Some Qualitative Observations of Air Power at Dieppe…

One of things I looked at in the course of my research was the contemporary qualitative view of the effectiveness of Air Power over Dieppe. This was easily classified into fours areas; political, command, operational and German views of the raid.

At an operational level a useful source was the Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Reports compiled by C P Stacey during the course of the war. Many of these were based upon oral accounts given by either surviving or released soldiers in the period 1942-1945. Therefore, they do not suffer from many of the issues related to oral testimony. Though Stacey’s motive must be born in mind as he was quite happy to confront Mountbatten over what he perceived as the problems of the raid. One of the more interesting things to come out of the accounts below was the issue of identification. Indeed by the D-Day it was common to see aircraft with the so-called ‘D-Day stripes’, however, these were certainly used during Operation STARKEY in 1943 and I have seen some reference to their use at Dieppe. Indeed I have seen a picture of a Free French Spitfire with bands applied over the cowling, however, I can’t find a standing order for this.

Anyway here is what I wrote on this source…

While at a political and command level it can be argued that RAF’s operations over Dieppe were viewed as a success, it is useful to see how those on the beach and on the supporting ships viewed it. Given that the RAF’s primary mission was air cover, their opinion helps to frame whether or not that support was successful from their perspective. The CMHQ reports compiled by C P Stacey form a useful basis for such an analysis.[1] In terms of air power, the views are mixed, varying from negative opinions on the issue of supporting bombardment to positive views on the overall impact of air power. For example, Captain G A Browne of the Royal Canadian Artillery, who served as a Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with the RRC, commented on the cancelling of the aerial bombardment to preserve the element of surprise that;

Further, is surprise easier to obtain, than the preparatory heavy air bombardment which in our case would quite probably have succeeded where surprise, or rather the hope of surprise, failed?[2]

This rather negative view can be contrasted with that of Lieutenant J E R Wood of the Royal Canadian Engineers, who was captured on RED/WHITE beach, commented after the war that

Some of our people later claimed they never saw the Air Force. Of course they didn’t. They were too busy up top keeping the Luftwaffe off us. I can truthfully say we were not machine gunned on that beach except by our own people after we’d folded up. That means the R.A.F. did its stuff.[3]

Two accounts highlight one of the key problems found during JUBILEE; the identification of friendly aircraft and friendly fire due to issues of command and control. Both Captain James Runcie of the QOCHC and Private Maier of the Essex Scottish both discuss the issue of friendly fire on Canadian positions on RED/WHITE beach.[4] However, neither account is critical of the RAF; for example, Maier noted that a late-arriving Landing Craft Tank caused the incident he witnessed, in his opinion.[5] All the force commanders in their reports highlighted the issue of recognition with Roberts noting that ‘A much higher standard of air recognition is required.’[6] This was reiterated by Hughes-Hallett in the ‘Lessons Learnt’ report.[7] The problem of control was noted in an army report in December, which praised the directing of close support aircraft, but noted that the delay imposed by the system then in place needed work.[8]

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[1] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 89 – The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Personal Stories of Participants, 31 December 1942; CMHQ Report No. 90 – The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Further Personal Stories of Participants, 18 February 1943; CMHQ Report No. 142 – Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42, Further New Information, 18 July 1945.

[2] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 89, p. A-9.

[3] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 142, para. 15.

[4] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 89, p. H-6; CMHQ Report No. 90, p. D-3.

[5] DHH, CMHQ Report No. 90, p. D-3.

[6] TNA, DEFE 2/551, The Dieppe Report (Combined Report,  October 1942), p. 143.

[7] TNA, ADM 239/350, Lessons Learnt, p. 1.

[8] TNA, WO 106/4195A, File 24 – Lessons to be Learned from the Dieppe Raid.

Some Concluding thoughts…

Here are some of my general thoughts on the effectiveness of the RAF during the raid on Dieppe. If I was to pull out one general point it would be that unlike what Mountbatten argued i.e that Dieppe provided vital lessons for OVERLORD, for the RAF Dieppe is one pillar of development that feeds in to 1943 but that it had to be understood in context with developments from other theatres.

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In the build up to and during JUBILEE, the RAF showed the degree to which as a service it was willing to integrate into Combined Operations. The fact that in the inter-war years the RAF called for a holistic Combined Operations doctrine illustrates that the RAF was aware of the need to consider inter-service cooperation on operations. That this did not happen was largely down to the other services, especially the RN which wished to keep the focus on amphibious operations. The RAF was aware of the key role it was to play in any Combined Operation and by the start of the war the pre-requisite of air superiority was accepted by all the services. By 1942, the RAF had made a vigorous attempt to integrate itself into the Combined Operations organisation with the setting up of No. 1441 Flight at the CTC. This would eventually become No. 105 Wing, which would have an important role in controlling the crews required for the HQS and FDTs from 1943 onwards. This organisation from 1942 onwards would train squadrons from Fighter, Bomber and Army Co-Operation Commands in the principles relating to the support of Combined Operations. This occurred alongside their normal operations with which they were tasked. That this occurred despite the protestations of Harris, illustrates the importance that the Air Staff placed upon integration and co-operation.

During the course of JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory, as the senior RAF officer, played a full part in the advising and operational decision-making process and during the course of the battle sought to control air operations with a representative onboard the HQS. That Leigh-Mallory was not on board himself highlights the difficulty of commanding air power and the need to be at a central command node to effectively control air assets. This would still be the overall situation in 1944, though eased by the development of the FDT. Leigh-Mallory also illustrated a willingness to work with Mountbatten on future operations when it showed the opportunity to attain his primary goal of air superiority, even though these would become strategic dead end.

The parallel development of Combined Operation doctrine and the operational objectives of Fighter Command merged to give that command its primary mission during JUBILEE. Normally viewed as a selfish act by the RAF, an understanding of Combined Operations doctrine shows that the opposite is actually the case. That the RAF’s view of the role of air superiority had developed to include fighter operations by the time of JUBILEE helps to explain its role. The fact that it aided its Fighter Command’s role in 1942 should not be seen negatively. It illustrates the flexibility of air power in the face of changing operational conditions. The need for air superiority from fighter aircraft had been illustrated in numerous campaigns before JUBILEE, prevented German attempts to gain air superiority in 1940.

That the RAF’s modus operandi during JUBILEE fitted in with Fighter Commands role should as be noted viewed positively. The RAF was seeking to do its best to prevent the Luftwaffe from interfering with the operation. In this, it was generally successful. That the RAF suffered more than the Luftwaffe is not an indication that it was out fought on the day as the detailed analysis above illustrates that many of the airframes were returned to service and many pilots were rescued. This would be a telling factor for the Luftwaffe whose inability to replace losses would cost them in the air battles of the 1943 and 1944. However, the RAF was able to maintain and effective strength in 1943 with a well-trained cadre of pilots. The Luftwaffe was not able to do from 1942 onwards due to poor training and the high rate of losses it was suffering on all fronts.

Possibly the one area where problems occurred in the aftermath of JUBILEE was in the belief held by Leigh-Mallory and Mountbatten that a similar operation could be launched in order to wear down the Luftwaffe by forcing it to fight, even the RAF was forced to admit that the method was a one shot strategy and without the actual landing of significant forces there was unlikely to be a repeat performance. However, given the strategic situation of late 1942 and early 1943 it was perhaps not wrong for it to be tried. Both AFLAME and COLEMAN were strategic dead ends and this was realised by members of the Air Staff who vetoed the operations as far as they could. That they stayed on the agenda may well be explained by Mountbatten’s attempts to garner more power for COHQ, as was seen in the preparation for JUBILEE. However, Leigh-Mallory must not be excused for not seeing the fallacy of this strategy. Despite the failures of late 1942 the strategy was revived as part of deception plans in 1943, however, once again it did not succeed in the aim of bringing the Luftwaffe to battle.

In terms of the direct impact of air power on JUBILEE, it can be argued that with the exception of the loss of HMS Berkeley and some landing craft the cover provided by Fighter Command was useful in preventing the full weight of the Luftwaffe attacking the beaches. It was noted by eyewitness that some of the losses, while regrettable, were not the fault of the RAF as in the midst of battle craft were arriving late and caught in the maelstrom. The loss of HMS Berkeley was primarily the fault of the failure of command and control systems then in place to deal with RAF aircraft flying below three thousand feet. This meant that Luftwaffe aircraft under this height became the RN’s responsiblity, therefore, the loss must be put down to the RN’s AA defences. In general, the direct support provided was very useful. For example, the attacks on the Hess Battery aided No.4 Commando’s operation. Smoke laying was found to be very useful and was most welcome in the withdrawal phase of JUBILEE. The most disappointing aspect was the provision of Tac R which were left with little to do, as the Germans did not send in reserves. However, the battle was costly for the RAF, with aircraft on the direct support mission suffering the most. Nevertheless, the RAF was willing to accept these losses.

Traditional arguments relating to the effectiveness of JUBILEE usually relate to its importance in providing lessons that contributed to the success of OVERLORD. This is certainly the argument made by Mountbatten in his later life and supported by Hughes-Hallett. From an air power perspective, it is hard to support this position. That JUBILEE served a purpose is certainly true. It fitted in with the prevailing view of air power in support of Combined Operations and aided Fighter Command’s key operational objectives; however, these lessons did not last into 1944. By 1943, it became apparent to the Allies that the battle for air superiority in preparation for OVERLORD would have to be fought closer to Germany and due to the technical limitation of Fighter Command’s equipment; this battle would be primarily fought by the 8AAF.

Therefore, if the lessons of JUBILEE were not important in the preparation for OVERLORD, were they as useful elsewhere? The answer to this is that JUBILEE’s importance lay in the impact it had upon events in 1943. JUBILEE acted as an enabler of change. It illustrated problems that had to be resolved if air power was to be fully effective in Combined Operations. The problems the occurred in the command and control of air power during JUBILEE, noticeably the loss of HMS Berkeley, led to the development and refinement of a command and control system that played a useful role in the Mediterranean and come to fruition at Normandy. Had the war gone on beyond 1945 it is also likely that the further development of the FDT concept into ocean going FDS would have been useful to SEAC. The ability to control air power within the area of fleet AA defence during OVERLORD overcame the primary problem encountered during JUBILEE.

JUBILEE also illustrated the need for some form of aerial bombardment in support of Combined Operations, though its exclusion was for valid reasons. In order to deal with this contentious issue, as illustrated by Harris’ unwillingness to allow Bomber Command aircraft to bomb civilian targets in France, the formation of the inter-service committee on fire support was encouraged by discussions emanating from JUBILEE. This committee, led by the RAF examined the issue and made suggestions that would aid the planners of OVERLORD where aerial bombardment was used fully. Indeed the choice of Graham as chair was a perceptible one due to his pre-war experience in Combined Operations doctrine. However, as JUBILEE was an enabler it should be recognised that much practical experience in this issue and the development of the FDT concept came from the Mediterranean, which proved to be a training ground for ideas being developed. The Graham Report that appeared in December 1943 would form one source of information for the planners of OVERLORD. In providing this source of information the RAF illustrated its flexibility and willingness to work with other services on joint issues.

The thesis has sought to re-frame the debate surrounding the RAF at Dieppe by taking a progressive examination of both its operational and doctrinal context. Then it has sought to examine what impact JUBILEE had on air power in Combined Operations. Generally, it can be argued the RAF performed well on the day and that while losses were high these were either replaceable or repairable. Its impact upon on the Luftwaffe is more difficult but it can be said that their losses were more difficult to replace. While losses to the assault force occurred, it can be argued that had the RAF not been fighting for air superiority, thus, providing air cover, they would have been worse. The impact of JUBILEE on future operations is more difficult to assess. Certainly JUBILEE enabled discussions to occur but whether this had a direct link to OVERLORD is debatable given the vast amount of experience be gained in the Mediterranean. Thus, this thesis has hopefully refocused the debate on JUBILEE to an examination of the operational effectiveness of the RAF and the impact on developments in 1943 not 1944.

Publishing my Thesis

I mentioned in my post yesterday that at some point I would like to publish what I have written. To do this I would need to expand the scope of the work but this is not some that is problematic as there were several areas that due to time and space just had to be left. From my introduction I made these observations as to the limitations of my thesis:

Despite the scope of research undertaken there are several areas that, because of limitations of time and the span of the work, have been avoided due to the focus on operational and tactical issues. First, strategic level discussions surrounding the RAF’s role, in particular the argument that the RAF were not interested due to its desire to prosecute the strategic bomber offensive, though by default this thesis does show that this is not a clear as some historians have argued. Second, it does not explore the importance of radar to JUBILEE as John Campbell in Dieppe Revisited has dealt with this effectively. Research also opened several areas that could not be explored but to the word limit; this included the use of balloons in Combined Operations and the RAF’s participation in providing meteorological advice for Combined Operations. If this work were expanded, it would be envisaged that the scope of archival sources would be increased to include various personal papers at assorted institutions and to expand the German perspective using the Bundesarchiv at Freiburg.

Thus, there are several distinct areas where I could bulk out a work such as this and because of the nature of my thesis I have not really described the air action of Dieppe, this having been done very well by Norman Franks in his work The Greatest Air Battle. However, it would be useful to include more of this to give a feel of the nature of operations during the raid.

However, I feel this is a few years off doing as I intend to start my PhD and so time will be precious. However, for financial reasons I intend to start my PhD in 2010 so in the mean time I have been giving some thought as to what can be effectively ‘cut out’ of my thesis and published as articles. This is a discussion I have already had with my supervisor, Professor Gary Sheffield. We have discussed distilling the key points from the thesis into one article and I feel this is a good idea but the thought of cutting 40,000 words into 10-15,000 sounds a bit daunting but a challenge I will enjoy. I do think that if done right this will add to the scholarship of Dieppe.

Another shorter article I have been thinking of playing with is statistical analysis of the losses suffered at Dieppe. This is one element of my final chapter but I feel that it could be taken further and is useful in explaining the nature of air power during Combined Operations and also disproving the normal arguments about the RAF at Dieppe i.e. they suffer more losses than the Luftwaffe, therefore, they must be bad. This to me is rubbish as offensive forces always suffers more proportionally. It is the nature of offensive warfare. It may well be use to link this to Lanchester’s Laws.

Another article, this time moving away from Dieppe, would be on the RAF and Combined Operations Doctrine. My research has highlighted that the orthodox argument of the RAF being fixated on strategic bombing have little basis in records. Actually recent scholarship, in particular David Ian Hall’s work on tactical air power, has started to show that the RAF views were much more nuanced and complex than hitherto assumed. This is certainly true of Combined Operations and an exploration of the RAF’s view and contribution may well be useful.

Most of these seem doable to me and is one of the reasons for me not starting my PhD as soon as I had planned, though I will be spending my time reading up on Leadership theory. I think, considering that eventually I would like to work in academia, that writing these papers and trying to get them published would be advantageous. I suppose a question for all you academics out there is which is more important; published works or qualifications? It always astounds me when I look at a job and they ask for a PhD but what if you have been published. Does this not count for anything?

Submitting my Thesis

Well I am almost at that time. In actual fact I am about two and a half weeks away from when I need to submit even though I still need to finish the conclusion. This isn’t as bad as it seems as I finish work on Friday so I have got time to get it done. 

It has been a very enjoyable experience that I intend to continue when I look to start my PhD very soon. My students are often amazed when I talk about writing 40,000 words but as I try to explain to them it is not that hard. Actual the real problem is trying to stay within the word limit. I have been re-drafting my chapters and I have found that I have just had to cut out section and references them in footnotes in an attempt to make my examiners aware that I know that these issues exist.

I have also been having to decide on a title for the thesis. Initially my proposal was entitled ‘The RAF and the Raid on Dieppe: A Reappraisal?’ However, as time has gone on and research has taken me in certain directions the feel of the thesis has changed to one that also deals with air power and Combined Operations doctrine. I felt that this needed to the reflected in the title. These were the titles I came up with:

1. The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942: A Reappraisal
2. Air Power and Operation JUBILEE, the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942: A Reappraisal
3. Air Power, Combined Operations (Doctrine) and Operations JUBILEE, the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
4. The Effectiveness of Air Power at Dieppe, Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942

Each one had its merits but in the end I have picked 3 but taken Doctrine out of the brackets. I feel this nicely sums up what I have been examining as I have attempted to look at the effectiveness of the RAF from a doctrinal perspective. I have used a linear models of effectiveness for the thesis do this needed to be represented in the title. I think it works. Does anyone think different.

As I say I have been working hard to finish this and I have been doing lots of the fiddly bits to the format. One thing I have prepared is the contents. This is how the thesis is laid out with the key areas that have been discussed:

1. Introduction
2. Air Power and Combined Operations Doctrine from 1914 to the Second World War
   1. Lessons of the First World War
   2. The Royal Air Force and the Problems of the Inter-War Years
   3. The Role of the Staff Colleges and Combined Operations Exercises
   4. Writing the Manual of Combined Operations and the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre
   5. Synopsis
3. The RAF, the Battle for Air Superiority and Planning Operation JUBILEE
   1. The Battle for Air Superiority, 1940-1942
   2. Training for Combined Operations
   3. Planning the Raid
   4. Synopsis
4. Operational Analysis of Operation JUBILEE and ‘Lessons Learnt’
   1. Contemporary Qualitative Analysis of Air Power at Dieppe
   2. Quantitative Analysis of Air Power at Dieppe
   3. Raiding as an Intruder Strategy, 1942-1943
   4. Command and Control of Air Power during Combined Operations
   5. The Graham Report and Aerial Bombardment
   6. Synopsis
5. Conclusion

The next part once I have finished and done my Viva is to look at what I can condense cut out and re-write for publication. I am toying with the idea of expanding the work to include area that time and length precluded me from examining. There is also a lot of narrative that was excluded that could be included to beef it out so who know.

Finally tank you to everyone that has read this blog and made comments of draft sections. Your contributions have been invaluable.

Raiding as an Intruder Strategy, 1942-1943

Another section of my thesis. This concentrates of the efficacy of the policy of using raids as the basis of the the intruder startegy.

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The perceived success of Operation JUBILEE would lead to the belief that raids would bring the Luftwaffe to fight, therefore, producing the means to battle them for air superiority over Northern France. In many respects, the emergence of this strategy, at the behest of Leigh-Mallory who in November 1942 replaced Douglas as AOC-in-C of Fighter Command, can be seen as a continuation of the offensive fighter sweep policy that was Fighter Commands main role in the 1941-1942. In conjunction with the developments that were to come into being in 1943, this scheme of combining raids with an attempt at offensive air action would become an important element of Operation COCKADE; the elaborate camouflage and deception plan aimed at keeping the German guessing as to when and where an invasion would take place.[1] In the year after JUBILEE, there would be various attempts at launching such scheme with varying degrees of success. The three main operation that made it as far as the planning stage, and one would take place, albeit in a slightly different form, were Operations AFLAME, COLEMAN and STARKEY.

As early as 22 August 1942 Leigh-Mallory was writing to Mountbatten saying that ‘I feel that we might profitably conduct a future operation on rather different lines.’[2] In terms of ‘different lines’ Leigh-Mallory suggested the use of commando’s as the assaulting force and in particular he cites the tactical success of Lord Lovat’s No. 4 Commando against the Hess Battery during JUBILEE.[3] Leigh-Mallory contends that one of the disappointing aspects of JUBILEE was the paucity of opportunity for his close support squadrons to attack German reserves, as they were not thrown into the battle. He argued that if a small force were landed on a quiet stretch of coast then this would force the German’s to utilise reserves, therefore, allowing his close support squadron the opportunity to inflict ‘heavy casualties’ upon the enemy.[4] He also noted the role that this type of operation would play in the conduct of the war as a whole as it would aid in the general degradation of the Luftwaffe’s striking force and would contribute to its final defeat.[5] Based upon the information then available to Leigh-Mallory these conclusions are hard to fault, however, it should be considered that in order to reproduce the effect that he was thinking about then a large fighter force relative to the size of the operation would have to be provided to protect the direct support aircraft that were to support the assaulting force. He also fails to appreciate that the sizes of the assaulting force would have to be of such a large size in order to draw in German reserve. Considering that this did not occur at Dieppe it is hard to see what effect a single commando unit would have upon German reserves in order to achieve the effect that Leigh-Mallory was seeking.

However, despite this failure to understand the military requirement of such an operation the idea obviously received the support on Mountbatten who convened a meeting on 7 September at COHQ to examine the feasibility of such an operation.[6] At this meeting, it was outline that the primary purpose of the operation was to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. In terms of naval support it was proposed that a similar number of Hunt class destroyers as used at Dieppe be utilised, however, there was no discussion of ground forces to be used. It was decided, however, that the plan appeared sound and that planning should proceed with the plan to put to the Chiefs of Staff and another meeting to be held on 17 September.[7] Mountbatten submitted a minute to the Chiefs of Staff on 16 September outlining the operation. In this minute, Mountbatten made the claim that it may not even be necessary to land any troops in order to bring the Luftwaffe to battle.[8] Again, it is hard to see the reasoning for this claim based upon the experience of JUBILEE. Despite this Mountbatten also made the claim that AFLAME may have a larger strategic role to play as part of Operation OVERTHROW, the deception plan for Operation TORCH assuming that approval was forthcoming in order to allow the operation to take place in October.[9]

From an air power perspective it is hard to ignore the fact that it appear that Dieppe had been an unqualified success when Leigh-Mallory received reports stating that the Germans were in the process of reinforcing certain position along the French and Norwegian coastline.[10] However, by the time of the second planning meeting Mountbatten had decided that no military force would be landed and that he was seeking the use of a light cruiser from the Admiralty in order to add to the deception. This brought concerns from Leigh-Mallory representative, Air Commodore Harcourt-Smith, who stated that the deception provided had to be strong enough to bring the Luftwaffe to battle; the primary objective of the operation.[11] In order to aid the deception plan it was again decided to make use of a small force of bombers on the night preceding the operation and to make use of dummy parachutists in order to convince the Germans of the operation veracity.[12] In terms of the support to be provided by Bomber Command Air Chief Marshal Harris was supportive but asked that the targets were both more realistic considering the lack of success during JUBILEE and also less politically sensitive. As Harris pointed out to Douglas, his directive from the War Cabinet dictated that only strictly military targets are attacked in occupied territory.[13] Douglas pointed this out to Leigh-Mallory in letter on 26 September, which garnered a response that stated that the suggestions made by Harris had already by considered and rejected and that in particular the bombing of docks was something that the Germans were used to, and unlikely to achieve the results desired.[14] It is evident that despite Harris’ rational objection the nature of the deception bombardment did not change and the town of Berck remained its target.[15] On this issue, Harris received the support of Douglas who laid the fault for this situation at Mountbatten over zealous attitude and hoped that Harris would still ‘play.’[16] ALFLAME was scheduled to take place between 4 and 16 October depending on the weather and primarily it was seen as a virtual repeat of JUBILEE without the ground forces.[17] Thankfully, however, the weather did play its part and ALFAME was postponed indefinitely. It is hard to see how the force involved could have induced the Luftwaffe to come to battle with the RAF. However, this did not stop planning for a similar operation-taking place.

By early October, Mountbatten was again seeking authorisation launch an operation with the objective of inducing a favourable air battle for Fighter Command.[18] In his covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten admits to the operation being similar in conception to AFLAME, therefore, by default JUBILEE, and that it were complementary to the ongoing CROSSBOW deception for Operation TORCH.[19] In effect, many elements that were prevalent in the planning for AFLAME re-appear in COLEMAN such as Mountbatten insistence that night bombing was vital to the operations success. In preparation for the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 22 October to consider the plan ACAS (P) was asked to prepare a summary of the viability of the operation. To enable this to occur both the Directors of Fighter and Bomber Operations were asked for their comments on the plan.[20] The memorandums illustrate the difficulties of inter-service co-operation. The Director of Fighter Operation (DFO) commented that the plan produced by Mountbatten illustrated the usual ‘…hurried sort of operation…’ that he had become known for.[21] The DFO noted that in his covering letter to the Chiefs of Staff he claimed to have had discussions with the heads of Fighter and Bomber Command about the operation. However, the DFO notes that this was certainly not the case with Harris who had first heard of the plan on 19 October when he was asked to examine the outline plan.[22] DFO does not refer to Douglas or Leigh-Mallory, who due to their involvement with AFLAME, were most likely aware of plans to re-launch it. Despite this the tone of the memorandum is one of frustration at Mountbatten’s tactics in trying to force the operation through the planning and approval process without due diligence of the procedures; an issues that was prevalent during the decision to re-launch Dieppe.[23] The DFO noted that if Mountbatten wanted the support of the RAF he should be careful to work within the appropriate channels.[24] The Director of Bomber Operations (DBO) backs this up by confirming that until 19 October no one at Bomber Command had seen the plan. In veiled terms, DBO claims that Mountbatten lied on the outline to the Chiefs of Staff.[25] This was of course a major issue for commands who were involved in constant operations. However, this was not, as already noted, the first time Mountbatten had attempted to circumvent the system, however, the opinions of the DFO and DBO would be brought forward to the Chiefs of Staff through the memorandum prepared by ACAS (P) for the 22 October meeting.[26]

At an operational level both DFO and DBO were concerned about the timings and appropriateness of the operation. The DFO noted that from Fighter Command’s perspective the decision to seek a battle for aerial superiority was a good idea, however, prevailing weather condition for November, when the operation was due to take place, would not aid the aim of the operation.[27] DFO was particularly concerned about the affect the weather would have on issues such as bombing accuracy and the fact that cloudy conditions would hinder offensive fighter operation due to the enemy’s ability to use cloud cover to escape.[28] DFO was also concerned about the level of support that Mountbatten was expecting from No. 2 Group’s light bombers and it was pointed out that support from the Americans would be needed and that even if this were possible high casualties were to be expected.[29] This was supported by the DBO who pointed out that at Dieppe the limited actions of No. 2 Group had caused a high rate of wastage and that if the required numbers could be collected then the same would occur.[30] On the issue of night bombing, the DBO re-iterated the concerns that Harris raised during AFLAME over the issue accuracy and civilian casualties. DBO contended that given the probable weather conditions night bombing should be considered incidental to the operation.[31] These views were summarised by ACAS (P) and submitted to the Chiefs of Staff for consideration with the caveat that the plan was a weak one given the prevailing operational issues that faced the air force in an attempt to gain a favourable victory.[32] In the aftermath of this appreciation and the Chiefs OF Staff meeting on 23 October Mountbatten was ordered to re-evaluate the plan in light of the navy’s decision not to provide him with six Hunt class destroyers and Portal’s decision to not allow fighter aircraft for close support operations.[33] Therefore, by late 1942 the attempt to draw the Luftwaffe to battle using raiding as bait for air action had ended. In many respects in highlighted a strategic dead-end, though not one that was not worth examining. Dieppe was in many respects the intruder strategy of 1941 writ large, therefore, the AFLAME and COLEMAN can be considered Dieppe writ large. However, they illustrate the degree to which Dieppe had been a one shot operation and that the likelihood of success a second time was unlikely especially so soon after Dieppe given the prevailing operational condition of the time.

Despite the apparent failure of using raiding as a means to bring the Luftwaffe to battle, due to opposition and unsatisfactory conditions, this strategy would receive renewed vigour under the auspicious of the planning for the invasion of Europe during 1943. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, discussion took place concerning the nature of operation during the forthcoming year. In a report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was decided that there were three possibilities for cross-channel operations during 1943. These were categorised as raids, operations with the purpose of seizing a bridgehead and an uncontested return to the continent.[34] The purpose of any future raids was described as provoking a major air battle and inflicting causalities on the enemy, therefore, a degree of continuity can be seen in the planning of raids in late 1942 and in 1943.[35] These proposed operations would eventually evolve into Operations COCKADE, OVERLORD and RANKIN.[36] It was assumed that by August 1943 there would be sufficient air power resources for the purpose of either of these operations, however, it was noted that the home based operational commands of the RAF would require re-organisation in order to make offensive air operations more effective.[37] This re-organisation, based on lessons in Europe and out in the Mediterranean, would lead to the eventual formation of the RAF’s 2^nd Tactical Air Force. In a report by the Combined Commanders to the Chiefs of Staff, it was made clear that from an air power perspective it was crucial that sufficient aircraft were available for maintaining air superiority.[38]

A key element in the preparations for the invasion of Europe was Operation COCKADE, which was conceived as a deception plan with the purpose of pinning German forces in the west for fear of possible large-scale operations against the continent.[39] COCKADE consisted of three subsidiary operations, STARKEY, WADHAM and TINDALL. Both STARKEY and WADHAM were to be inter-dependent with STARKEY acting as the main assault and WADHAM as a follow-on force landing on the Brittany peninsula.[40] Of these operations STARKEY is most important for consideration in this thesis as inherent to it planning was the desire to draw the Luftwaffe to battle.[41] The outline plan for STARKEY noted that it was ‘…primarily designed to compel the German Air Force over a prolonged period to engage in air battles of attrition…’[42] Thus, it becomes apparent that in terms of effectively deceiving the German of the Allies intentions in 1943 raiding with the purpose of forcing an air battle had become an important element of preparations for the invasion. In its basic conception, STARKEY sought to feign the movement of a large number of troops and to suggest to the Germans that a major operation was to take place in the area of Boulogne. As these movement took place a crescendo of air operations would take place in the vicinity in an attempt o bring the Luftwaffe to battle. Then in the final phase of the operation, it was intended to demonstrate amphibious force of the French coast but not to actually land them. In all the operation, unlike JUBILEE, was to last for a period of three weeks with air operations reaching their peak by early September 1943.[43] As with previous planned operations and JUBILEE Leigh-Mallory, now promoted Air Marshal and AOC-in-C Fighter Command, was to take control of the air force during the operation. Due to the planned scale of STARKEY, planning was spread over several months from March to August 1943. The air plan called for the use of significant amount of Allied air power from both the RAF and the United States Army Air Force. In this respect General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Army Air Force (8AAF), aided Leigh-Mallory in the planning process.[44] From an air power perspective, the planning for STARKEY was similar in many respects to the operation that had gone before it. This should come as no surprise due to the involvement of Leigh-Mallory. However, one area where it did divert from previous operations was in the use of large numbers of bombers. Previously issues over accuracy and the possibility of civilian casualties had led to the abandonment of their use. However, at the time of JUBILEE, this was not considered a major issue due to the factor of tactical surprise. Yet for STARKEY their use was considered vitally important to the deception plan. This does not mean that there were not questions raised over the use of bombers. Harris again questioned the viability noting that the initial level of bomber support to be provided was ‘…just the sort of thing an idol army dotes on…’ he was supported in this view by Eaker who was not willing to waver from the Pointblank Directive that had been issued to both himself and Harris.[45] Thus, while bomber forces were to be used they were not used on the levels intended.

The air plan called for three phases of operations, first, the preliminary phase was to call for the reinforcement of Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group between 16 and 24 August, second, the preparatory phase called for a increase in operation with reconnaissance over the target area and bombardment of key installations between 25 August and 7 September, finally, the culminating phase called continually attacks on vital installation such as coastal batteries in preparation for the sailing of the naval force that was to demonstrate of Boulogne. The naval force was to be protected by an air umbrella in an attempt to lure the Luftwaffe up.[46] As already, noted significant forces were tasked to take part in STARKEY with No. 11 Group reinforced to seventy-two squadrons. For the culminating phase by 8AAF and Bomber Command, promised three hundred sorties each when available.[47] The issues of availability came around because Bomber Command had just begun its assault upon Berlin, thus, Harris complained to the Chiefs of Staff that this interfered with his primary mission. However, he was ordered to make a portion of aircraft available for STARKEY, thus illustrating the importance placed on this operation.[48]

In general operation proceeded as planned over the period of the operation and during the period of D-Day, 7/8 September Fighter Command flew some seventeen hundred sorties on fighter cover duties. Despite the air effort the Germans did not respond in the manner hoped for with only small forces engaging the attacking bombers and fighters that were over the battlespace. By this time, the Luftwaffe in northern France had standing orders to avoid combat where numbers were unadvantageous and the Air Historical Branch narrative comments this was probably a lesson learnt from Dieppe.[49] However, despite this apparent disappointment, lessons were learnt and they were able to be refined in preparation for the invasion in 1944. Much like at Dieppe concerns were still being uttered concerning the command and control of forces during the operation. It was noted that the Headquarters ship was not positioned advantageously for the control of fighters and that communications with airfields was far from good. This was an issue, as seen below, that was already being examined in light of Dieppe and operation elsewhere. It was also noted that in terms of strategic reconnaissance for the operation had been inadequate had this been an active operation.[50]

In other areas, STARKEY aided allied preparations for Normandy, for example, in the area of deception, Campbell has argued that lessons learnt during STARKEY affected FORTITUDE SOUTH. It had been intended that FORTITUDE SOUTH take a similar form to STARKEY but upon examining the results of STARKEY this plan was revised.[51] The issue of bombing during STARKEY has remained a point of contention with Cumming’s work concentrating on this aspect of the operation.[52] Considering the similarities between JUBILEE and STARKEY and the key issue raised by Villa over the lack of aerial bombardment, it is interesting to compare this with a work that is at odds with the efficacy of bombing. A possible explanation for this divergence arrives from the issue that unlike JUBILEE STARKEY did not actually land any troops, therefore, for it is difficult to understand there use. However, despite this, there is a link between doctrine, which did state bombardment should be used where possible but was not an overriding concern, and attempts to consider the use of bombing in raids such as STARKEY after Dieppe. From an air power perspective, STARKEY helped shake the belief that air superiority could be won over the invasion area during the operation, a belief that had existed from Dieppe in 1942 and exemplified in the planned operations of that autumn.[53] This led to the precondition that air superiority was a direct pre-requisite for OVERLORD’s success. Thus, by 1943 it can be contended that the attempts at combining feint raids with the desire to engage the Luftwaffe had not had the effect of drawing down German strength but had instead aided in learning lessons for 1944 in the area of deception and the necessity of air superiority. In many respects, the issue of air superiority had long been understood and that operational experience brought home the realties of inter-war doctrine of its importance in Combined Operations. For example, the Manual of Combined Operations had noted that where possible and using advanced landing ground air superiority should be gained in advance of any planned operation.[54]

 

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[1] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘The Air Defence of Great Britain: Vol. V – The Struggle for Air Supremacy, January 1942 – May 1945’ p. 274

[2] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[3] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[4] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[5] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Mountbatten’ 22 August 1942, p. 1

[6] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 1A – Minutes of Meeting to Consider Operation “AFLAME”’ 7 September 1942

[7] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 1A – Minutes of Meeting to Consider Operation “AFLAME”’ 7 September 1942

[8] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Minute to the Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Combined Operation reference Operation AFLAME’ 16 September 1942

[9] TNA, DEFE 2/67 ‘Minute to the Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Combined Operation reference Operation AFLAME’ 16 September 1942

[10] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 3A – Message from COHQ to Leigh-Mallory’ 18 September 1942

[11] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 4A – Minutes of a Meeting of the Force Commanders of Operation “AFLAME”’ 17 September 1942, p. 2

[12] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 6A – Letter from Leigh-Mallory to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 23 September 1942

[13] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 11B – Letter from Harris, AOC-in-C Bomber Command, to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 25 September

[14] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 11A – Letter from Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command, to Leigh-Mallory’ 26 September 1942; AIR 16/762 ‘File 12A – Letter from 11 Group to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 28 September 1942

[15] TNA, AIR 16/763 ‘Operation “AFLAME’ – Royal Air Force Operation Order No. 1’ p. 1

[16] TNA, AIR 16/762 ‘File 13A – Letter from Harris, AOC-in-C Bomber Command, to Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 30 September 1942

[17] TNA, AIR 16/763 ‘Operation “AFLAME’ – Royal Air Force Operation Order No. 1’ p. 1

[18] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Operation “COLEMAN” – Outline of the Operation’ 18 October 1942

[19] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Covering Letter to Outline of Operation “COLEMAN”’ 18 October 1942

[20] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942; AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942

[21] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[22] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[23] On the issue of re-launching Dieppe and Mountbatten’s role in changing procedure see, Peter Henshaw, ‘The British Chief of Staff Committee and the Preparation of the Dieppe raid, March-August 1942: Did Mountbatten really evade the Committee’s authority?’ War in History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 197-214

[24] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[25] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942

[26] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Memorandum by ACAS (P) on Operation “COLEMAN” for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting on 22 October 1942’ 20 October 1942, p. 1

[27] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2

[28] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, pp. 1-2

[29] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Fighter Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 1

[30] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2

[31] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Director of Bomber Operation to ACAS (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN”’ 19 October 1942, p. 2

[32] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Memorandum by ACAS (P) on Operation “COLEMAN” for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting on 22 October 1942’ 20 October 1942, p. 2

[33] TNA, AIR 20/4529 ‘Extract from the Chiefs of Staff’s 239^th Meeting, 23^rd October’ 24 October 1942

[34] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 1

[35] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 1

[36] John Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY, 1943: ‘A Piece of Harmless Playacting’?’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1987) p. 92

[37] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the British Joint Planning Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Continental Operations in 1943’ 22 January 1943, p. 2

[38] TNA, AIR 20/5105 ‘Report by the Combined Commanders – Some Basic Factors Concerning and Opposed Landing in France and the Low Countries’ 22 March 1943, p. 1

[39] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 274

[40] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 93; TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 274

[41] The most useful works on STARKEY are, Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ and Michael Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice: The Allied Bombing of Le Portel, 1943 (Stroud: Sutton, 1996)

[42] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, p. 1

[43] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 275; AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 1-2; Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice, pp. 25-31

[44] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 275

[45] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ pp. 95-96

[46] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 2-3

[47] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Appendix ‘A’ – STARKEY Order of Battle in Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp. 1-4

[48] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 276

[49] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 280

[50] TNA, AIR 40/312 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation “STARKEY”, 16^th August-9^th September 1943’ 16 September 1943, pp.28-30

[51] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 107

[52] Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice, passim

[53] Campbell, ‘Operation STARKEY’ p. 107

[54] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 121

Air Power and Planning Operation RUTTER/JUBILEE

Just another section from my thesis. This time it deals with some of the issues thrown up during the planning for Dieppe.

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The genesis of Operation JUBILEE lay in a decision on 14 June 1940 to appoint Lieutenant-General Alan Bourne as ‘Commander of Raiding Operations on coasts in enemy occupation and Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations.’[1] This appointment was made in the aftermath of a series of memorandum written by the Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, to his Chief of Staff, Major-General Ismay on 4 and 6 June 1940. In these memorandums, Churchill called for the ‘…joint Chiefs of Staff to propose me measures for a vigorous, enterprising and ceaseless offensive…’ against German held territory.[2] Bourne had under his command six independent commando companies that had been formed for the Norway campaign. Unfortunately for Bourne the first raids under his command were described by Churchill as a ‘…silly fiasco…’[3] Churchill, displeased with these early failures, replaced Bourne with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations on 17 July 1940.[4] Keyes had been the architect of the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918.[5]

Over the next year, raiding became an inherent part of British strategy in the war against Germany and a series of raids were launched against enemy held territory. However, Keyes faced problems in the planning and implementation of operations and on many occasions during 1941 these problem came to a head with the Chiefs of Staff Committee.[6] Eventually in the aftermath of a disastrous exercise in August 1941 he brought his concerns to the attention of with the Chiefs of Staff; especially the concern of who was to issue orders to force commanders. In the ensuing debates Keyes had a new directive drafted for his role and was re-titled Advisor on Combined Operations.[7] However, Keyes could not accept this and on 27 October 1941, Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced him.[8] Mountbatten, with the backing of Churchill, began to conduct larger and larger raids against the enemy coasts, most notable at St Nazaire and Bruneval.[9] Thus, by early 1942, despite a tumultuous background, raiding and combined operations had become a distinct part of British military operations against the Axis powers.

The origins of the raid on Dieppe lay in an Anglo-American strategic decision taken in April 1942 to increase the scale and frequency of raids.[10] The decision had a clear impact upon the RAF as it meant that as operations increased in scale they would require greater support, specifically in the form of air cover. The increase in scale also had the advantage of allowing the Fighter Command to continue its policy of offensive air operations against the Luftwaffe. While this may at first appear a selfish decision the motive can be viewed, through an understanding of Combined Operation doctrine, as altruistic, because if the RAF sought an aerial battle it would aid it in the aim of providing air cover for the assaulting forces. However, even before this decision was made raids had in general become larger in scale. For example, at the end of 1941 Operation ARCHERY, the raid on Vaagso Island, had seen the first truly combined operation undertaken by COHQ.[11] In terms of RAF participation, the operation had the support of bomber and fighter aircraft. In terms of forces structure, much like at Dieppe, fighters were predominant with five squadrons of long range Bristol Beaufighters’ and Blenheims’ being utilised. In terms of bombers there were twenty-nine Handley Page Hampdens supplied by Bomber Command.[12] The key role during the operation was to cover the operation and maintain air cover over the battlespace. ARCHERY illustrated the importance of air cover to the success of Combined Operations and that attrition in providing cover would be expensive for fighters with eleven aircraft lost.[13] Thus, in general by March/April 1942 raids on the continent were becoming ever larger in size and scope of their objectives. It is in this background that the raid on Dieppe emerged.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in 1942 General Officer Commanding Southern Command and involved in the planning for Operation RUTTER, the precursor to JUBILEE, noted about the planning of the raid that:

‘My own feeling about the Dieppe raid is that there were far too many authorities with a hand in it; there was no single operational commander who was solely responsible for the operation from start to finish, a Task Force Commander in fact.’[14]

Montgomery’s comment on the planning of the Dieppe Raid would appear on the surface prescient if was not written some fourteen years after the raid and seen through his experience of Operation OVERLORD, where an overall commander was in place. Unfortunately, this teleological view of the planning of Dieppe has persisted in the historiography of the raid and has distorted our understanding of some of the key issues raised during the planning process.[15] The 1938 Manual of Combined Operations discussed the merits of three systems of command in Combined Operations, these were, Joint Command, Unified Command and Command by One Service.[16] Early on in the planning process, it was decided that the system of command would by either Joint Command or Command by One Service.[17] While this decision maybe seen by Montgomery as having been the root cause of the problems at Dieppe it does highlight the difficulty of planning for larger raids that faced COHQ in early 1942. Up until this point, the majority of raids had been small and there was little experience on which to make a decision on the system of command. Thus, by early May, Leigh-Mallory was appointed the air force commander in a joint system of command alongside Major-General Roberts as military commander and it was proposed the Vice-Admiral Baille-Grohman as naval commander.[18] With the exception of the change of Captain Hughes-Hallett for Baille-Grohman, this would be the command structure in place when JUBILEE was remounted in late July.

The planning for RUTTER/JUBILEE has opened up several issues concerning air power, as there were two key changes to the plan between the cancellation of RUTTER and the remounting of JUBILEE; namely the use of a preliminary bombing raid and the use of airborne force to attack gun batteries on the flanks of the assault. The lack of Bomber Command involvement has becoming a major point of contention with Brian Loring Villa noting that, ‘Without heavy air bombardment, the disparity in fire-power proved fatal to the Canadian and British invaders.’[19] This theme has continued with Robin Neillands claiming that Leigh-Mallory’s decision to remove the support of bombardment was the result of loyalty that pressed him ‘…to accept a decision that fundamentally undermined the possibilities of success at Dieppe.’[20] However, both of these accounts are viewing JUBILEE from the viewpoint of the invasion of Normandy and they fail to appreciate the implication of utilising heavy strategic bombers for what amounted to a small-scale operation within the context of the Second World War. They also do not take account of the prevailing doctrinal view on the use of aerial bombardment in the support of Combined Operations. The Manual of Combined Operations noted that only ‘Under certain conditions support of the landing by air bombardment will be of value.’[21] However, the Manual of Combined Operations notes that:

‘To what extent this support can be provided will depend on the number of aircraft available and other operations required of them. In most cases the general struggle for air superiority, local operations in defence of the landing against enemy aircraft, and spotting and reconnaissance duties will have prior claims.’[22]

Thus, even before the war began it was laid down in Combined Operations doctrine that while it would be advantageous to have access to the use of aerial bombardment it should not be counted on due to other ongoing operations. Before RUTTER/JUBILEE, aircraft from Bomber Command had been utilised in both the raid on St Nazaire, Operation CHARIOT, and Vaagso, Operation ARCHERY, and, for example, at St Nazaire the use of aircraft had been used to try to divert attention away from the assault. However, their strange action over St Nazaire, where they circled and dropped single bombs, alerted the garrison to a possible attack on the town, and at midnight the garrison received orders to repel a possible parachute attack.[23] Thus, the use of Bomber Command in diversionary operations may have compromised the success of this operation. Also as already noted above bomber operations during Operation ARCHERY were expensive in terms of effort given and results achieved. It is, therefore, more surprising that in the initial planning for RUTTER that bombing appeared. It should be considered that given the nature of operations that were to occur over Dieppe and the order Leigh-Mallory received from Douglas on 13 April the decision not to include bombers did not divert attention from the primary aim of air cover during the raid; the provision of effective air cover. As early, as 14 April aerial bombardment was planned as a precursor to the landings with it being noted that the target will be the town generally.[24] However, it was noted in Mountbatten’s appreciation given to the Chiefs of Staff that the approval for bombardment was required from the War Cabinet due to the standing directive that covered the use of bombers over occupied territory.[25] However, by the planning meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory argued that bombing would not add anything to the operation and it would denude the element of tactical surprise.[26] Another factor leading to this decision was Harris’ contention that bombers could not be used before twilight, thus, leaving only a window of five minutes for bombers before the start of the operation.[27] Leigh-Mallory’s decision was also affected by the conclusion of the War Cabinet reference the use of aerial bombardment, which stated that it should only be used when accurate attacks could be guaranteed.[28] Mountbatten would attempt to modify this directive but as seen by the meeting of 5 June Leigh-Mallory had concluded that it would not be effective anyway.[29] While Villa has contended that Leigh-Mallory’s decision to cancel the bombing was based upon prescient analysis of its effect upon the landing force and Harris’ intransigence it is clear that he states his objection to their effectiveness at the 5 June meeting.[30]  Villa also points out on the issue of surprise that Dieppe had been bombed several times earlier; however, it is difficult to see how this relates to the issue of support for a Combined Operation.[31] Villa’s reliance on the analysis of the official historians, C P Stacey and Stephen Roskill, who stated that while the problems were difficult but not insurmountable raises the question of their understanding of the use of air power in support of combined operations.[32] Prevailing doctrine clearly stated that bombing should be used where possible but was not the overriding concern of the air force commander during operations.[33] In addition, recent research has explored the problems of using aerial bombardment in support of ground operations, which clearly recognises the problems inherent with their use; therefore, while Villa has made a case for their use and the reasons why they should have been used it does not stand up well to scrutiny.[34]  Thus, while much has been lamented over the lack over bombers support it can be argued that this decision was taken four months before JUBILEE took place and three months before RUTTER was due to occur and that the decision was based upon sound advice from the relevant commanders with experience of air power. When combined with Leigh-Mallory’s standing orders from Douglas, the issue of tactical surprise and Harris’ orders on bombing occupied territory it is understandable to that bombing of Dieppe was cancelled.

The other key area that requires some explanation is the decision to replace the airborne attack on the flanks with Commandos. This was, in hindsight, the right decision as both No. 3 and 4 Commando achieved the most success on the ground during the raid. Indeed, No. 4 Commandos’ success would form the basis of a British Army doctrinal pamphlet on attacking gun positions.[35] However, the reasons for this change lay in the state of Britain’s airborne forces in 1942 and their lack of effective means to deploy a sizable force accurately.[36] From the very start, it was envisaged that airborne troops were to be used to protect the flanks of the operation and cut enemy communications.[37] It was intended that the 1^st Parachute Battalion, reinforced to the strength of one and a half battalions, be dropped near Beneval-le-Grand in order to neutralise gun batteries either side of Dieppe.[38] However, even at this stage question were raised with Mountbatten’s AACO questioning the advisability of using parachute troops in this manner.[39] Army Co-Operation Command was responsible for the control of squadrons tasked with dropping airborne forces and during May and June, the problem of squadron allocation and usage become an operational issue for RUTTER. At a staff meeting on 11 May Harris informed Mountbatten that due to overriding operational requirements Nos. 12 and 142 Squadrons were required by Bomber Command.[40] Much of this is set against the background of Operation MILLENIUM and Harris’ large raids of mid-1942. The loss of these squadrons led to a cut-down in the size of the airborne force for the raid, in particular the loss of glider troops. The loss of squadrons was a key issue of concern for Mountbatten who appealed to Portal on 26 May to release the squadrons. Mountbatten was particularly concerned that if the squadrons suffered heavy casualties then this would put at risk the use of these squadrons for the lack of experienced aircrew.[41] Portal urged Mountbatten to discuss the issue with Barrett at Army Co-Operation Command as no command had been obliged by the air ministry to support Bomber Command’s operations.[42] Barrett, who had been on leave, wrote to Portal to state that that he was exercising his prerogative, outlined in Portal’s reply to Mountbatten on 27 May, and recalling the two Whitley squadrons from the planned Bomber Command operation. In the letter he states that he loaned two Blenheim squadrons and the Whitleys to Harris on the advice of DBO, however, the prospect of jeopardising RUTTER meant their recall from operations.[43] However, the lack of effective airframes continued to beleaguer the use of airborne troops in light of the operational needs of other commands. Thus, by 1 June the planned forced was reduced to one battalion.[44] Considering the operational difficulties facing Britain’s nascent airborne force it is understandable that when RUTTER was re-launched as JUBILEE the decision to replace them with Commandos appear in the light of their success a prophetic decision. The decision enabled a concentrated force, rather than a possibly dispersed force, to be landed and assault the position with success.[45] The problem of timings would also have made concentration difficult for airborne force to complete the task successfully. However, the saga of squadron allocation does highlight the difficulties inherent in Combined Operations and the need to prioritise operations.

In preparation for RUTTER two exercises, YUKON I and II, were planned to take place during June. Both of these exercises were deemed failures and must rank as one of the contributing factors in the cancellation of RUTTER.[46] Due to operational commitments there was little involvement from the RAF in YUKON I, however, for YUKON II seven fighter squadrons were tasked with participating in the exercise.[47] The squadrons were to replicate the proposed actions of the RAF during the operation; fighter cover and Tac R. Leigh-Mallory was anxious for the RAF to play its part and to test the process of calling up air cover during the course of the operation.[48] The key concern for Leigh-Mallory in the aftermath of YUKON II was issues of communication between Uxbridge and the area headquarters at Portsmouth. For Leigh-Mallory, this gave concern over communication with the force headquarters during the raid.[49] He was assured that this was being looked into; in fact, earlier in the year at inter-service committee had been formed to examine the issue of communications during Combined Operations.[50]

Despite this concern and the two prominent issues of bombing and airborne troops, planning for JUBILEE ran into few problems from an air power perspective. By the time of JUBILEE, the plan had been simplified to concentrate on air cover with close support a secondary consideration and in this respect, it closely followed the principal outlined in Combined Operations doctrine. The plan called for fighter cover and general protection to the landing force to be provided all through the daylight hours with the most intensive operations coming during the landing and withdrawal. While air cover was provided, low-level fighter and bomber attacks would support the landing troops and provide smoke laying where appropriate. Tac R was to be provided by aircraft from Army Co-Operation Command within both the battle area and the lines of approach to Dieppe. While no bombing was to be used on the town, diversionary raids were planned to attack the airfield at Abbeville by aircraft of the US 8^th Air Force.[51] It was estimated that in the area of Northern France the Germans could deploy approximately two-hundred and sixty fighters and one-hundred and twenty bombers. Against this Leigh-Mallory was able to deploy seventy squadrons, thus allowing him to deploy overwhelming superior numbers as laid out in his operational orders of 13 April.[52] Control of the air battle was to be exercised from No. 11 Group headquarters at Uxbridge and through the normal command and control system of sector control.[53] The HQ Ships HMS Fernie and Calpe provided control of close support aircraft with links to Leigh-Mallory at Uxbridge; Air Commodore Cole on the Calpe represented Leigh-Mallory.[54]Cole was instructed to liaise with the other force commanders and direct operation at low-level, for example, Tac R aircraft from RAF Gatwick that performed reconnaissance along the approaching roads. The system utilised for control of low-level aircraft was the system developed by Army Co-Operation command and based upon forward and rear air links with a tentacle controlling aircraft from the headquarters ship. Reconnaissance was one area where air power aided in both the planning and conduct of JUBILEE. During preparations for RUTTER/JUBILEE RAF reconnaissance aircraft were involved in gathering intelligence of the positions in and around Dieppe. It was responsible for discovery caves in the cliff faces of the two headlands either side of the town. This enabled target identification for the destroyers offshore.[55] Reconnaissance also informed planners of the suitability of the area designated as a sanctuary for landing craft and that in the opinion of both the pilots and Leigh-Mallory the size of the anchorage needed to be reduced in order to present it as a target for bombers.[56] In light of this information, Baille-Grohman examined the possibility of modifying the plan. During the course of the raid, it was planned to make use of Tac R through the communication tentacle in HMS Calpe to co-ordinate air support. Some seventy-one sorties were flown and this was considered lavish in a report written after the raid.[57] There is justification to this claim as when compared to the number of operation conducted by the Western Desert Air Force (WDAF) at the same time the number of sorties for one day equalled half of those being flown by WDAF.[58] Thus, by the time of the issuing of operational orders to squadrons in mid-August the RAF had overcome issues relating the effective use of air power.

 

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[1] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 47, Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Expedition (London: Aurum Press, 2006) p. 25

[2] Cited in Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 47

[3] Cited in Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 26

[4] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 27, Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 52. Fergusson suggests that the title Director went to Keyes head and that he believed he was responsible to the Minster of Defence, Churchill, and not the Chiefs of Staff. This issue was to follow him until his replacement by Mountbatten.

[5] Mark Karau, ‘Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 2003) pp. 455 – 481

[6] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 70-85

[7] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 83

[8] Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 89

[9] Anon, ‘Combined Operations’ in I C B Dear (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 198

[10] Charles Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume I – Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955) p. 324

[11] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 44; Niall Cherry, Striking Back: Britain’s Airborne and Commando Raids, 1940-42 (Solihull: Helion, 2009) pp. 130-163

[12] Appendix X ‘Naval and Military Reports relating to Operation ARCHERY’ in Cherry, Striking Back, p. 337

[13] Appendix XII ‘RAF Losses on Operation Archery’ in Cherry, Striking Back, pp. 349-351

[14] Cited in Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 85

[15] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 86

[16] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ pp. 20-22

[17] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘RUTTER – Planning’ p. 8

[18] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Extracts from Chiefs of Staff Meeting No. 42’ 13 May 1942

[19] Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid, 1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

[20] Neillands, The Dieppe Raid, p. 273

[21] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[22] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[23] C E Lucas Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, Pan Edition (London: Pan Books, 2000) p. 129

[24] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Conclusions of Meeting Held at COHQ on Tuesday 21^st April’

[25] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Extracts from Chiefs of Staff Meeting No. 42 dated 13.5.42’

[26] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Minutes of Meeting of Council and Advisers to CCO and Combined Force Commanders with Lieutenant-General Montgomery in the Chair, 5.6.42’

[27] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 11 May 1942

[28] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 19 May 1942

[29] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 1 June 1942

[30] Villa, Unauthorized Action, pp. 152-153

[31] Villa, Unauthorized Action, p. 153

[32] Villa, Unauthorized Action, p. 153; C P Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: Queen’s Printers 1948) p. 62; Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume II: The Period of Balance (London: HMSO, 1954) p. 241

[33] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 146

[34] See Ian Gooderson, ‘Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Close Air Support Role During World War II?’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No.3, (September 1992.)

[35] TNA, WO 208/3108 ‘Notes from Theatres of War No. 11: Destruction of a German Battery by No. 4 Commando during the Dieppe Raid’ 1943

[36] On the early years of Britain’s airborne force and the various institutional and organisational problems that faced them see; William Buckingham Paras: The Birth of British Airborne Forces from Churchill’s Raiders to 1^st Parachute Brigade (Stroud: Tempus, 2005)

[37] TNA, AIR 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at Combined Operations Headquarters at 1100 Hours 14.4.42 to Discuss Operation “RUTTER” 16 April 1942

[38] TNA, DEFE 2/549 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Operational Orders for 1^st Parachute Battalion’ 2 July 1942

[39] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”’ 14 April 1942

[40] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at 1200 on 11^th May 1942 at Combined Operations Headquarters to Discuss Operation “RUTTER”’

[41] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CCO to CAS’ 26 May 1942

[42] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CAS to CCO’ 27 May 1942

[43] TNA, DEFE 2/542 ‘Planning Notes for Operation “RUTTER”: Letter from CAS to CCO’ 27 May 1942; AIR 8/895 ‘Letter from AOC-in-C Army Co-Operation Command to CAS’ 29 May 1942

[44] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Operation “RUTTER”: Minutes of 1^st Meeting of Combined Force Commanders at Combined Operations Headquarters on 1^st June 1942’ 4 June 1942

[45] On the success of No. 4 Commando see Will Fowler. The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day (London: Collins, 2002); On 3 Commandos role see Brereton Greenhous. ‘Operation FLODDEN: The Sea Fight off Berneval and the Suppression of the Goebbels Battery, 19 August 1942’ Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2003) pp. 47-57. It is useful to compare the performance of the Commandos at Dieppe with similar airborne operation during D-Day. The 9^th Parachute Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Terence Otway was to attack the Merville Battery with strength of six hundred. However, due to scattering this force was reduced to one hundred and fifty. They took the battery with heavy casualties.

[46] Villa, Unauthorized Action, pp. 12-13

[47] TNA, ADM 179/223 ‘Exercise YUKON II: Outline of RAF Participation’ 20 June 1942, p. 2

[48] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held at COHQ at 1400 hrs on Monday, 15^th June 1942, to discuss certain points concerning Operation “RUTTER”’

[49] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25^th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’

[50] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25^th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’; AIR 20/832 ‘Inter-Service Committee on Communications in Combined Operations Interim Report No. 2: Support Communications in Combined Operations’ 14 January 1942

[51] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ pp. 118-119; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[52] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 119; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[53] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 120; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[54] TNA, AIR 41/49 ‘Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V: The Struggle for Air Superiority, 1942-1943’ p. 120; AIR 16/ 746 ‘Combined Plan for Operation JUBILEE’

[55] Michael Shoeman ‘Air Umbrella – Dieppe’ Military History Journal of the South African Military History Society, Vol. 1, No. 5. Accessed at www.rapidttp.com

[56] TNA, DEFE 2/546 ‘‘Minutes of Meeting held on 25^th June at COHQ for Operation “RUTTER”’

[57] TNA, DEFE 2/333 ‘Army Air Support and Tactical Reconnaissance during Operation “JUBILEE”’ p. 2

[58] TNA, DEFE 2/333 ‘Army Air Support and Tactical Reconnaissance during Operation “JUBILEE”’ p. 2

RAF Training Policy for Combined Operations

Bernard Fergusson in his history of Combined Operations, The Watery Maze, has described the RAF as having a nonchalant attitude towards the subject of Combined Operations by stating that they were inclined to take the view that ‘…there was nothing particularly tricky in supporting an amphibious operation.’[1] As has already been illustrated there is little evidence of this being true, however, due to the pressures of the war effort the RAF did have problems in preparing units for possible Combined Operations. It took until November 1941 for any movement to take place in providing COHQ with any form of permanent advisor on air operations; though it should be noted that until this point Combined Operations had been small and required minimal air support. Mountbatten wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, requesting the posting of an officer of the rank of Group Captain to fill the post of Assistant Advisor on Combined Operations (Air) in order to allow him to carry out his duties as Advisor on Combined Operations.[2] CAS replied on 5 November agreeing to release Group Captain Willetts to serve on Mountbatten’s staff.[3] At the same time as this appointment, Mountbatten chaired the first meeting of an Inter-Service Committee that was charged with examining questions of training, equipment, inspection and administration for Combined Operation. From an air power perspective, the key conclusion of the first meeting of this committee was that there was a need for greater RAF participation in order for COHQ’s training programme to be met. In response to this meeting Mountbatten again wrote to CAS to request suitable officers and equipment be seconded to COHQ. Mountbatten stated that ‘At present we have no tested doctrine…for the employment of air forces in combined operations…’; the key word here being tested as there certainly already existed a doctrine on the use of air power Combined Operations as laid out in the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations and in the RAF’s War Manual AP1300.[4] He argued that in order to rectify this situation the only suitable solution was the positing of a ‘…competent and representative body of airman…’ to work alongside officers from the RN and Army.[5] Mountbatten in this letter points out that one of the key issues that had not yet been grappled with for the RAF were some of the more practical issues such as the capture and preservation of aerodromes, which while discussed had not as yet been analysed and competently examined. However, it was noted that the primary aim of air power, as laid out in pre-war doctrine, was the maintenance of air superiority. In a reply to this letter, CAS vigorously picked up the issue and requested that the Director of Plans examine the issue forthwith.[6] The decision was taken initially to appoint a senior staff officer, Air Commodore Walker, a signals officer and administrative officer.[7]

While a nucleus staff was being set up the more pressing question of equipment and the role of the unit based Inverary was being raised by December. The question of the formation of a development flight was dealt with by a meeting of relevant personnel on 24 December 1941.[8] It was at this meeting, brought forward to 23 December, that the decision was taking to form No. 1441 Combined Operations Development Flight. The units remit was to act as an experimental establishment that was to explore aerial problems inherent to Combined Operations and to take part in exercises with the Commando units at Inverary. Initially the unit was to be equipped with Westland Lysnaders but it was envisaged that these would be replaced as soon as possible with more suitable fighter types, specifically the Hawker Hurricane.[9]

At the same time as the formation of No. 1441 Flight there was raised the question of control of air operations in any Combined Operation by Mountbatten. In a letter to Air Marshal Sir Richard Peck, ACAS (G), of 7 February 1942, Mountbatten queried a directive issued to Air Commodore Fullard reference the appointment of force commanders for the air aspect of a Combined Operation.[10] Mountbatten referred to a decision taken at a meeting on 28 December 1941 where it had been decided that until any foothold had been gained on the continent command of any air contingent would fall on the Air Advisor on Combined Operations and then afterward it would devolve onto a force commander.[11] Mountbatten argued that the directive to Fullard was at variance with his role and the role initially given to the Air Advisor in a directive of 6 February 1942 and required clarification of the procedure for the appointment of a force commander from the RAF.[12] This issue of force commander and the role of Mountbatten’s air advisor were clarified in a memo from DCAS to the Director of Plans, which stated that in the opinion of CAS the force commander should be the AOC-in-C of the predominant command involved in the operation and not the Air Advisor on Combined Operations, thus in Operation JUBILEE command would devolve onto Air Marshal Sir Trafford Mallory rather than the Air Advisor on Combined Operations.[13]

With the appointment of an air staff to the COHQ set-up, attention turned to the issue of training the appropriate RAF units in preparation for their participation in projected Combined Operations. A meeting was planned for 9 February 1942 to discuss the training of RAF units in Combined Operations; however, the meeting was pushed back to 16 February. At the top of the agenda of this meeting was which type of training was to be the priority of No. 1441 Flight. These included, first, fighter support and control, second, smoke laying, third, close support and finally, recognition of ships.[14] The meeting agreed that in meeting the first method of training the methods utilised by No. 1441 Flight should match those of Fighter Command as closely as possible in order to ease interoperability for training.[15] Based on a statement by CAS that ‘The RAF will make available in turn six fighter squadrons for training with the Expeditionary Force.’ discussions took place exploring the efficacy of rotating squadrons from operational commands in order to take part in training.[16] Air Commodore Whitworth-Jones, the Director of Fighter Operations, noted that up to fifteen squadrons had been earmarked for exercises and experiments with the then forming expeditionary force and that initially it would be from these squadrons that the initial training units would come from. It was noted that there was a need for Bomber Command squadrons; in particularly those from No. 2 Group, to train and that, the matter was to be discussed with Air Chief Marshal Harris, C-in-C Bomber Command.[17]

Director of Plans, Air Marshal Dickson, had by the end of March issued operational orders to the C-in-C’s of the functional commands involved with Combined Operations; Fighter, Bomber and Army Co-Operation Commands, and took up the issue of supplying appropriate squadrons for training vigorously. The orders, sent out under the aegis of DCAS, Air Vice Marshal Bottomley, note that it was the intention of the Air Ministry to ‘…press forward as rapidly as possible with training and preparation for combined operations.’[18] Air Chief Marshal Douglas, AOC-in-C Fighter Command, was instructed that the intention to train all fighter squadrons in army air support had now been extended to include the ‘…special conditions of Combined Operations.’[19] It was made clear to Douglas that the Air Staff were aware that his command was under sever operational pressures and that the system of rotation being implemented in order to affect the training of units was to be worked out in conjunction with the CCO. Douglas was also ordered to aid Army Co-Operation Command by providing battle experience for three fighter-reconnaissance squadrons.[20] It was also made clear to Douglas that RAF participation in Combined Operation fell into two categories, first, air cover over the area of the operation and, second, support of ground troops in the land phase of the battle.[21] DCAS, in his minute to the Deputy Director of Fighter Operations reference the extent of Douglas’ knowledge, makes it clear that it is his opinion that it is in the second category that he believes that the greatest degree of training is required and that if it makes training more economical and effective then a wing of six squadrons should be made available at any one time depending on operational requirements.[22]

A similar operational order was issued to the AOC-in-C of Army Co-Operation Command.[23] In response to this directive Air Vice Marshal Barrett responded by noting that he had already earmarked three squadron, No. 225, No. 239 and No. 241, to partake in Combined Operations training exercises.[24] However, Barratt raised the issue of the equipment of his squadrons and noted that the current equipment of his units was not appropriate for what it was being asked to perform.[25] This was a similar issue that effected No. 1441 Flight. Barrett believed that if this issue was not dealt with it would seriously impair their training. No. 239 Squadron was to take part in Operation JUBILEE and at the time of this communication it was equipped with Curtiss Tomahawks, which Barrett deemed unacceptable, however, by the time of the operation it had been re-equipped with North American Mustang MkIA’s.[26]

A draft directive was prepared for Bomber Command but not issued. The draft letter directed Harris to provide squadrons from No. 2 Group for training particularly with reference to smoke laying operations.[27] However, the Director of Pans sent the letter to VCAS for verification due to the wide-ranging operations, which No. 2 Group was then undertaking, and it was felt that the addition of another operational requirement could cause problems.[28] At this point, the light bombers of No. 2 Group were involved in a wide range of activities, which were split into operational and training issues. In terms of operations, the group was involved in CIRCUS, Intruder and Channel Stop operations.[29] The key issue for DCAS was to avoid interference in Bomber Commands operations while meeting the requirements for training in Combined Operations and he directed that this be included in any directive to Harris.[30] At the same time, the draft letter was sent to the Director of Bomber Operations who was concerned that certain assurances would have to be given to Harris in particular with reference to the re-equipment of No. 2 Group.[31] Subsequently VCAS, Air Chief Marshal Freeman, wrote to Harris directing him to provide squadrons for training but noting that this activity should not influence operations unnecessarily.[32] Freeman’s letter, and a letter sent on 15 April by Air Commodore Lewis-Roberts, the Director of Operation Training, who outlined the RAF’s training policy with regards to Combined Operations, received a swift reply from Harris who was characteristic in his forthright delivery of his opinion on the plans to provide squadrons for operations that he described as a ‘…hypothetical operation.’[33] The training policy outlined that Bomber Command must train four light bomber squadrons in Combined Operations and that in particular they must familiarise themselves with recognition techniques, close support bombing and smoke laying.[34] Harris noted that this policy was wasteful and that he thought that given the turnover in crews it would be ineffective. Harris suggested that the most effective means of providing training for his crews in these forms of operation would be in the Operational Training Units.[35] Harris received a swift reply from DCAS who re-iterated that the semi-official directive given to him by VCAS on 7 April stood firm and that it was the intention of the Air Staff to proceed promptly with this policy.[36] Thus, Harris was expected to implement the policy despite his apparent objections.

However, despite the objection of Harris, the decision to train units in support of Combined Operations was in the main received positively by the operational heads of the commands responsible for possible support operations. On 1 May 1942, Douglas at Fighter Command received a directive from DCAS on his priority of tasks for future operations. The letter referred to the recent discussions that had taken place on the subject of training for Combined Operations. DCAS prioritised the operations of Fighter Command as:

(a) The intensification of the day fighter offensive which calls for reinforcement of 11 Group with Spitfire squadrons.

(b) Maintenance of a proper state of readiness of squadrons ear-marked for operation “Region”

(c) The training of fighter squadrons in rotation in Combined Operation[37]

Thus, by May 1942, training for a ‘hypothetical’ operation had clearly become one of the primary tasks of Fighter Command in particular and the other functional commands in general. It was noted that units that were earmarked for Operation BLAZING should be the first to rotate through the training program.[38] No. 239 Squadron was the first squadron to go through the training at RAF Abbotsinch and would later serve during Operation JUBILEE. Thus, by the time planning and training was moving forward the RAF had in place a policy and doctrine that not only took account of the need of Combined Operations but that also made it a leading priority in the training tasks of the appropriate functional commands.

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[1] Bernard Fergusson The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations (London: Collins, 1961) p. 82

[2] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Letter from Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten to CAS’ 1 November 1941

[3] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Letter from CAS to ACO’ 5 November 1941

[4] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Letter from ACO to CAS’ 6 November 1941

[5] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Letter from ACO to CAS’ 6 November 1941

[6] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Memo from D. of Plans to VCAS, AMP, AMSO and DWO’ 7 November 1941; AIR 20/5011 ‘Letter from CAS to ACO’ 8 November 1941

[7] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Letter from CAS to ACO’ 8 November 1941

[8] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Memo from D. of Plans to DGO, DWO and DTO’ 21 December 1941

[9] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Minutes of a Meeting held in the Air Ministry, Whitehall, on 23^rd December to discuss formation of an Air Section at Combined Training Centre, Inverary, and of a Combined Operations Development Flight’

[10] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Letter from Mountbatten to ACAS(G)’ 7 February 1942

[11] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Annex to Agenda fro Meeting of Combined Operations Air Committee’ 29 December 1941

[12] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Directive to Vice Admiral, Combined Training’ 6 February 1942, p. 2

[13] TNA, AIR 20/5011 ‘Memo from DCAS to D. of Plans’ 23 February 1942

[14] TNA, DEFE 2/812 ‘Agenda – Meeting to Discuss the Training of RAF Units in Combined Operations’ 5 February 1942, p. 1

[15] TNA, DEFE 2/812 ‘Minutes of the Meeting to Discuss the Training of RAF Units in Combined Operations’ 16 February 1942, p. 1

[16] TNA, DEFE 2/812 ‘Agenda – Meeting to Discuss the Training of RAF Units in Combined Operations’ 5 February 1942, p. 1

[17] TNA, DEFE 2/812 ‘Minutes of the Meeting to Discuss the Training of RAF Units in Combined Operations’ 16 February 1942, p. 3

[18] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 4A – Letter from DCAS to AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 31 March 1942, p. 1

[19] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 4A – Letter from DCAS to AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 31 March 1942, p. 1

[20] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 4A – Letter from DCAS to AOC-in-C Fighter Command’ 31 March 1942

[21] TNA, AIR 20/829 ‘ Minute from DCAS to Deputy Director of Fighter Operations’ 21 March 1943

[22] TNA, AIR 20/829 ‘ Minute from DCAS to Deputy Director of Fighter Operations’ 21 March 1943

[23] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 5A – Letter from DCAS to AOC-in-C Army Co-Operation Command’ 31 March 1942

[24] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 12A – Letter from AOC-in-C Army Co-Operation Command to DCAS

Ref. Training of AC Squadrons in Combined Operations’ 4 April 1942, p. 1

[25] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 12A – Letter from AOC-in-C Army Co-Operation Command to DCAS

Ref. Training of AC Squadrons in Combined Operations’ 4 April 1942, p. 2

[26] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 12A – Letter from AOC-in-C Army Co-Operation Command to DCAS

Ref. Training of AC Squadrons in Combined Operations’ 4 April 1942, p. 2; Norman Franks The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 19^th August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1997) p. 224

[27] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 6A – Draft Letter from Director of Plans to AOC-in-C Bomber Command’

[28] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘Minute by Director of Plans to VCAS reference File 6A’ 31 March 1942

[29] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘Minute by Director of Plans to VCAS reference File 6A’ 31 March 1942

[30] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘Minute by DCAS to Director of Plans reference File 6A’ 31 March 1942

[31] TNA AIR 20/829 ‘Minute by Director of Bomber Operations to DCAS’ 20 March 1942

[32] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 11A – Letter from VCAS to AOC-in-C Bomber Command’ 7 April 1942

[33] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 18A – Letter from AOC-in-C Bomber Command to the Under Secretary for State for Air reference Training Combined Operation – Bomber Command’s Commitment’ 26 April 1942 p. 2; AIR 2/7697 ‘File 20B – Letter from Director of Operation Training to Operational Commanders’ 15 April 1942

[34] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 20B – Appendix ‘A’ – RAF Training Policy and Training Requirements in Combined Operations’

[35] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 18A – Letter from AOC-in-C Bomber Command to the Under Secretary for State for Air reference Training Combined Operation – Bomber Command’s Commitment’ 26 April 1942 p. 2

[36] TNA, AIR 2/7697 ‘File 19A – Letter from DCAS to AOC-in-C Bomber Command’ 30 April 1942

[37] TNA, AIR 20/829 ‘Letter from DCAS to AOC-in-C Fighter Command reference Fighter Command: Priority of Tasks’ 1 May 1942, p. 1       

[38] TNA, AIR 20/829 ‘Letter from DCAS to AOC-in-C Fighter Command reference Fighter Command: Priority of Tasks’ 1 May 1942, p. 2

German Footage of Dieppe

Here is some contemporary German Propaganda footage of the Dieppe Raid. Makes for interesting viewing about the attack.

As to the validity of the footage I am not sure so if anyone has more information I would be interested.

One thing about youtube I like is some of the comments made by people. This piece has a few comments made by Canadians who still insist on blaming the British for throwing Canadians into this operation. The reality is more to do with the fact that by 1942 the Canadians are looking to be used in a major operations. All of this comes back to the debate surrounding Villa’s book and the role of Mountbatten. Villa’s work is extremely conspiratorial about the motives for Dieppe and centre’s much of the blame on Mountbatten. Villa’s work certainly shows that he had an axe to grind. For a more balanced view I would recommend some of the work done by Robert Henshaw who examines the role of Canadian Nationalism in the raid. Henshaw does not absolve Mountbatten but does show that it was far more naunced than Villa argues. As an interesting side note about the importance of Canadian Nationalism in wartime was pointed out to me last year by Trevor Harvey, who was talking about the formation of the Canadian Corps in the First World War, and he noted that nationalism was one of the key driving forces in the formation of that unit and its subsequent employment.

As a sidenote I have started another blog to support a unit my students are taking on Mass Media and Social Change in post-war Britain. It is a bit of an experiment to see how it can support the course. Also social and cultural history are not my areas so any thoughts or tips will be graciously recieved.

Gallipoli, Combined Operations and Air Power

Just a bit that I have been working on lately for my thesis. This is part of my attempt to place air power and combined operations in its historical context and explain where the thinking on air powers use in the type of operation came from. Comments always welcomed and wanted.

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The experience of the First World War had a profound affect on the development on all aspects of British military doctrine in the inter-war period and this was no less true of Combined Operations.[1] In October 1919 the Army and the Royal Navy held the first Combined Operations exercise at the Army Staff College (ASC) and it was during this exercise that the importance of air power on Combined Operations was first identified. Major General Anderson, Commandant of the ASC, observed that the most important lessons from the First World War was that Combined Operations ‘…will in the future have to be considered as a combined operation involving all three services..’[2]

The key experience for Combined Operations from the First World War came from operations conducted during the Dardanelles Campaign in 1915 and the small raids conducted along the Flanders coast, the most notable of which was the raid on Zeebrugge on 22/23 April 1918.[3] As for Gallipoli, Kenneth Clifford has noted that ‘The lessons of Gallipoli were more than a past experience…’[4] Thus, it would be this operation that would be the guiding hand on the development of British Combined Operations doctrine during the inter-war years.

The Dardanelles campaign was a failure, on that most historians’ agree. In the aftermath of the campaign the Dardanelles Commission was set up in order to examine the purpose and conduct of the campaign.[5] However, despite its exertions and criticisms, the conduct of air power during the campaign was overlooked as a contributory factor to the problems that the forces deployed during the campaign faced.[6] However, air power did not live up to it expectation as, in line with other campaigns of the First World War, air power did not contribute in the war the airmen expected it to. Eric Ash has noted that, Colonel Frederick Sykes, the senior airmen for much of the campaign, ‘…failed to appreciate the technological limits of air power…’[7] During the campaign the main roles for the air forces deployed were those normally associated with air power in the early years of the First World War; tactical reconnaissance (Tac R) and artillery reconnaissance and spotting (Arty R).[8] However, as the campaign progressed, as in other theatres, other roles came to the fore. For example, during November and December 1915 attempts at Battlefield Aerial Interdiction (BAI) were made upon important logistical centres such as Ferejik and Dede Agach in an attempt to dislocate the battlefield from the Turkish lines of communication.[9] Also throughout much of the campaign Turkish troop movements from railheads became targets of opportunities for pilots.[10] In conducting the withdrawal from Gallipoli the two wings of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) were tasked with maintaining patrols overt the peninsula in order to maintain air superiority and stop Turkish aeroplanes from interfering in the retreat; in this they were successful and an important lesson in combined operations learnt.[11]

Despite some limited success near the end of the campaign the experience of air power for much of it had been frustrating. In June 1915, the aforementioned Colonel Sykes was sent to the Dardanelles to assess the use of air power and the problems it was encountering. Through his subsequent report and his command of the RNAS units employed during the campaign several key problems can be identified. The first key problem was one of command relationships. When Sykes went out to the Dardanelles the RNAS commander on the scene was Wing Commander C R Samson, a man noted to be uncooperative and tactless.[12] The relations between both men can be best described by Vice Admiral de Robeck’s communication to the First Sea Lord at the end of August 1915 when he noted that he hoped that Samson and Sykes would work well together but that ‘…an unfortunate publication…has appeared here…’ in which ‘…Samson [was] criticising Sykes.’[13] However, despite this clash Samson did continue to work with Sykes until his departure in November. Despite the emergence of a status quo between Sykes and Samson, relations with other naval officers remained strained and many refused to recognise Sykes’ naval rank, Wing Captain. This problem of command did not help the difficult conditions facing the air forces deployed to Gallipoli.

The RNAS’ main problem was one of reorganisation and reinforcement. The units sent out to support the campaign at its inception were woefully disproportionate to the task at hand. Samson’s squadron, No. 3 RNAS, was the main unit to be initially deployed, was expected to perform a multitude of tasks from spotting to bombing. However, the biggest problem faced by the squadron was one of logistics and organisation. The squadrons consisted of no less than five different types of aircraft which caused many problems when the need for spare parts arose.[14] Also the squadron’s original base of Tenedos was unsuitable for the squadron and eventually the squadron moved to Imbros in July 1915 where a more effective organisation was built up. Sykes also requested the replacement of the ragtag collections of aircraft equipping his command to be replaced and rationalised into single types in order to ease the logistical issues he faced.[15]

Once Sykes dealt with the organisational and logistical issues that his command faced he identified that his force had two objectives. The first was to act as a means of intelligence and communication between the services and secondly, to prevent reinforcements reaching the battlefield. In order to pursue these objectives Sykes came to realise that he also needed to maintain air superiority in order to stop the Turkish air force from interfering with his primary mission. Thus, he recognised that his role was to support the combined operation that was ongoing. For Sykes as an air power theorist this meant he had to think on the strategic and operational level in order to achieve tactical objectives. This meant he needed to build up air power in the region and then utilise it to dislocate the battle space and allow his command to achieve its primary objectives.[16] However, despite the limited success’ already mentioned the campaign ended before air power could have any significant impact upon its conduct. For example, Ash has noted that despite attempts at BAI they were on the whole insignificant.[17]

Yet despite the technological limitation placed upon Sykes’ command many lessons for future combined operations could and were drawn from this experience. The key lessons learnt were, first, that an effective operating base was needed and this was something that would frustrate the services in the inter-war period. Second, once this was established it was noted that for air power to effectively support the land and maritime operations air superiority would be needed, and indeed this would go on to be the primary objective of air power in the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations, which noted that ‘The main aim of air strategy…is therefore to assert the superiority of out air forces over…the enemy…as to prohibit any sustained attack on the expedition…’[18] Third, once this was achieved support operations could operate successfully within the battle space. Thus, the Dardanelles campaign would provide the lessons and context for the development of inter-war Combined Operations doctrine and the application of air power in support of that type of operation. As the Royal Air Force’s official history notes about Gallipoli, ‘For the first time a campaign was conducted on, under and over the sea, and on and over the land.’[19]

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[1] For example, for the experience of the Army see: David French ‘Doctrine and Organisation in the British Army, 1919 – 1932’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2001) pp. 497 – 515

[2] The National Archives, ADM 116/2086 ‘Letter from Major General Anderson, Commandant Army Staff College to the Secretary of the Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 7/01/1920’ p. 1

[3] The literature on the Dardanelles Campaign is vast. Some of the best treatments of the campaign are: Jenny McLeod (Ed.) Gallipoli Reconsidered (London: Frank Cass, 2004) and Timothy Travers Gallipoli, 1915 (Stroud: Tempus, 2001). For the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend see Mark Karau ‘Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 2003) pp. 455 – 481

[4] Kenneth Clifford Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920 (New York: Edgewood, 1983) p. 31

[5] Jenny McLeod ‘General Sir Ian Hamilton and the Dardanelles Commission’ War in History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2001) p. 418

[6] Eric Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912 – 1918’ PhD Thesis (University of Calgary, 1995) p. 248

[7] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 241

[8] Peter Mead The Eye in the Air: History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army, 1785 – 1945 (London: HMSO, 1983) p. 112

[9] H A Jones The War in the Air: Being the Story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, Volume 2 (London: HMSO, 1928 ) pp. 64 – 72

[10] Ibid

[11] Jones The War in the Air, pp. 72 – 77

[12] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 243

[13] Cited in Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 251 and Brad King ‘Gallipoli: The Royal Naval Air Service and the Dardanelles’ The Joint Imperial War Museum/Australian War Memorial Battlefield Study Tour to Gallipoli, September 2000 (2001) p. 8 

[14] King ‘Gallipoli’ p. 3

[15] Jones The War in the Air, p. 57

[16] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ pp. 253 – 256

[17] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 256

[18] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 121

[19] Jones The War in the Air, p. 75

Combined Operations

Another aspect of my thesis that has required explaining is what is meant by the term Combined Operations as its meaning has change din the years since the Second World War. 

Combined Operations in modern military parlance does not equate to how it was viewed in the inter-war period and during the Second World War. RAF doctrine of the 21^st century, AP 3000, defines combined operations as, ‘Military operations in which elements of two or more Allied nations participate.’[1] This definition is akin to coalition warfare and is not what is meant by the term combined operations as will be used throughout this thesis. RAF doctrine of the Second World War era, AP 1300, defines combined operation as:

‘…the term to de-scribe those forms of operations where naval, military or air forces in any combination are co-operating with each other, working separately under their respective commanders, but with a common aim.’[2] 

Thus, with this definition we are closer to what is meant by combined operations during the Second World War. If combined operation were to be discussed in the modern military the vernacular to be used would be one of jointness where operations take place ‘…in which elements of more than one service of the same nations participates.’[3] Therefore, combined operations in this context involves more than one service operating together to achieve a common aim. However, the definition can be taken further, as does the doctrinal manuals of the time, AP 1300 and the Manual of Combined Operations,[4] do, as there are several forms of combined operations which can be taken into consideration, such as raids, invasion, demonstrations and withdrawals.[5] By the time the revised Manual of Combined Operations had been published in 1938 the definition had been modified to:‘…forms of operations where, naval, military, or air forces in combination are co-operating with each other, working independently under their respective commanders, but with a common strategical object.’[6] 

While this definition does not offer a satisfactory definition for the topic of this thesis it is what the British military understood by the term as they went into the Second World War. It does, despite several salient shortcomings, provide a sound basis as to what combined operations are. Within the context of this thesis a combined operations can be defined as a raid against a hostile shore utilising forces from each of the three services operating independently under the command of their respective service chiefs but with common tactical, operational and strategic aim as laid down by the supreme commander, in this case the Chief of Combined Operations, Mountbatten. This contains the key tenants of the 1938 definition under which Mountbatten and his force commanders, including AVM Leigh-Mallory, were operating.

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[1] Anon AP 3000: British Air Power Doctrine, 3^rd Edition (London: HMSO, 1999) p. 3.13.3

[2] TNA, AIR 10/1910 ‘Royal Air Force War Manual Part I – Chapter 13: Combined Operations’ p. 1. AP 1300 was originally published in 1928 and subsequently republished in 1935 and 1940. A useful online version of the manual is available at http://ww2airfronts.org/doctrine/raf/warmanual1/warmanual1-0.html

[3] Anon, AP 1300, P. 3.13.6

[4] TNA, DEFE 2/709 ‘Manual of Combined Operations, 1938’. This manual is a revision of the 1925 and 1931 manual that was born out of exercise at the three service staff colleges.

[5] Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck Amphibious Warfare: The Theory and Practice of Amphibious Operations in the 20^th Century (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001) p.

[6] Cited in Kenneth Clifford Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1940 – 1940 (New York: Edgewood, 1983) p. 1