Armistace Day and Haig

The 90th Anniversary of the end of the First World War has now come and gone and I feel that for many it was an extremely poignant event especially with the last 3 British veterans at the Cenotaph. Even my ‘A’ Level students understood its importance. They actually demanded that we stop for a 2 minutes silence at 11. I could be sceptical and suggest that they just wanted to stop work for 2 minutes but I have to admit that is not true. One of my students was disgusted that college was not selling poppies so she went the British Legion shop in town and brought them to the college. I hope we are starting to seeing a youth who are more aware of the past and willing to pay their respects for those who have come before us.

Despite this though we are seeing another round of Haig baiting. J P Harris published his new book this week on Haig, Douglas Haig and the First World War, and I fear that many have it seems not bothered reading the work fully and are just picking on very specific sections to berate Haig, specifically Haig’s contention of seeking a negotiated peace in 1918. Ironically this is contrary to what appears to be the aim of the book i.e. an attempt to place Haig within the general context of the era, not only militarily but also socially and culturally. A couple of comments can be found on the Times website and on the H-War network. Martin Gilbert’scounterfactual is an interesting one ans shows the positive that may have been achieved through a negotiated peace. I fear this is not the end to the Haig debate as there are at least another 2 ‘biographies’ in the offing. I think the last comment on the H-War post rather misses the point when the commentator notes that:

How would the British ever have continued the war without American resources?

I fear this shows a degree of naivety on the nature of the effect of the American war effort and is dosed with a large helping of hindsight and what if. I fear this person has forgotten that ‘industrially’ much of the American army arriving in France from 1917 onwards are equipped with British and French armaments and that they are trained by them. Yes by 1919 this would have reversed but that did nit happen and is outside the context of what was being written. No if he had saif ‘financially’ it would not be issue as US finance, or the ability to raise credit in America is extremely important to the war effort.

Ah well here is to the next round of Haig baiting. It is just a shame that it has happened this week when rather than raising the debates, and most of them are valid ones, we should be remembering the experience and those who gave their lives for our tomorrow.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them. We will remember them

Upcoming Conference – 1918 – The Genesis of Modern Warfare: The Birth of the Royal Air Force and the Hundred Days Campaign

I know Dan Todman has already noted this but I have been asked to spread the word as it were so here is the annoucement for the above conference. The programme looks very promising and I am dissapointed that work will stop me from attending. There will, however, be a book of the conference so not all is lost.

Here is the announcement:

2008 is the ninetieth anniversary of two landmark events in the history of the British armed forces: the creation of the Royal Air Force, the world’s first independent air service, from the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service; and the ‘Hundred Days’ campaign, the greatest series of land victories in British military history. This conference marks these anniversaries. Papers will address land, air and maritime topics, including technology; tactics, operations and strategy; logistics; organisation; command; doctrine; the media; culture; and the legacy of 1918.

There are a limited number of slots available for early-stage scholars to give papers. Please contact Professor Gary Sheffield with offers of presentations.

Organised by the Centre for First World War Studies, University of Birmingham
Defence Studies (Army); Defence Studies (Royal Air Force); Defence Studies (Royal Navy)

Speakers include:
Gary Sheffield, Sebastian Cox, Stephen Badsey

For more information visit the conference website.

Gallipoli, Combined Operations and Air Power

Just a bit that I have been working on lately for my thesis. This is part of my attempt to place air power and combined operations in its historical context and explain where the thinking on air powers use in the type of operation came from. Comments always welcomed and wanted.

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The experience of the First World War had a profound affect on the development on all aspects of British military doctrine in the inter-war period and this was no less true of Combined Operations.[1] In October 1919 the Army and the Royal Navy held the first Combined Operations exercise at the Army Staff College (ASC) and it was during this exercise that the importance of air power on Combined Operations was first identified. Major General Anderson, Commandant of the ASC, observed that the most important lessons from the First World War was that Combined Operations ‘…will in the future have to be considered as a combined operation involving all three services..’[2]

The key experience for Combined Operations from the First World War came from operations conducted during the Dardanelles Campaign in 1915 and the small raids conducted along the Flanders coast, the most notable of which was the raid on Zeebrugge on 22/23 April 1918.[3] As for Gallipoli, Kenneth Clifford has noted that ‘The lessons of Gallipoli were more than a past experience…’[4] Thus, it would be this operation that would be the guiding hand on the development of British Combined Operations doctrine during the inter-war years.

The Dardanelles campaign was a failure, on that most historians’ agree. In the aftermath of the campaign the Dardanelles Commission was set up in order to examine the purpose and conduct of the campaign.[5] However, despite its exertions and criticisms, the conduct of air power during the campaign was overlooked as a contributory factor to the problems that the forces deployed during the campaign faced.[6] However, air power did not live up to it expectation as, in line with other campaigns of the First World War, air power did not contribute in the war the airmen expected it to. Eric Ash has noted that, Colonel Frederick Sykes, the senior airmen for much of the campaign, ‘…failed to appreciate the technological limits of air power…’[7] During the campaign the main roles for the air forces deployed were those normally associated with air power in the early years of the First World War; tactical reconnaissance (Tac R) and artillery reconnaissance and spotting (Arty R).[8] However, as the campaign progressed, as in other theatres, other roles came to the fore. For example, during November and December 1915 attempts at Battlefield Aerial Interdiction (BAI) were made upon important logistical centres such as Ferejik and Dede Agach in an attempt to dislocate the battlefield from the Turkish lines of communication.[9] Also throughout much of the campaign Turkish troop movements from railheads became targets of opportunities for pilots.[10] In conducting the withdrawal from Gallipoli the two wings of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) were tasked with maintaining patrols overt the peninsula in order to maintain air superiority and stop Turkish aeroplanes from interfering in the retreat; in this they were successful and an important lesson in combined operations learnt.[11]

Despite some limited success near the end of the campaign the experience of air power for much of it had been frustrating. In June 1915, the aforementioned Colonel Sykes was sent to the Dardanelles to assess the use of air power and the problems it was encountering. Through his subsequent report and his command of the RNAS units employed during the campaign several key problems can be identified. The first key problem was one of command relationships. When Sykes went out to the Dardanelles the RNAS commander on the scene was Wing Commander C R Samson, a man noted to be uncooperative and tactless.[12] The relations between both men can be best described by Vice Admiral de Robeck’s communication to the First Sea Lord at the end of August 1915 when he noted that he hoped that Samson and Sykes would work well together but that ‘…an unfortunate publication…has appeared here…’ in which ‘…Samson [was] criticising Sykes.’[13] However, despite this clash Samson did continue to work with Sykes until his departure in November. Despite the emergence of a status quo between Sykes and Samson, relations with other naval officers remained strained and many refused to recognise Sykes’ naval rank, Wing Captain. This problem of command did not help the difficult conditions facing the air forces deployed to Gallipoli.

The RNAS’ main problem was one of reorganisation and reinforcement. The units sent out to support the campaign at its inception were woefully disproportionate to the task at hand. Samson’s squadron, No. 3 RNAS, was the main unit to be initially deployed, was expected to perform a multitude of tasks from spotting to bombing. However, the biggest problem faced by the squadron was one of logistics and organisation. The squadrons consisted of no less than five different types of aircraft which caused many problems when the need for spare parts arose.[14] Also the squadron’s original base of Tenedos was unsuitable for the squadron and eventually the squadron moved to Imbros in July 1915 where a more effective organisation was built up. Sykes also requested the replacement of the ragtag collections of aircraft equipping his command to be replaced and rationalised into single types in order to ease the logistical issues he faced.[15]

Once Sykes dealt with the organisational and logistical issues that his command faced he identified that his force had two objectives. The first was to act as a means of intelligence and communication between the services and secondly, to prevent reinforcements reaching the battlefield. In order to pursue these objectives Sykes came to realise that he also needed to maintain air superiority in order to stop the Turkish air force from interfering with his primary mission. Thus, he recognised that his role was to support the combined operation that was ongoing. For Sykes as an air power theorist this meant he had to think on the strategic and operational level in order to achieve tactical objectives. This meant he needed to build up air power in the region and then utilise it to dislocate the battle space and allow his command to achieve its primary objectives.[16] However, despite the limited success’ already mentioned the campaign ended before air power could have any significant impact upon its conduct. For example, Ash has noted that despite attempts at BAI they were on the whole insignificant.[17]

Yet despite the technological limitation placed upon Sykes’ command many lessons for future combined operations could and were drawn from this experience. The key lessons learnt were, first, that an effective operating base was needed and this was something that would frustrate the services in the inter-war period. Second, once this was established it was noted that for air power to effectively support the land and maritime operations air superiority would be needed, and indeed this would go on to be the primary objective of air power in the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations, which noted that ‘The main aim of air strategy…is therefore to assert the superiority of out air forces over…the enemy…as to prohibit any sustained attack on the expedition…’[18] Third, once this was achieved support operations could operate successfully within the battle space. Thus, the Dardanelles campaign would provide the lessons and context for the development of inter-war Combined Operations doctrine and the application of air power in support of that type of operation. As the Royal Air Force’s official history notes about Gallipoli, ‘For the first time a campaign was conducted on, under and over the sea, and on and over the land.’[19]

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[1] For example, for the experience of the Army see: David French ‘Doctrine and Organisation in the British Army, 1919 – 1932’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2001) pp. 497 – 515

[2] The National Archives, ADM 116/2086 ‘Letter from Major General Anderson, Commandant Army Staff College to the Secretary of the Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 7/01/1920’ p. 1

[3] The literature on the Dardanelles Campaign is vast. Some of the best treatments of the campaign are: Jenny McLeod (Ed.) Gallipoli Reconsidered (London: Frank Cass, 2004) and Timothy Travers Gallipoli, 1915 (Stroud: Tempus, 2001). For the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend see Mark Karau ‘Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 2003) pp. 455 – 481

[4] Kenneth Clifford Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920 (New York: Edgewood, 1983) p. 31

[5] Jenny McLeod ‘General Sir Ian Hamilton and the Dardanelles Commission’ War in History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2001) p. 418

[6] Eric Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912 – 1918’ PhD Thesis (University of Calgary, 1995) p. 248

[7] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 241

[8] Peter Mead The Eye in the Air: History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army, 1785 – 1945 (London: HMSO, 1983) p. 112

[9] H A Jones The War in the Air: Being the Story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, Volume 2 (London: HMSO, 1928 ) pp. 64 – 72

[10] Ibid

[11] Jones The War in the Air, pp. 72 – 77

[12] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 243

[13] Cited in Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 251 and Brad King ‘Gallipoli: The Royal Naval Air Service and the Dardanelles’ The Joint Imperial War Museum/Australian War Memorial Battlefield Study Tour to Gallipoli, September 2000 (2001) p. 8 

[14] King ‘Gallipoli’ p. 3

[15] Jones The War in the Air, p. 57

[16] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ pp. 253 – 256

[17] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 256

[18] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 121

[19] Jones The War in the Air, p. 75

Lions led by Donkeys?

This piece started life as a seminar piece while I was at university studying for my undergraduate degree and to be completely honest my views have not significantly changed. I tend not to agree with the Orthodox opinion of British Generalship and agree with the view that any analysis of their actions is not a simplistic as they make out. This is a brief introduction to what is a complicated and constantly evolving subject. For example, see my review of Elizabeth Greenhalgh’s new book Victory Through Coalition, which is reviewed elsewhere on the blog

The term ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ first came into common usage to describe British military leadership of the Great War when Alan Clark wrote his book The Donkeys.[i] The term is by its very nature polemic and is seen as a method of apportioning blame for what occurred on the western front during the Great War. In Clark’s case he is seeking to lay the blame for the western front squarely at the door of the generals and most notably Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, possible as a means of shifting the blame from politicians, as he was one himself. As Tim Travers comments Clark and other orthodox historians attitudes have, ‘…created …a ‘mud and blood’ image of the First World War, which stressed the horrors of the war and/or the callousness of generals…’[ii]

The former Prime Minister Lloyd George, who sought to blame the generals for the problems of the western front, suggested this opinion of the Great War early on in his memoirs.[iii] The famous military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart in his books on the Great War, Reputations and The Real War, also picked upon it this interpretation of bad British Generalship.[iv] The historian John Laffin in his book British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One[v] has more recently picked upon the interpretation that the western front generals were both aloof and callous in their actions. As Laffin comments the, ‘…senior generals of World War I were limited in their professionalism, in that they gave orders but when things went wrong did not accept responsibility.’[vi] Laffin carries along on this theme and even later in his book has a chapter entitled ‘Haig, Haking and Gough: Incompetence, Callousness and Vanity’[vii] 

Much of the Orthodox interpretation of the war stems from this apparent aloofness, which the generals are argued to have had, and has evolved into a myth of how the Great War was fought. This myth has seriously been perpetuated by appearance of what passes as school history. War poets such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon are commonly passed off as what the war was and how it was fought and are more commonly taught in English lessons rather than History lessons. As Ian Beckett comments, ‘English teachers have much to answers for in terms of the enduring image of the Great War.’[viii] This myth about the Western Front also has a place in popular culture with the production by the BBC of Blackadder Goes Forth. This has often been passed off as an accurate, yet satirical, view of the Western Front. Therefore, the Orthodox interpretation has sought to apportion blame of the Great War away from the politicians, both pre-war and during the war, and lay it at the door of the Generals. This view has been perpetuated into popular culture through the teaching of the war poets in school and through the media. These interpretations have in the past fifteen to twenty years come in for serious criticism from new school of Revisionist historians who have sought to re-asses this situation. The new spate of revisionists have tended to look at the operational side of the debate in an attempt to balance out the attack on Great War British generalship and as Correlli Barnett comments, ‘…by 1918 Haig and his Army commanders…had proved professionally superior to their German…counterparts…’[ix]

Members of this new school of historians have included Paddy Griffith and Tim Travers. Much of their work has been dedicated to looking at the development of tactics and the usage of new weaponry by the army, most notably the tank and air power and the development of the all-arms battle. They find that the orthodox view is structurally flawed as their histories typically finish on the 1st July 1916, the opening of the Somme offensive and pay scant attention to the latter half of the war.[x] However, as Griffith points out, ‘…tactics were already being reformed in quite significant ways at least as early as…2nd July 1916…’[xi] Therefore, by examining the lower areas of operations Revisionists have been able to show that the British generals on the western front were always looking for methods to improve the way the war was fought and to end it as quickly as possible.

Revisionists also note that by not looking any further into subjects such as command and control and battlefield tactics Orthodox historians have failed to see the complete picture of what revisionist argue as the successes of the war, most notably the ‘Hundred Days’ in 1918.[xii] Revisionists believe that the changes instituted by the General Headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force led to the ending of the war and that the advances that were made in 1918 would not have been possible without them. Advances which were greater than those made in the Italian Campaign of World War II thirty years later. Much work has been done on seeking to understand the performance of the British in the war. Further to this Dr John Bourne at the University of Birmingham has been compiling a computer-based biography of divisional commanders in an attempt to understand tactical as well as operational decision-making.[xiii] Also the Imperial War Museum has started the SHLM Project to compile information on divisional operations in the war.[xiv]

So as can be seen the debate on British military leadership has been very politically charged as the orthodox historians, of whom some politicians are members, have sought to lay blame at the door of the generals. Though Revisionists have attempted to move away from this apportioning of blame at look more at the operational level of the war in order to seek an answer to the question of the effectiveness of British military leadership. Most Revisionists would be reluctant to deny that mistakes were made, such as the first day of the Somme, but what they seek to be made understood was that changes were made. Therefore, if they had not been made then how could the war have been won and as such how could the military hierarchy that was involved in these changes be considered ‘donkeys’. As Revisionists’ vehemently point out the military hierarchy were constantly looking for ways to shorten the war with as few casualties as possible.

Therefore, to only consider the debate from the standpoint of the Orthodox historians are, as Revisionists’ claim, fatally flawed in its methodology as it is missing the whole picture. That is that things did change, new methods were introduced and that to only look up to the first day of Somme is only half of the story of British generalship on the Western Front.

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[i] The book was originally published in 1961. The term is taken from a conversation that was apparently held between Colonel Max Hoffman and General Erich Von Ludendorff describing the British army on the western front.

[ii] Tim Travers The Killing Ground: The British Army and the Emergence of Modern Warfare (Routledge, 1990), p. xvii

[iii] Lloyd George’s memoirs, War Memoirs, ran to six volumes and were published between 1933 and 1936.

[iv] Reputations: Ten Years On was originally published in 1928 and then The Real War 1914 – 1918 was published in 1930. Both attempted to lay the blame of the war at the Generals’ feet.

[v] John Laffin British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (Sutton Publishing, 1992). This book picks up to a large extent were Clark left off and seeks to re-interpret what he considers pre-conceived myth about the war.

[vi] John Laffin Butchers, p. 3

[vii] John Laffin Butchers, pp. 79 – 89

[viii] Ian Beckett, ‘The Military Historian and the Popular Image of the Western Front, 1914 – 1918’ The Historian, No. 53 (1997:Spring), p. 11

[ix] Correlli Barnett ‘Saturday Essay’ Daily Mail, June 29 1996

[x] For example see Martin Middlebrook’s The First Day on the Somme: 1st July 1916 (Penguin, 2001). This book, first published in 1971, is typical of the orthodox stance, dealing with as the title suggests with the 1st July 1916.

[xi] Paddy Griffith (Ed.) British Fighting Methods in the Great War (Frank Cass, 1996) p. xii

[xii] See for example been Martin Samuels Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888 – 1918 (Frank Cass, 1995) on the subject of command and control and the more recent Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (Eds.) Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience, 1914 – 19 (Spellmount, 2004), which offers a more detailed and up to date insight. On the issue of battlefield tactics see Paddy Griffith (1994) Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916 – 1918 (Yale University Press, 1994) and his edited work Paddy Griffith (Ed.) British Fighting Methods.

[xiii] The fruits of this labour is to be soon published in book format but much of it can be seen on the Centre for First World War Studies webpage; http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/biogs.htm

[xiv] A good introduction to this project is John Lee’s chapter ‘The SHLM Project – Assessing the Battle Performance of British Divisions’ in Paddy Griffith (Ed.) British Fighting Methods, pp. 175 – 181