraged by discussions emanating from JUBILEE. This committee, led by the RAF examined the issue and made suggestions that would aid the planners of OVERLORD where aerial bombardment was used fully. Indeed the choice of Graham as chair was a perceptible one due to his pre-war experience in Combined Operations doctrine. However, as JUBILEE was an enabler it should be recognised that much practical experience in this issue and the development of the FDT concept came from the Mediterranean, which proved to be a training ground for ideas being developed. The Graham Report that appeared in December 1943 would form one source of information for the planners of OVERLORD. In providing this source of information the RAF illustrated its flexibility and willingness to work with other services on joint issues.

The thesis has sought to re-frame the debate surrounding the RAF at Dieppe by taking a progressive examination of both its operational and doctrinal context. Then it has sought to examine what impact JUBILEE had on air power in Combined Operations. Generally, it can be argued the RAF performed well on the day and that while losses were high these were either replaceable or repairable. Its impact upon on the Luftwaffe is more difficult but it can be said that their losses were more difficult to replace. While losses to the assault force occurred, it can be argued that had the RAF not been fighting for air superiority, thus, providing air cover, they would have been worse. The impact of JUBILEE on future operations is more difficult to assess. Certainly JUBILEE enabled discussions to occur but whether this had a direct link to OVERLORD is debatable given the vast amount of experience be gained in the Mediterranean. Thus, this thesis has hopefully refocused the debate on JUBILEE to an examination of the operational effectiveness of the RAF and the impact on developments in 1943 not 1944.

Publishing my Thesis

I mentioned in my post yesterday that at some point I would like to publish what I have written. To do this I would need to expand the scope of the work but this is not some that is problematic as there were several areas that due to time and space just had to be left. From my introduction I made these observations as to the limitations of my thesis:

Despite the scope of research undertaken there are several areas that, because of limitations of time and the span of the work, have been avoided due to the focus on operational and tactical issues. First, strategic level discussions surrounding the RAF’s role, in particular the argument that the RAF were not interested due to its desire to prosecute the strategic bomber offensive, though by default this thesis does show that this is not a clear as some historians have argued. Second, it does not explore the importance of radar to JUBILEE as John Campbell in Dieppe Revisited has dealt with this effectively. Research also opened several areas that could not be explored but to the word limit; this included the use of balloons in Combined Operations and the RAF’s participation in providing meteorological advice for Combined Operations. If this work were expanded, it would be envisaged that the scope of archival sources would be increased to include various personal papers at assorted institutions and to expand the German perspective using the Bundesarchiv at Freiburg.

Thus, there are several distinct areas where I could bulk out a work such as this and because of the nature of my thesis I have not really described the air action of Dieppe, this having been done very well by Norman Franks in his work The Greatest Air Battle. However, it would be useful to include more of this to give a feel of the nature of operations during the raid.

However, I feel this is a few years off doing as I intend to start my PhD and so time will be precious. However, for financial reasons I intend to start my PhD in 2010 so in the mean time I have been giving some thought as to what can be effectively ‘cut out’ of my thesis and published as articles. This is a discussion I have already had with my supervisor, Professor Gary Sheffield. We have discussed distilling the key points from the thesis into one article and I feel this is a good idea but the thought of cutting 40,000 words into 10-15,000 sounds a bit daunting but a challenge I will enjoy. I do think that if done right this will add to the scholarship of Dieppe.

Another shorter article I have been thinking of playing with is statistical analysis of the losses suffered at Dieppe. This is one element of my final chapter but I feel that it could be taken further and is useful in explaining the nature of air power during Combined Operations and also disproving the normal arguments about the RAF at Dieppe i.e. they suffer more losses than the Luftwaffe, therefore, they must be bad. This to me is rubbish as offensive forces always suffers more proportionally. It is the nature of offensive warfare. It may well be use to link this to Lanchester’s Laws.

Another article, this time moving away from Dieppe, would be on the RAF and Combined Operations Doctrine. My research has highlighted that the orthodox argument of the RAF being fixated on strategic bombing have little basis in records. Actually recent scholarship, in particular David Ian Hall’s work on tactical air power, has started to show that the RAF views were much more nuanced and complex than hitherto assumed. This is certainly true of Combined Operations and an exploration of the RAF’s view and contribution may well be useful.

Most of these seem doable to me and is one of the reasons for me not starting my PhD as soon as I had planned, though I will be spending my time reading up on Leadership theory. I think, considering that eventually I would like to work in academia, that writing these papers and trying to get them published would be advantageous. I suppose a question for all you academics out there is which is more important; published works or qualifications? It always astounds me when I look at a job and they ask for a PhD but what if you have been published. Does this not count for anything?

Air Power and Planning Operation RUTTER/JUBILEE

Just another section from my thesis. This time it deals with some of the issues thrown up during the planning for Dieppe.

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The genesis of Operation JUBILEE lay in a decision on 14 June 1940 to appoint Lieutenant-General Alan Bourne as ‘Commander of Raiding Operations on coasts in enemy occupation and Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations.’[1] This appointment was made in the aftermath of a series of memorandum written by the Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, to his Chief of Staff, Major-General Ismay on 4 and 6 June 1940. In these memorandums, Churchill called for the ‘…joint Chiefs of Staff to propose me measures for a vigorous, enterprising and ceaseless offensive…’ against German held territory.[2] Bourne had under his command six independent commando companies that had been formed for the Norway campaign. Unfortunately for Bourne the first raids under his command were described by Churchill as a ‘…silly fiasco…’[3] Churchill, displeased with these early failures, replaced Bourne with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations on 17 July 1940.[4] Keyes had been the architect of the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918.[5]

Over the next year, raiding became an inherent part of British strategy in the war against Germany and a series of raids were launched against enemy held territory. However, Keyes faced problems in the planning and implementation of operations and on many occasions during 1941 these problem came to a head with the Chiefs of Staff Committee.[6] Eventually in the aftermath of a disastrous exercise in August 1941 he brought his concerns to the attention of with the Chiefs of Staff; especially the concern of who was to issue orders to force commanders. In the ensuing debates Keyes had a new directive drafted for his role and was re-titled Advisor on Combined Operations.[7] However, Keyes could not accept this and on 27 October 1941, Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced him.[8] Mountbatten, with the backing of Churchill, began to conduct larger and larger raids against the enemy coasts, most notable at St Nazaire and Bruneval.[9] Thus, by early 1942, despite a tumultuous background, raiding and combined operations had become a distinct part of British military operations against the Axis powers.

The origins of the raid on Dieppe lay in an Anglo-American strategic decision taken in April 1942 to increase the scale and frequency of raids.[10] The decision had a clear impact upon the RAF as it meant that as operations increased in scale they would require greater support, specifically in the form of air cover. The increase in scale also had the advantage of allowing the Fighter Command to continue its policy of offensive air operations against the Luftwaffe. While this may at first appear a selfish decision the motive can be viewed, through an understanding of Combined Operation doctrine, as altruistic, because if the RAF sought an aerial battle it would aid it in the aim of providing air cover for the assaulting forces. However, even before this decision was made raids had in general become larger in scale. For example, at the end of 1941 Operation ARCHERY, the raid on Vaagso Island, had seen the first truly combined operation undertaken by COHQ.[11] In terms of RAF participation, the operation had the support of bomber and fighter aircraft. In terms of forces structure, much like at Dieppe, fighters were predominant with five squadrons of long range Bristol Beaufighters’ and Blenheims’ being utilised. In terms of bombers there were twenty-nine Handley Page Hampdens supplied by Bomber Command.[12] The key role during the operation was to cover the operation and maintain air cover over the battlespace. ARCHERY illustrated the importance of air cover to the success of Combined Operations and that attrition in providing cover would be expensive for fighters with eleven aircraft lost.[13] Thus, in general by March/April 1942 raids on the continent were becoming ever larger in size and scope of their objectives. It is in this background that the raid on Dieppe emerged.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in 1942 General Officer Commanding Southern Command and involved in the planning for Operation RUTTER, the precursor to JUBILEE, noted about the planning of the raid that:

‘My own feeling about the Dieppe raid is that there were far too many authorities with a hand in it; there was no single operational commander who was solely responsible for the operation from start to finish, a Task Force Commander in fact.’[14]

Montgomery’s comment on the planning of the Dieppe Raid would appear on the surface prescient if was not written some fourteen years after the raid and seen through his experience of Operation OVERLORD, where an overall commander was in place. Unfortunately, this teleological view of the planning of Dieppe has persisted in the historiography of the raid and has distorted our understanding of some of the key issues raised during the planning process.[15] The 1938 Manual of Combined Operations discussed the merits of three systems of command in Combined Operations, these were, Joint Command, Unified Command and Command by One Service.[16] Early on in the planning process, it was decided that the system of command would by either Joint Command or Command by One Service.[17] While this decision maybe seen by Montgomery as having been the root cause of the problems at Dieppe it does highlight the difficulty of planning for larger raids that faced COHQ in early 1942. Up until this point, the majority of raids had been small and there was little experience on which to make a decision on the system of command. Thus, by early May, Leigh-Mallory was appointed the air force commander in a joint system of command alongside Major-General Roberts as military commander and it was proposed the Vice-Admiral Baille-Grohman as naval commander.[18] With the exception of the change of Captain Hughes-Hallett for Baille-Grohman, this would be the command structure in place when JUBILEE was remounted in late July.

The planning for RUTTER/JUBILEE has opened up several issues concerning air power, as there were two key changes to the plan between the cancellation of RUTTER and the remounting of JUBILEE; namely the use of a preliminary bombing raid and the use of airborne force to attack gun batteries on the flanks of the assault. The lack of Bomber Command involvement has becoming a major point of contention with Brian Loring Villa noting that, ‘Without heavy air bombardment, the disparity in fire-power proved fatal to the Canadian and British invaders.’[19] This theme has continued with Robin Neillands claiming that Leigh-Mallory’s decision to remove the support of bombardment was the result of loyalty that pressed him ‘…to accept a decision that fundamentally undermined the possibilities of success at Dieppe.’[20] However, both of these accounts are viewing JUBILEE from the viewpoint of the invasion of Normandy and they fail to appreciate the implication of utilising heavy strategic bombers for what amounted to a small-scale operation within the context of the Second World War. They also do not take account of the prevailing doctrinal view on the use of aerial bombardment in the support of Combined Operations. The Manual of Combined Operations noted that only ‘Under certain conditions support of the landing by air bombardment will be of value.’[21] However, the Manual of Combined Operations notes that:

‘To what extent this support can be provided will depend on the number of aircraft available and other operations required of them. In most cases the general struggle for air superiority, local operations in defence of the landing against enemy aircraft, and spotting and reconnaissance duties will have prior claims.’[22]

Thus, even before the war began it was laid down in Combined Operations doctrine that while it would be advantageous to have access to the use of aerial bombardment it should not be counted on due to other ongoing operations. Before RUTTER/JUBILEE, aircraft from Bomber Command had been utilised in both the raid on St Nazaire, Operation CHARIOT, and Vaagso, Operation ARCHERY, and, for example, at St Nazaire the use of aircraft had been used to try to divert attention away from the assault. However, their strange action over St Nazaire, where they circled and dropped single bombs, alerted the garrison to a possible attack on the town, and at midnight the garrison received orders to repel a possible parachute attack.[23] Thus, the use of Bomber Command in diversionary operations may have compromised the success of this operation. Also as already noted above bomber operations during Operation ARCHERY were expensive in terms of effort given and results achieved. It is, therefore, more surprising that in the initial planning for RUTTER that bombing appeared. It should be considered that given the nature of operations that were to occur over Dieppe and the order Leigh-Mallory received from Douglas on 13 April the decision not to include bombers did not divert attention from the primary aim of air cover during the raid; the provision of effective air cover. As early, as 14 April aerial bombardment was planned as a precursor to the landings with it being noted that the target will be the town generally.[24] However, it was noted in Mountbatten’s appreciation given to the Chiefs of Staff that the approval for bombardment was required from the War Cabinet due to the standing directive that covered the use of bombers over occupied territory.[25] However, by the planning meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory argued that bombing would not add anything to the operation and it would denude the element of tactical surprise.[26] Another factor leading to this decision was Harris’ contention that bombers could not be used before twilight, thus, leaving only a window of five minutes for bombers before the start of the operation.[27] Leigh-Mallory’s decision was also affected by the conclusion of the War Cabinet reference the use of aerial bombardment, which stated that it should only be used when accurate attacks could be guaranteed.[28] Mountbatten would attempt to modify this directive but as seen by the meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory had concluded that it would not be effective anyway.[29] While Villa has contended that Leigh-Mallory’s decision to cancel the bombing was based upon prescient analysis of its effect upon the landing force and Harris’ intransigence it is clear that he states his objection to their effectiveness at the 5 June meeting.[30]  Villa also points out on the issue of surprise that Dieppe had been bombed several times earlier; however, it is difficult to see how this relates to the issue of support for a Combined Operation.[31] Villa’s reliance on the analysis of the official historians, C P Stacey and Stephen Roskill, who stated that while the problems were difficult but not insurmountable raises the question of their understanding of the use of air power in support of combined operations.[32] Prevailing doctrine clearly stated that bombing should be used where possible but was not the overriding concern of the air force commander during operations.[33] In addition, recent research has explored the problems of using aerial bombardment in support of ground operations, which clearly recognises the problems inherent with their use; therefore, while Villa has made a case for their use and the reasons why they should have been used it does not stand up well to scrutiny.[34]  Thus, while much has been lamented over the lack over bombers support it can be argued that this decision was taken four months before JUBILEE took place and three months before RUTTER was due to occur and that the decision was based upon sound advice from the relevant commanders with experience of air power. When combined with Leigh-Mallory’s standing orders from Douglas, the issue of tactical surprise and Harris’ orders on bombing occupied territory it is understandable to that bombing of Dieppe was cancelled.

The other key area that requires some explanation is the decision to replace the airborne attack on the flanks with Commandos. This was, in hindsight, the right decision as both No. 3 and 4 Commando achieved the most success on the ground during the raid. Indeed, No. 4 Commandos’ success would form the basis of a British Army doctrinal pamphlet on attacking gun positions.[35] However, the reasons for this change lay in the state of Britain’s airborne forces in 1942 and their lack of effective means to deploy a sizable force accurately.[36] From the very start, it was envisaged that airborne troops were to be used to protect the flanks of the operation and cut enemy communications.[37] It was intended that the 1^st Parachute Battalion, reinforced to the strength of one and a half battalions, be dropped near Beneval-le-Grand in order to neutralise gun batteries either side of Dieppe.[38] However, even at this stage question were raised with Mountbatten’s AACO questioning the advisability of using parachute troops in this manner.[39] Army Co-Operation Command was responsible for the control of squadrons tasked with dropping airborne forces and during May and June, the problem of squadron allocation and usage become an operational issue for RUTTER. At a staff meeting on 11 May Harris informed Mountbatten that due to overriding operational requirements Nos. 12 and 142 Squadrons were required by Bomber Command.[40] Much of this is set against the background of Operation MILLENIUM and Harris’ large raids of mid-1942. The loss of these squadrons led to a cut-down in the size of the airborne force for the raid, in particular the loss of glider troops. The loss of squadrons was a key issue of concern for Mountbatten who appealed to Portal on 26 May to release the squadrons. Mountbatten was particularly concerned that if the squadrons suffered heavy casualties then this would put at risk the use of these squadrons for the lack of experienced aircrew.[41] Portal urged Mountbatten to discuss the issue with Barrett at Army Co-Operation Command as no command had been obliged by the air ministry to support Bomber Command’s operations.[42] Barrett, who had been on leave, wrote to Portal to state that that he was exercising his prerogative, outlined in Portal’s reply to Mountbatten on 27 May, and recalling the two Whitley squadrons from the planned Bomber Command operation. In the letter he states that he loaned two Blenheim squadrons and the Whitleys to Harris on the advice of DBO, however, the prospect of jeopardising RUTTER meant their recall from operations.[43] However, the lack of effective airframes continued to beleaguer the use of airborne troops in light of the operational needs of other commands. Thus, by 1 June the planned forced was reduced to one battalion.[44] Considering the operational difficulties facing Britain’s nascent airborne force it is understandable that when RUTTER was re-launched as JUBILEE the decision to replace them with Commandos appear in the light of their success a prophetic decision. The decision enabled a concentrated force, rather than a possibly dispersed force, to be landed and assault the position with success.[45] The problem of timings would also have made concentration difficult for airborne force to complete the task successfully. However, the saga of squadron allocation does highlight the difficulties inherent in Combined Operations and the need to prioritise operations.

In preparation for RUTTER two exercises, YUKON I and II, were planned to take place during June. Both of these exercises were deemed failures and must rank as one of the contributing factors in the cancellation of RUTTER.[46] Due to operational commitments there was little involvement from the RAF in YUKON I, however, for YUKON II seven fighter squadrons were tasked with participating in the exercise.[47] The squadrons were to replicate the proposed actions of the RAF during the operation; fighter cover and Tac R. Leigh-Mallory was anxious for the RAF to play its part and to test the process of calling up air cover during the course of the operation.[48] The key concern for Leigh-Mallory in the aftermath of YUKON II was issues of communication between Uxbridge and the area headquarters at Portsmouth. For Leigh-Mallory, this gave concern over communication with the force headquarters during the raid.[49] He was assured that this was being looked into; in fact, earlier in the year at inter-service committee had been formed to examine the issue of communications during Combined Operations.[50]

Despite this concern and the two prominent issues of bombing and airborne troops, planning for JUBILEE ran into few problems from an air power perspective. By the time of JUBILEE, the plan had been simplified to concentrate on air cover with close support a secondary consideration and in this respect, it closely followed the principal outlined in Combined Operations doctrine. The plan called for fighter cover and general protection to the landing force to be provided all through the daylight hours with the most intensive operations coming during the landing and withdrawal. While air cover was provided, low-level fighter and bomber attacks would support the landing troops and provide smoke laying where appropriate. Tac R was to be provided by aircraft from Army Co-Operation Command within both the battle area and the lines of approach to Dieppe. While no bombing was to be used on the town, diversionary raids were planned to attack the airfield at Abbeville by aircraft of the US 8^th Air Force.[51] It was estimated that in the area of Northern France the Germans could deploy approximately two-hundred and sixty fighters and one-hundred and twenty bombers. Against this Leigh-Mallory was able to deploy seventy squadrons, thus allowing him to deploy overwhelming superior numbers as laid out in his operational orders of 13 April.[52] Control of the air battle was to be exercised from No. 11 Group headquarters at Uxbridge and through the normal command and control system of sector control.[53] The HQ Ships HMS Fernie and Calpe provided control of close support aircraft with links to Leigh-Mallory at Uxbridge; Air Commodore Cole on the Calpe represented Leigh-Mallory.[54]Cole was instructed to liaise with the other force commanders and direct operation at low-level, for example, Tac R aircraft from RAF Gatwick that performed reconnaissance along the approaching roads. The system utilised for control of low-level aircraft was the system developed by Army Co-Operation command and based upon forward and rear air links with a tentacle controlling aircraft from the headquarters ship. Reconnaissance was one area where air power aided in both the planning and conduct of JUBILEE. During preparations for RUTTER/JUBILEE RAF reconnaissance aircraft were involved in gathering intelligence of the positions in and around Dieppe. It was responsible for discovery caves in the cliff faces of the two headlands either side of the town. This enabled target identification for the destroyers offshore.[55] Reconnaissance also informed planners of the suitability of the area designated as a sanctuary for landing craft and that in the opinion of both the pilots and Leigh-Mallory the size of the anchorage needed to be reduced in order to present it as a target for bombers.[56] In light of this information, Baille-Grohman examined the possibility of modifying the plan. During the course of the raid, it was planned to make use of Tac R through the communication tentacle in HMS Calpe to co-ordinate air support. Some seventy-one sorties were flown and this was considered lavish in a report written after the raid.[57] There is justification to this claim as when compared to the number of operation conducted by the Western Desert Air Force (WDAF) at the same time the number of sorties for one day equalled half of those being flown by WDAF.[58] Thus, by the time of the issuing of operational orders to squadrons in mid-August the RAF had overcome issues relating the effective use of air power.

 

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[1] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 47, Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Expedition (London: Aurum Press, 2006) p. 25

[2] Cited in Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 47

[3] Cited in Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 26

[4] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 27, Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 52. Fergusson suggests that the title Director went to Keyes head and that he believed he was responsible to the Minster of Defence, Churchill, and not the Chiefs of Staff. This issue was to follow him until his replacement by Mountbatten.

[5] Mark Karau, ‘Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 2003) pp. 455 – 481

[6] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 70-85

[7] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 83

[8] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 89

[9] Anon, ‘Combined Operations’ in I C B Dear (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 198

[10] Charles Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume I – Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955) p. 324

[11] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 44; Niall Cherry, Striking Back: Britain’s Airborne and Commando Raids, 1940-42 (Solihull: Helion, 2009) pp. 130-163

[12] Appendix X ‘Naval and Military Reports relating to Operation ARCHERY’ in Cherry, Striking Back, p. 337

[13] Appendix XII ‘RAF Losses on Operation Archery’ in Cherry, Striking Back, pp. 349-351

[14] Cited in Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 85

[15] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 86

[16] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ pp. 20-22

[17] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘RUTTER – Planning’ p. 8

[18] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Extracts from Chiefs of Staff Meeting No. 42’ 13 May 1942

[19] Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid, 1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

[20] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 273

[21] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[22] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[23] C E Lucas Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, Pan Edition (London: Pan Books, 2000) p. 129

[24] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Conclusions of Meeting Held at COHQ on Tuesday 21^st April’

[25] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Extracts from Chiefs of Staff Meeting No. 42 dated 13.5.42’

[26] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Minutes of Meeting of Council and Advisers to CCO and Combined Force Commanders with Lieutenant-General Montgomery in the Chair, 5.6.42’

[27] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 11 May 1942

[28] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 19 May 1942

[29] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 1 June 1942

[30] Villa, Unauthorized Action, pp. 152-153

[31] Villa, Unauthorized Action, p. 153

[32] Villa, Unauthorized Action, p. 153; C P Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: Queen’s Printers 1948) p. 62; Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume II: The Period of Balance (London: HMSO, 1954) p. 241

[33] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[34] See Ian Gooderson, ‘Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Close Air Support Role During World War II?’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No.3, (September 1992.)

[35] TNA, WO 208/3108 ‘Notes from Theatres of War No. 11: Destruction of a German Battery by No. 4 Commando during the Dieppe Raid’ 1943

[36] On the early years of Britain’s airborne force and the various institutional and organisational problems that faced them see; William Buckingham Paras: The Birth of British Airborne Forces from Churchill’s Raiders to 1^st Parachute Brigade (Stroud: Tempus, 2005)

[37] TNA, AIR 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at Combined Operations Headquarters at 1100 Hours 14.4.42 to Discuss Operation “RUTTER” 16 April 1942

[38] TNA, DEFE 2/549 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Operational Orders for 1^st Parachute Battalion’ 2 July 1942

[39] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 14 April 1942

[40] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at 1200 on 11^th May 1942 at Combined Operations Headquarters to Discuss Operation “RUTTER”’

[41] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CCO to CAS’ 26 May 1942

[42] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CAS to CCO’ 27 May 1942

[43] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CAS to CCO’ 27 May 1942; AIR 8/895 ‘Letter from AOC-in-C Army Co-Operation Command to CAS’ 29 May 1942

[44] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Minutes of 1^st Meeting of Combined Force Commanders at Combined Operations Headquarters on 1^st June 1942’ 4 June 1942

[45] On the success of No. 4 Commando see Will Fowler. The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day (London: Collins, 2002); On 3 Commandos role see Brereton Greenhous. ‘Operation FLODDEN: The Sea Fight off Berneval and the Suppression of the Goebbels Battery, 19 August 1942’ Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2003) pp. 47-57. It is useful to compare the performance of the Commandos at Dieppe with similar airborne operation during D-Day. The 9^th Parachute Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Terence Otway was to attack the Merville Battery with strength of six hundred. However, due to scattering this force was reduced to one hundred and fifty. They took the battery with heavy casualties.

[46] Villa, Unauthorized Action, pp. 12-13

[47] TNA, ADM 179/223 ‘Exercise YUKON II: Outline of RAF Participation’ 20 June 1942, p. 2

[48] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at COHQ at 1400 hrs on Monday, 15^th June 1942, to discuss certain points concerning Operation “RUTTER”’

[49] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25^th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’

[50] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25^th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’; AIR 20/832 ‘Inter-Service Committee on Communications in Combined Operations Interim Report No. 2: Support Communications in Combined Operations’ 14 January 1942

[51] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ pp. 118-119; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[52] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 119; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[53] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 120; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[54] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 120; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[55] Michael Shoeman ‘Air Umbrella – Dieppe’ Military History Journal of the South African Military History Society, Vol. 1, No. 5. Accessed at www.rapidttp.com

[56] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25^th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’

[57] TNA, DEFE 2/333 ‘Army Air Support and Tactical Reconnaissance during Operation “JUBILEE”’ p. 2

[58] TNA, DEFE 2/333 ‘Army Air Support and Tactical Reconnaissance during Operation “JUBILEE”’ p. 2

Combined Operations

Another aspect of my thesis that has required explaining is what is meant by the term Combined Operations as its meaning has change din the years since the Second World War. 

Combined Operations in modern military parlance does not equate to how it was viewed in the inter-war period and during the Second World War. RAF doctrine of the 21^st century, AP 3000, defines combined operations as, ‘Military operations in which elements of two or more Allied nations participate.’[1] This definition is akin to coalition warfare and is not what is meant by the term combined operations as will be used throughout this thesis. RAF doctrine of the Second World War era, AP 1300, defines combined operation as:

‘…the term to de-scribe those forms of operations where naval, military or air forces in any combination are co-operating with each other, working separately under their respective commanders, but with a common aim.’[2] 

Thus, with this definition we are closer to what is meant by combined operations during the Second World War. If combined operation were to be discussed in the modern military the vernacular to be used would be one of jointness where operations take place ‘…in which elements of more than one service of the same nations participates.’[3] Therefore, combined operations in this context involves more than one service operating together to achieve a common aim. However, the definition can be taken further, as does the doctrinal manuals of the time, AP 1300 and the Manual of Combined Operations,[4] do, as there are several forms of combined operations which can be taken into consideration, such as raids, invasion, demonstrations and withdrawals.[5] By the time the revised Manual of Combined Operations had been published in 1938 the definition had been modified to:‘…forms of operations where, naval, military, or air forces in combination are co-operating with each other, working independently under their respective commanders, but with a common strategical object.’[6] 

While this definition does not offer a satisfactory definition for the topic of this thesis it is what the British military understood by the term as they went into the Second World War. It does, despite several salient shortcomings, provide a sound basis as to what combined operations are. Within the context of this thesis a combined operations can be defined as a raid against a hostile shore utilising forces from each of the three services operating independently under the command of their respective service chiefs but with common tactical, operational and strategic aim as laid down by the supreme commander, in this case the Chief of Combined Operations, Mountbatten. This contains the key tenants of the 1938 definition under which Mountbatten and his force commanders, including AVM Leigh-Mallory, were operating.

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[1] Anon AP 3000: British Air Power Doctrine, 3^rd Edition (London: HMSO, 1999) p. 3.13.3

[2] TNA, AIR 10/1910 ‘Royal Air Force War Manual Part I – Chapter 13: Combined Operations’ p. 1. AP 1300 was originally published in 1928 and subsequently republished in 1935 and 1940. A useful online version of the manual is available at http://ww2airfronts.org/doctrine/raf/warmanual1/warmanual1-0.html

[3] Anon, AP 1300, P. 3.13.6

[4] TNA, DEFE 2/709 ‘Manual of Combined Operations, 1938’. This manual is a revision of the 1925 and 1931 manual that was born out of exercise at the three service staff colleges.

[5] Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck Amphibious Warfare: The Theory and Practice of Amphibious Operations in the 20^th Century (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001) p.

[6] Cited in Kenneth Clifford Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1940 – 1940 (New York: Edgewood, 1983) p. 1

Outline of Operation JUBILEE

I have been doing more work on my thesis recently as as part of the introduction I felt it prudent to outline to basics of the operation and below is what I have done so far. Any comments are welcome as it is in its draft form and I may well re-write it at some point. I have missed some reference off as it has been written on the go and I need to insert them at some pint. 

At 0445 on 19 August 1942, the first forces landed on the French coast at Berneval approximately six miles from Dieppe.[1] This was the first wave of a raid in force on the French town of Dieppe. The operational orders for JUBILEE stated that the purpose of the operation was:

Operation JUBILEE is a raid on Jubilee with limited military and air objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences, power stations, harbour installations, rolling stock, etc., in Jubilee, the capture of prisoners, the destruction of an eardrum near the town and the capture and removal of German invasion barges and other craft in the harbour.[2] 

Operation JUBILEE was the culmination of two years of raiding by the Combined Operation Headquarters (COHQ) and was largest attempted to date. The major part of the raiding force was comprised of troops from the 2^nd Canadian Infantry Division. The British provided additional troops in the form of No. 3 and 4 Commando from the Army and ‘A’ Commando from the Royal Marines (RM). There was also a small detachment of French and US personnel, the most prominent of which were the fifty US Rangers attached to No. 3 and 4 Commando. The military forces involved in the operation came under the ground force commander Major General J H Roberts, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 2^nd Canadian Infantry Division. Roberts was a curious choice for such a prestigious and difficult mission, as he had not actually seen battlefield command in the war and, therefore, like most of his soldiers were untrained and untested in combat.[3] 

The Royal Air Force (RAF) supplied substantial forces in the support of JUBILEE. In total fifty-six day fighter squadrons were involved, fifty of these were in the cover role and six were designated for close support roles. There was also two squadrons of day bombers and two squadrons Hawker Hurricane Squadrons that were tasked for the bomber role. Three squadrons of Douglas Boston light bomber were in place to supply smoke cover for the raid. Finally, there were four army co-operation squadrons in place to provide tactical reconnaissance throughout the raid.[4] The air commander on the day was Air Vice Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, a man who would go on and command the Allied air forces during Operation Overlord. In later years, a great deal of controversy would surround his role in the ‘Big Wing’ controversy of 1940 and his choice as commander of the tactical air forces for OVERLORD that has clouded any reasonable analysis of his effectiveness as a leader.[5] RAF operation during JUBILEE can be divided into five distinct phases with operation starting at 0445 and the last air operation finishing at approximately 2245.[6] The first phase, from 0445 to 0550, saw the RAF preparing the beaches for the landing by the dropping of smoke to mask the bomber aircraft of Bomber and Army Co-operation Command, these aircraft were escorted in by fighters.[7] At the same time intruder, operations were carried out against the gun batteries on the flanks on Dieppe. Hurricane Fighter-bombers and Spitfire fighters performed this.[8]

During the period of the second phase of operations, 0550 to 0730, fighter covered was maintained of the raid area and continued attempts were made to support the landing. For example, at 0645, the Rommel battery at Puys behind Blue Beach was casing problem for the Royal Regiment of Canada, Therefore, orders were sent to the Boston’s on No. 88 Squadron to attack the battery.[9] Within an hour, the squadron was en route when a recall order was received.[10] As the unit was too far to come back, the attack went in suffering heavy casualties from attacking German fighters.[11] 

The third phase, 0730 to 1030, was were the RAF was tasked primarily with providing air cover for the withdrawal of the forces to the beaches and this in the main consisted of counter air patrols against Luftwaffe aircraft that were encroaching over the battlespace. Leigh-Mallory’s states that this was the period of greatest activity by the enemy with ‘20 to 30 fighters being seen continuously in the area…’[12] There were also calls made for ground support as the units were withdrawn to the beaches.

The penultimate phase, 1050 to 1410, saw the RAF providing cover for the withdrawal of forces from the beaches similar calls were made on the RAF to provide air cover and close support as forces were taken of the beaches.[13] It was also during this phase that Luftwaffe tactics changed and larger formation were seen coming to Dieppe. These formations not only contained fighters but also fighter-bombers and bombers tasked with attempting to attack the raiding force and the naval forces offshore.[14] The final phase, 1410 to 2245, saw the RAF providing fighter cover for the forces that were returning to Britain. By the latter part of the evening deteriorating weather put a halt o any further operation by both the RAF and Luftwaffe.[15]  

The Royal Navy (RN), whose military head, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, was deeply suspicious of such operations, only provided paltry forces for the support of the operations. The heaviest ships involved in the operation were destroyers of which eight were used. In total, there were two hundred thirty seven vessels in various roles for the operation.[16] All of these ships came under the command of Captain J Hughes Hallett.  

The operation began, as it was to go on. No. 3 Commando, the first unit to land, at Berneval came under intense fire and of their twenty-three landing craft, only six made it to shore. Most of these men themselves became casualties, but despite this, the commando managed to keep the battery quite though they did not actually take it out as the plan called for.[17] The next units to land were the Royal Regiment of Canada and the Black Watch of Canada at Blue beach at Puys. Of the approximately five hundred men who landed, only six returned unscathed. The reason for this was that they landed fifteen minutes behind schedule and eight after the Germans had sounded the alarm. 

Next to come was the frontal assault on Dieppe itself, White and Red beaches. This was led Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, White beach, and the Essex Scottish, Red beach. Initially things looked good for the unit as Hurricane fighter-bombers had attacked German position and the defenders appeared dazed. This eventually passed and the defenders started pouring machine gun and mortar fire into the area. As Lieutenant Fred Woodcock of the Royal Hamilton’s, who was caught in a landing craft that was filled with Bangalore torpedoes and hit by a mortar bomb, comments he could ‘…only remember the sound, because I was blinded. The boat filled with water and I was soon up to my neck.’[18] 

The assault on Dieppe was to be supported by twenty-nine[19] Churchill MkIII tanks from Calgary Tank Regiment.[20] However, from the start of the operation things deteriorated. The LCT’s were fifteen minutes late arriving at the beaches and as has been commented this had ‘…unfortunate results for the general fortunes of the operation on the main beaches.’[21] Eventually all of the tanks were destroyed and only three made it onto the esplanade.[22]  

At 0630, approximately an hour and half after the main landing, Major-General Roberts decided that the situation was ready to land his floating reserve. This consisted on the Fusiliers Mont Royal. Roberts gives his reasons as follows, ‘About one hour after touch down, information received indicated that “Red” Beach was sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve.’[23] In this decision Roberts was wrong as Red Beach had not been cleared and was not ready, the RHLI were pinned against the beach wall. In addition, the FMR were landed at the wrong place. 

It had been initially planned to land RM ‘A’ Commando in the harbour and cut out enemy craft to take back to England. However, it was soon found that this was not possible. Therefore, they became part of the floating reserve. At 0800, Roberts, having been deceived by intelligence again, decided to commit them to White beach to force a breakthrough. This necessitated a quick rethink on the way into the beach and as Lieutenant M. Buist, RN comments it soon became clear that this was to be a ‘…sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade.’[24] The commando came under a hail of artillery fire and its intended effect became negligible. 

The next attack was at Green beach by the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada on the inner western flank. Initially there was success but eventually things started to go wrong. It was intended for the SSR to land at zero hour, 0450, and the QOCHC to land an hour and a half later and pass through them capture the high ground and proceed to Dieppe. The SSR quickly entered Pourville and became involved in fire fights with groups of Germans. The SSR attempted to subdue them with fire from the supporting destroyers and 3-inch mortars, but to no avail and they became bogged down. The QOCHC then landed at 0520 and were to link up with the tanks of the Calgary and capture a nearby airfield. This proved fruitless as the tanks were destroyed mostly on the beaches. By this time, everything was going wrong and both regiments attempted form a cordon until ordered to withdrawal.  

At the western end of the raid, No. 4 Commando landed at 0454 and their objectives were to take out the German battery at Vasterival. This was Operation CAULDRON and this has often been considered the most successful aspect of the JUBILEE operation.[25] However, it must be noted that there was a degree of luck involved as the Hess battery was blown up by one mortar round that landed in pit of open artillery shells that had been laid out for the battery. This does not, however, take anything away from the action that was the model of efficiency and became the basis of a Military Training Pamphlet that outlined attacks on fortified gun batteries.[26] As an official report comments this operation was ‘…a model of bold action and successful synchronization.’[27]  

By 0930, it became clear to everyone that the operation was a failure and landing craft started taking the wounded off the beach. At the same time both the Military Commander, Roberts, and the Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallet, contended that withdrawal was necessary and that it should begin at 1100.[28] By 1250, all troops that could be evacuated had been removed from the beaches. Thus ended one of the bloodiest days in Commonwealth military history. The casualty rate for the ground force reached almost sixty percent. As one historian has commented, it was a cruel fate for a country, Canada, who had waited:‘…over two and a half years for combat and be  killed, maimed, or captured within a single morning one of the undeniable tragedies of the Second World War’[29]

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[1] All times given are in British Summer Time. In the German War Diaries, all times were given in Continental time, which is one hour ahead.

[2] Quoted in Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 83 ‘Preliminary Report on Operation “Jubilee” (The Raid on Dieppe), 19 Aug 42’ 19 Sept 1942, p. A-1. From here on this report will be referred to as CMHQ No. 83. The reoccurrence of the word Jubilee is in reference to Dieppe and was used in an attempt to keep the target from German agents. However, in an accident of war on the final page of the operational orders the map reference for the target, Dieppe, was given.

[3] The process of choosing both the Canadians as the main assaulting force and decision to choose Roberts as the ground force commander is dealt with in Brain Loring Villa Unauthorized Action, Specifically his chapter…

[4] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on the Combined Operation against Dieppe – August 19^th 1942’ 5 September 1942, p. 2. The numbers of squadrons involved in the operation has produced some confusion with John Terraine citing sixty-one and the RAF’s official history quotes fifty-six, the right figures for the fighter forces. John Terraine The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945 (London: Wordsworth, 1997) p. 560, Denis Richards and Hillary St George Saunders Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Volume 2: The Fight Avails (London: HMSO, 1953) p. 143

[5] The only biography of Leigh-Mallory is one produced by his great nephew, Bill Newton Dunn, Liberal Democrat MEP for the East Midlands. Unfortunately the book has many factual inaccuracies and is often defensive about the criticism made of Leigh-Mallory; Bill Newton Dunn Big Wing: A Biography of ACM Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Airlife, 1992)

[6] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ pp. 6 – 10

[7] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 6

[8] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 6

[9] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 7, Norman Franks The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 9^th August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1992), p. 70

[10] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 8

[11] Norman Franks The Greatest Air Battle pp. 70 – 71

[12] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 8

[13] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 9

[14] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 9

[15] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 10

[16] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) History of the Second World War: The War at Sea Volume II, p. 243

[17] No. 3 Commando’s action and the problems they suffered are dealt with in Brereton Greenhous…

[18] Quoted in Atkin R (1980) Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster, p. 153

[19] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 108 ‘Operation “Jubilee”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches.’ 17 Dec 43 Amended on 12 Jul 1950. Paragraph 137 From here on CMHQ 108 

[20] This unit was official known in the Canadian organisation as the 14^th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)

[21] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraph 80.

[22] CMHQ 108 Op Cit Paragraph 84-88. Hugh Henry has dealt with the failure of the Calgary Tanks in…

[23]  CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 142

[24] Quoted in CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 174

[25] See for example Will Fowler…

[26] MTP…IWM

[27] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 101 ‘Operation “Jubilee”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks.’ 11 Aug 1943 p. 21. From here on CMHQ 101

[28] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraphs 225-230

[29] Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. p. 2