Gallipoli, Combined Operations and Air Power

Just a bit that I have been working on lately for my thesis. This is part of my attempt to place air power and combined operations in its historical context and explain where the thinking on air powers use in the type of operation came from. Comments always welcomed and wanted.

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The experience of the First World War had a profound affect on the development on all aspects of British military doctrine in the inter-war period and this was no less true of Combined Operations.[1] In October 1919 the Army and the Royal Navy held the first Combined Operations exercise at the Army Staff College (ASC) and it was during this exercise that the importance of air power on Combined Operations was first identified. Major General Anderson, Commandant of the ASC, observed that the most important lessons from the First World War was that Combined Operations ‘…will in the future have to be considered as a combined operation involving all three services..’[2]

The key experience for Combined Operations from the First World War came from operations conducted during the Dardanelles Campaign in 1915 and the small raids conducted along the Flanders coast, the most notable of which was the raid on Zeebrugge on 22/23 April 1918.[3] As for Gallipoli, Kenneth Clifford has noted that ‘The lessons of Gallipoli were more than a past experience…’[4] Thus, it would be this operation that would be the guiding hand on the development of British Combined Operations doctrine during the inter-war years.

The Dardanelles campaign was a failure, on that most historians’ agree. In the aftermath of the campaign the Dardanelles Commission was set up in order to examine the purpose and conduct of the campaign.[5] However, despite its exertions and criticisms, the conduct of air power during the campaign was overlooked as a contributory factor to the problems that the forces deployed during the campaign faced.[6] However, air power did not live up to it expectation as, in line with other campaigns of the First World War, air power did not contribute in the war the airmen expected it to. Eric Ash has noted that, Colonel Frederick Sykes, the senior airmen for much of the campaign, ‘…failed to appreciate the technological limits of air power…’[7] During the campaign the main roles for the air forces deployed were those normally associated with air power in the early years of the First World War; tactical reconnaissance (Tac R) and artillery reconnaissance and spotting (Arty R).[8] However, as the campaign progressed, as in other theatres, other roles came to the fore. For example, during November and December 1915 attempts at Battlefield Aerial Interdiction (BAI) were made upon important logistical centres such as Ferejik and Dede Agach in an attempt to dislocate the battlefield from the Turkish lines of communication.[9] Also throughout much of the campaign Turkish troop movements from railheads became targets of opportunities for pilots.[10] In conducting the withdrawal from Gallipoli the two wings of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) were tasked with maintaining patrols overt the peninsula in order to maintain air superiority and stop Turkish aeroplanes from interfering in the retreat; in this they were successful and an important lesson in combined operations learnt.[11]

Despite some limited success near the end of the campaign the experience of air power for much of it had been frustrating. In June 1915, the aforementioned Colonel Sykes was sent to the Dardanelles to assess the use of air power and the problems it was encountering. Through his subsequent report and his command of the RNAS units employed during the campaign several key problems can be identified. The first key problem was one of command relationships. When Sykes went out to the Dardanelles the RNAS commander on the scene was Wing Commander C R Samson, a man noted to be uncooperative and tactless.[12] The relations between both men can be best described by Vice Admiral de Robeck’s communication to the First Sea Lord at the end of August 1915 when he noted that he hoped that Samson and Sykes would work well together but that ‘…an unfortunate publication…has appeared here…’ in which ‘…Samson [was] criticising Sykes.’[13] However, despite this clash Samson did continue to work with Sykes until his departure in November. Despite the emergence of a status quo between Sykes and Samson, relations with other naval officers remained strained and many refused to recognise Sykes’ naval rank, Wing Captain. This problem of command did not help the difficult conditions facing the air forces deployed to Gallipoli.

The RNAS’ main problem was one of reorganisation and reinforcement. The units sent out to support the campaign at its inception were woefully disproportionate to the task at hand. Samson’s squadron, No. 3 RNAS, was the main unit to be initially deployed, was expected to perform a multitude of tasks from spotting to bombing. However, the biggest problem faced by the squadron was one of logistics and organisation. The squadrons consisted of no less than five different types of aircraft which caused many problems when the need for spare parts arose.[14] Also the squadron’s original base of Tenedos was unsuitable for the squadron and eventually the squadron moved to Imbros in July 1915 where a more effective organisation was built up. Sykes also requested the replacement of the ragtag collections of aircraft equipping his command to be replaced and rationalised into single types in order to ease the logistical issues he faced.[15]

Once Sykes dealt with the organisational and logistical issues that his command faced he identified that his force had two objectives. The first was to act as a means of intelligence and communication between the services and secondly, to prevent reinforcements reaching the battlefield. In order to pursue these objectives Sykes came to realise that he also needed to maintain air superiority in order to stop the Turkish air force from interfering with his primary mission. Thus, he recognised that his role was to support the combined operation that was ongoing. For Sykes as an air power theorist this meant he had to think on the strategic and operational level in order to achieve tactical objectives. This meant he needed to build up air power in the region and then utilise it to dislocate the battle space and allow his command to achieve its primary objectives.[16] However, despite the limited success’ already mentioned the campaign ended before air power could have any significant impact upon its conduct. For example, Ash has noted that despite attempts at BAI they were on the whole insignificant.[17]

Yet despite the technological limitation placed upon Sykes’ command many lessons for future combined operations could and were drawn from this experience. The key lessons learnt were, first, that an effective operating base was needed and this was something that would frustrate the services in the inter-war period. Second, once this was established it was noted that for air power to effectively support the land and maritime operations air superiority would be needed, and indeed this would go on to be the primary objective of air power in the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations, which noted that ‘The main aim of air strategy…is therefore to assert the superiority of out air forces over…the enemy…as to prohibit any sustained attack on the expedition…’[18] Third, once this was achieved support operations could operate successfully within the battle space. Thus, the Dardanelles campaign would provide the lessons and context for the development of inter-war Combined Operations doctrine and the application of air power in support of that type of operation. As the Royal Air Force’s official history notes about Gallipoli, ‘For the first time a campaign was conducted on, under and over the sea, and on and over the land.’[19]

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[1] For example, for the experience of the Army see: David French ‘Doctrine and Organisation in the British Army, 1919 – 1932’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2001) pp. 497 – 515

[2] The National Archives, ADM 116/2086 ‘Letter from Major General Anderson, Commandant Army Staff College to the Secretary of the Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 7/01/1920’ p. 1

[3] The literature on the Dardanelles Campaign is vast. Some of the best treatments of the campaign are: Jenny McLeod (Ed.) Gallipoli Reconsidered (London: Frank Cass, 2004) and Timothy Travers Gallipoli, 1915 (Stroud: Tempus, 2001). For the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend see Mark Karau ‘Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 2003) pp. 455 – 481

[4] Kenneth Clifford Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920 (New York: Edgewood, 1983) p. 31

[5] Jenny McLeod ‘General Sir Ian Hamilton and the Dardanelles Commission’ War in History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2001) p. 418

[6] Eric Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912 – 1918’ PhD Thesis (University of Calgary, 1995) p. 248

[7] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 241

[8] Peter Mead The Eye in the Air: History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army, 1785 – 1945 (London: HMSO, 1983) p. 112

[9] H A Jones The War in the Air: Being the Story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, Volume 2 (London: HMSO, 1928 ) pp. 64 – 72

[10] Ibid

[11] Jones The War in the Air, pp. 72 – 77

[12] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 243

[13] Cited in Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 251 and Brad King ‘Gallipoli: The Royal Naval Air Service and the Dardanelles’ The Joint Imperial War Museum/Australian War Memorial Battlefield Study Tour to Gallipoli, September 2000 (2001) p. 8 

[14] King ‘Gallipoli’ p. 3

[15] Jones The War in the Air, p. 57

[16] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ pp. 253 – 256

[17] Ash ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’ p. 256

[18] TNA, AIR 10/1437 ‘Manual of Combined Operations (1938)’ p. 121

[19] Jones The War in the Air, p. 75

Combined Operations

Another aspect of my thesis that has required explaining is what is meant by the term Combined Operations as its meaning has change din the years since the Second World War. 

Combined Operations in modern military parlance does not equate to how it was viewed in the inter-war period and during the Second World War. RAF doctrine of the 21^st century, AP 3000, defines combined operations as, ‘Military operations in which elements of two or more Allied nations participate.’[1] This definition is akin to coalition warfare and is not what is meant by the term combined operations as will be used throughout this thesis. RAF doctrine of the Second World War era, AP 1300, defines combined operation as:

‘…the term to de-scribe those forms of operations where naval, military or air forces in any combination are co-operating with each other, working separately under their respective commanders, but with a common aim.’[2] 

Thus, with this definition we are closer to what is meant by combined operations during the Second World War. If combined operation were to be discussed in the modern military the vernacular to be used would be one of jointness where operations take place ‘…in which elements of more than one service of the same nations participates.’[3] Therefore, combined operations in this context involves more than one service operating together to achieve a common aim. However, the definition can be taken further, as does the doctrinal manuals of the time, AP 1300 and the Manual of Combined Operations,[4] do, as there are several forms of combined operations which can be taken into consideration, such as raids, invasion, demonstrations and withdrawals.[5] By the time the revised Manual of Combined Operations had been published in 1938 the definition had been modified to:‘…forms of operations where, naval, military, or air forces in combination are co-operating with each other, working independently under their respective commanders, but with a common strategical object.’[6] 

While this definition does not offer a satisfactory definition for the topic of this thesis it is what the British military understood by the term as they went into the Second World War. It does, despite several salient shortcomings, provide a sound basis as to what combined operations are. Within the context of this thesis a combined operations can be defined as a raid against a hostile shore utilising forces from each of the three services operating independently under the command of their respective service chiefs but with common tactical, operational and strategic aim as laid down by the supreme commander, in this case the Chief of Combined Operations, Mountbatten. This contains the key tenants of the 1938 definition under which Mountbatten and his force commanders, including AVM Leigh-Mallory, were operating.

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[1] Anon AP 3000: British Air Power Doctrine, 3^rd Edition (London: HMSO, 1999) p. 3.13.3

[2] TNA, AIR 10/1910 ‘Royal Air Force War Manual Part I – Chapter 13: Combined Operations’ p. 1. AP 1300 was originally published in 1928 and subsequently republished in 1935 and 1940. A useful online version of the manual is available at http://ww2airfronts.org/doctrine/raf/warmanual1/warmanual1-0.html

[3] Anon, AP 1300, P. 3.13.6

[4] TNA, DEFE 2/709 ‘Manual of Combined Operations, 1938’. This manual is a revision of the 1925 and 1931 manual that was born out of exercise at the three service staff colleges.

[5] Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck Amphibious Warfare: The Theory and Practice of Amphibious Operations in the 20^th Century (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001) p.

[6] Cited in Kenneth Clifford Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1940 – 1940 (New York: Edgewood, 1983) p. 1

The Falklands War - 25 Years On

The Falklands War in Perspective: 25 Years On

Centre for First World War Studies

Saturday 23rd June saw another day school at the Centre for First World War Studies, University of Birmingham. The theme for this year’s school centred on the Falklands War in respect of that conflicts 25th anniversary, which was commemorated this year. Being the first day school I have attended I was pleasantly surprised with a good turn out at the event even though Dr John Bourne, the Centre’s director, did note it was not as high as usual and that this was probably because the content was not about the First World War though after listening to Dr Bob Bushaway’s lecture you could have been forgiven for thinking that you were but more on that later.

The event was opened by Dr Bourne explaining the reasons for the subject, quite self – explanatory given the anniversary, and his reasons for not giving a lecture. Traditionally the day schools are a Bourne – Bushaway event. I think Dr Bourne is giving his voice a rest after twenty years of public speaking. Throughout the day Dr Bourne did an excellent job of introducing each of the distinguished speakers. The speakers for the day were Dr Stephen Badsey, Dr Bob Bushaway, Air Commodore Peter Grey and Lieutenant General Sir Hew Pike, the latter two having served during the war.

The first lecture was given by Dr Stephen Badsey who gave the audience an overview of the political and strategic aspects of the war and some of the problems that the British faced in this sphere. The first point Dr Badsey made was that in the years since the war its definition has changed significantly. To contemporaries the war referred to as a crisis and in the intervening year it became known as a conflict but now we are quite safe in defining it as a war. This shows how opinions change over time. It makes one wonder what we shall call the current crisis in Iraq in twenty five years time. His next point linked to this was how the war was viewed at the time. It was at the time believed to be an aberration, something out the norm. It was not east – west and was conventional in nature. It was possible a colonial campaign, the Falklands being a British dependency, but was being fought against an invader. Now, as Dr Badsey noted, the war is seen as the first war of the coming cold war era. The lecture then covered some of the key political issue that affected the nature of the campaign and provided its context and conduct. Britain in the late 70’s and early 80’s was undoubtedly in a dire situation with unemployment running high and with the new Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher unable to deal with this issue. The war was also fought on the backdrop of Sir John Nott’s defence review held in 1981, which sought to re – align Britain’s priority towards NATO and the central front. For Britain’s armed forces this was to mean the eventual loss of an out of area and expeditionary capability and as noted by Dr Badsey if Argentina held waited just another year the situation could have been very different. We were then presented with the argentine situation and their actions leading up to the war. The situation then presented surrounding some of legal issues that caused problems for Britain’s prosecution of the war. Notable amongst these was the attempts by the UN to bring an end to the conflict. This provides an interesting context to the operations conducted by the military and the strains placed upon them. The audience was then presented with an interesting talk as to were research in the future should take historians as Dr Badsey asserted that despite the fact that the official records are still closed for a further five years there is probably not much more to add to the British account of the war. This, therefore, points the historian to argentine accounts of the war and exploring the role the certain countries played in the conflict most notable America, France and Chile. Chile was a country that continued to crop up throughout the day as answers were sought about there role in the war. It will probably be an answer that may never be found as the question of sources is most pressing. Chilean records are either closed or may not even exist considering that countries problems in the past twenty five year and British records may be placed under further restrictions and may well not come to light for many years to come. The final and one of the most interesting of the day was Dr Badsey’s opinion of the recently published Official History as written by Sir Lawrence Freedman. He noted that this was probably the last top down history that will be written. This implies that in the future any official histories that will be written may well be from the perspective of the soldiers and not from that of Whitehall and the Generals. This probably a reflection of where the study of military history is going at present and the impact and influence the media has had on our perception of war as presented via the various forms of mass media.

The day then moved on to look at the operational aspects of the campaign and to start with we were treated with a most unorthodox, and interesting analysis of the amphibious aspects of the war. This was presented by Dr Bob Bushaway and as mentioned earlier you could be forgiven for thinking that the lecture was about First World War amphibious operations as much of the lecture was dedicated to a discussion of the lesson learnt from the Gallipoli operation of 1915. As Dr Bushaway noted all British amphibious, and latterly combined, operations have been conducted under the spectre of the Gallipoli disaster. Dr Bushaway then argued, quite convincingly, that until the success of OVERLORD in 1944 British operations were designed to ensure that similar failure did not occur. Therefore, CORPORATE can be both seen as a British operations being conducted under the ghost of Gallipoli but analysis of its success is seen through the prism of Normandy. Also for Dr Bushaway CORPORATE is an expression of the British way of warfare and this is best represented in the next major theme of his discussion. This was an excellent overview of the importance of one of the seminal pieces military theory, Sir Julian Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Corbett in his work argued that Britain, as the world’s pre – eminent maritime power had the ability to project power ashore using her navy and was then able to guarantee her sea lines of communications. It was, as noted by Dr Badsey, this ability that was to be lost to the Royal Navy in the wake of Nott’s defence review in 1981. Dr Bushaway’s lecture pushed this idea of the British way in war as the doctrine for amphibious operations and that it is this context that the effectiveness of Commodore Clapp’s task group should and must be analysed. Given all of the problems facing the amphibious task group Dr Bushaway concluded that the force performed beyond all expectation and maintained the great British tradition of well executed amphibious operations. That was the first half of the day. The second half will appear soon.

Thesis - Background and Rationale

The Anglo-Canadian raid on the French port of Dieppe on August 19 1942 has possible come in for more scrutiny than any other day in the history of the Second World War. Up to date thousands of pages have been written on its planning, execution and failure.[1] The historiography of the raid can be split distinctly into two opposing camps. The orthodox histories have consistently concentrated looking at the operation itself and have not sought to seek out answers for the reasons behind the operation and any structural reasons, which led to its failure. A notable example of this school is Ronald Atkins’ work, Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster. This book only gives over only fifty of its two hundred and seventy five pages to analysing the planning of the operation.[2] On the other hand, revisionist works have tended to concentrate on the events leading up to the raid. For example, Brian Loring Villa’s work, long considered the pre – eminent work on the raid, only briefly goes over the actions of the raid itself. In fact, it is a mere eleven pages out of two hundred and sixty seven in the book. Even these eleven pages contain outline facts dealing with the planning of the raid. However, revisionists’ have tended to look at the failure of the operation from a higher command level and have seen it as a failure in strategy and have tended to negate any real explanation of the failure on the tactics used during the operation. For example, Loring Villa’s work tends to concentrate on the role of Earl Mountbatten of Burma in the planning and execution of the operation as well as concentrating on the decision making processes, which led to the raid. He also makes a certain amount of reference to the Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, and the various chiefs of staff’s, and their role in the raid.[3]However, one aspect of the raid, which has received little thorough attention to it, is the application of air power by the Royal Air Force (RAF) before and during the raid. This started almost as soon as the dust had settled on the raid in Captain Hughes – Hallett’s Dispatch, which was initially submitted to the Commander in Chief Portsmouth on 30 August 1942, and then published in the London Gazette on 14 August 1947. In this dispatch Hughes – Hallett gives scant attention to the role of the RAF; a paltry ten lines, thus showing the importance, which Hallett placed upon it.[4] It is true that Norman Franks wrote his history of aerial operations on the day, The Greatest Air Battle; however, this book has several major failing’s in that it only briefly deals with the planning of the operations and mainly deals with the events on the day itself.[5] Franks does not attempt to look at any of the pre-war planning of the RAF and any of the structural problems inherent in the RAF at the time in terms of supplying Close Air Support (CAS) to an operation of this nature. John Keegan has noted in his work on the Battle of Normandy that Captain John Hughes-Hallett’s, the Naval Force commander at Dieppe and Mountbatten’s Naval Adviser at Combined Operation Headquarters (COHQ), main lesson drawn from the operations was the need for air cover during amphibious landings, he noted this because he felt he had seen it done well during the raid by the RAF.[6] However, this is not the full explanation as the RAF was to lose heavily at the hands of the Luftwaffe during the operation. With the exception of the Frank’s work the only other major attempt to explaining the role of the RAF during the raid again comes from Villa’s work.[7] However, in keeping with the theme inherent in Villa’s work the chapter concerned concentrates on the role of Air Marshal Portal in the decision making framework with regards to the raid. Villa also concentrates on the role relating to the decision not to involve RAF Bomber Command in the raid.Therefore, the rationale for this thesis proposal is to investigate a much maligned and hitherto ignored area of the raid on Dieppe. For example, with the exception of the texts previously mentioned, both the role of the Royal Navy and the role of the Commandoes involved in the subsidiary attacks Orange and Yellow Beaches have recently received the much deserved recognition which they needed.[8] Where as the RAF has received little attention and that which it has had has arguable ignored the important aspects of the development of the RAF as a force and how this affected the service’s performance during the raid. Hence, this thesis will seek to place the raid in its historical context and explain the evolutionary nature of RAF air power leading up to the raid as means of explaining it perceived failure during the raid. Therefore, this thesis plans to take as its starting point the RAF’s strategic planning of the inter – war period and its participation in the Inter – Service Training and Development Centre, which was set up in 1930 to examine the problems of amphibious warfare. The thesis will then turn its attention to the early war period and look at the nature of Fighter Command Strategy and the role of Trafford Leigh – Mallory, the operations air commander, and the nature of Fighter Command operation and how the RAF perceived its role in raiding operations. As such it will also look the RAF’s role in the Combined Operations Headquarters. The thesis will also examine the question of why Air vice Marshal Barrett’s Army Co – Operation Command was not heavily involved in the operation. The thesis will then seek to analyse the performance of the RAF on the day on understand why it did so badly against the Luftwaffe on the day of battle.

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[1] For example see; Ronald Atkin Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster (London: Macmillan, 1980), John P Campbell Dieppe Revisited: A Documentary Investigation (London: Frank Cass, 1993), Brian Loring Villa Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid 1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)
[2] Ronald Atkin Dieppe 1942, pp. 3 – 53
[3] Brian Loring Villa Unauthorized Action, passim
[4] Dispatch No. 38045 Captain John Hughes – Hallett ‘Dieppe Raid: Dispatch on the Raid 1942 Aug. 18 – 19’ The London Gazette, 14 August 1947
[5] Norman Franks The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 19th August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1992)
[6] John Keegan Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris (London: Pimlico, 1982) p. 124
[7] Loring Villa Unauthorized Action, pp. 127 – 163
[8] Will Fowler The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D – Day (London: Collins, 2002), Christopher Page The Royal Navy and the Raids on Dieppe and St Nazaire (London: Frank Cass, 2002) and Brereton Greenhous ‘Operation Flodden: The Sea Fight of Berneval and the Suppression of the Goebbels Battery, 19 August 1942’ Canadian Military Journal (Autumn 2003) pp. 47 – 57

Thesis - The RAF and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942: A Reappraisal?

The proposed title for my thesis is as you can see above about the RAF’s role in the raid on Dieppe in 1942. Dieppe has always held a bit of a fascination for me, not really sure why though, and I have never been fully satisfied with the explanation that Mountbatten was fully to blame for its failure. Therefore, I am hoping to show that, form the point of view of the RAF at least, the failure was more due inherent differences between the services and the evolutionary nature of air power at the time, which led to the problem of 19 August 1942.

Thus, my principal aims have been set out as;

1. Examine the reasons for the failure of the Royal Air Force during the raid on Dieppe in August 1942.

2. Place the failures into their historical context especially looking at aspects British Air Power Strategy and Tactics in the early years of the Second World War, especially with reference to RAF Fighter Command.

3. Examine the lessons learnt from the raid on Dieppe and whether these were integrated into RAF doctrine in preparation for the Invasion of Europe or were the lessons necessary learnt elsewhere.

If anyone has any thoughts, ideas or comments please let me know.