German Footage of Dieppe

Here is some contemporary German Propaganda footage of the Dieppe Raid. Makes for interesting viewing about the attack.

As to the validity of the footage I am not sure so if anyone has more information I would be interested.

One thing about youtube I like is some of the comments made by people. This piece has a few comments made by Canadians who still insist on blaming the British for throwing Canadians into this operation. The reality is more to do with the fact that by 1942 the Canadians are looking to be used in a major operations. All of this comes back to the debate surrounding Villa’s book and the role of Mountbatten. Villa’s work is extremely conspiratorial about the motives for Dieppe and centre’s much of the blame on Mountbatten. Villa’s work certainly shows that he had an axe to grind. For a more balanced view I would recommend some of the work done by Robert Henshaw who examines the role of Canadian Nationalism in the raid. Henshaw does not absolve Mountbatten but does show that it was far more naunced than Villa argues. As an interesting side note about the importance of Canadian Nationalism in wartime was pointed out to me last year by Trevor Harvey, who was talking about the formation of the Canadian Corps in the First World War, and he noted that nationalism was one of the key driving forces in the formation of that unit and its subsequent employment.

As a sidenote I have started another blog to support a unit my students are taking on Mass Media and Social Change in post-war Britain. It is a bit of an experiment to see how it can support the course. Also social and cultural history are not my areas so any thoughts or tips will be graciously recieved.

No. 2 Squadron SAAF – 23rd March 1943

I have been busy the last few days hence the lack of posts on this project. Thankfully I am not doing it in ‘real time’ to the event so it is not a major issue. Here is the entry for 23 March.

“BOMBING HIGHLY SATISFACTORY”. This message, transmitted back from Army Headquarters, was expression of appreciation for the work done by the Kittyhawks of our wing in a bombing raid on an enemy strong point about 30 miles North West of MEDININ and just in front of the MARETH LINE. The enemy strong point consisted of a hill with gun emplacements, commanding a road up which our troops were endeavouring to advance. Nine of our aircraft with Lt.Col. LOFTUS leading in the tenth Kittyhawk, took-off at 0630 hours fully armed. They were followed by Kittybombers of No. 5 Squadron and No. 4 Squadron provided top cover of fighters.

The enemy strong-point was located and our aircraft dived from 8000′ to drop their bombs, some of the pilots strafing in their dive. Bombs were all in their target area and direct hits on emplacements were registered. One bomb is thought to have hit an ammunition dump as “quite a pyrotechnic display resulted”.

An indication of the success of the bombing was the fact that the Americans, who were to have bombed after us, were not called upon to do so. Over 30 per cent of the enemy emplacements were put out of action, it was learned, and the position was taken. From all aspects this was a most successful operation, as the enemy were taken completely by surprise and there was no A.A. Fire from the target are to speak of, when our planes swooped down.

The main road to FOUM TATAHOUINE passes our camp and with the recent thrust towards the GABES GAP, this road has lots of interest. This evening under the cover of darkness, tanks and supply vehicles began rumbling up and numbers of our personnel stood at the road “watching the tanks go by” – a heartening spectacle for us.

TNA, AIR 27/22 ‘No. 2 Squadron SAAF Operations Record Book’ 22 March 1943

Hawker Hurricane II

I have been playing around a bit more and have now figured out how to insert video.

This is an interesting piece from the Second World War showing the new Hawker Hurricane II in mock combat with a captured Junkers Ju88. It also has some interest shots of attacks against shipping in the channel

A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation

My post blogging of the Battle for the Mareth Line, which I have fallen behind with, was based upon research I had done in preperation for a conference I attended last year. I have been playing around with word press and I have just realised I can upload PowerPoint so I thought I would upload so people can have a look. The paper I am writing for the conference publication is based on this presentation.

A Case Study in Army-Air Force Cooperation

Ross

No. 2 Squadron SAAF – 22nd March 1943

Here is the third entry of No. 2 Squadron SAAF.

The weather was dull and overcast this morning and the was lots of rain about when Major ARMSTRONG, CAPT. HAPUTFLEISCH and LT. HOJEM set out at 1100 hours to do an armed reconnaissance with No. 239 Wing. They did zone circuits at FOUM TATAHOUINE but No. 239 Wing did not appear and owing to the weather conditions at the time, our aircraft returned with their bombs.

A feature of night-life in the Officers Mess tonight was the entertainment of Group Captain Petrus Hugh, D.S.O., D.F.C. and two bars, Croix de Guerre and palm-leaves who visited our squadron with our Wing Commander, Lt.Col. LOFTUS, D.F.C. The famous South African Ace, who had come across from the other side – the First Army – was rapidly made to feel at home in the atmosphere of a South African mess and was entertained with a special “broadcast-programme” the evening ending with a sing-song featuring, mostly, South African “lindjins”. This singing, conducted in the brilliant moonlight and to the accompliment of occasional A.A.Fire and bombs dropped at a landing ground in this vicinity, rounded off a pleasant and interesting evening.

TNA, AIR 27/22 ‘No. 2 Squadron SAAF Operation Record Book’ 22nd March 1943

No. 2 Squadron SAAF – 21st March 1943

Here is the second post for operations on 21 March.

Eleven of our pilots were early on the job this morning when they took the air shortly before eleven o’clock. They were flying as close cover to 18 Bostons who were to bomb a road in the enemy lines, and they were led by Lt.Col. LOFTUS. The operation was without event. There was no movement observed on the road and the Bostons did not release their loads.

A repeat performance was staged three hours later by the Bostons and our aircraft, eleven stong led by Major ARMSTRONG on this occasion acting as medium cover. The road was bombed but results were not observed by our pilots, who reported no enemy aircraft and only medium A.A. fire from the target area.

After lunch the aircraft took off for HAZBUB MAIN and the remainder of the squadron proceeding thither by road, the entire squadron was encamped at the new landing ground by nightfall.

General MONTGOMERY’s personal message to the Eighth Army was received to-day. As usual his message made interesting and heartening reading.

Another nocturnal call was paid by the jerry tonight. One enemy bomber flew very low over our camp in the moonlight the rear-gunner firing a few bursts at some of our transports but without causing any damage. Bofors shells in pursuit of the intruder flew low over tent-tops in the camp, also, however, without causing any damage.

No. 2 Squadron SAAF – 20th March 1943

Here is the first entry from the Squadrons ORB. At this time the Squadron was equipped with Cutiss Kittyhawks.

Operations started with a rush to-day, the squadron acting as close, medium and top cover to the light bombers in consecutive operations. There were 32 sorties and a total of some 48 hours operational flying.

Good bombing results by the Bostons were observed by our pilots on the first operation, led by Lt.Col. LOFTUS. The target appeared to be dug in enemy positions. A.A. fire was intense but no other enemy opposition was encountered by our aircraft which returned safely.

The medium cover operation also called on an dozen aircraft from this unit but the “engine-trouble Gremlin” was busy on this operation and only eleven took off, Capt. HAUPT***** leading. Over the target area, another two “moscowed”. (Miscued?)

Bombing was carried out by the 18 escorted Bostons South of Mareth from a height of 7000′. Cloud obscured the bombing results. Heavy and accurate A.A. fire was put up and one of the Bostons, apparently hit, was observed to go in, two parachutes being observed to open.

In the last operation, Major ARMSTRONG took eleven as top cover for a third formation of Bostons bombing in the Mareth area. Our aircraft flew at 13,000′ and bombing results were not observed. Another Boston was hit by A.A. fire and went down in flames, and again two parachutes were observed to open. No enemy air opposition was encountered on any of the days operations.

“A” party received unexpected instructions to move to HAZBIB MAIN (Medinin area) at lunch-time this afternoon and by this evening were setting up at our new landing ground. What with flares, A.A. fire, and an enemy twin-engined bomber strafing the road adjoining the new camp, our personnel had a slightly unpleasant introduction to their new home.

TNA, AIR 27/22 ‘No. 2 Squadron SAAF – Operations Record Book’ 20th March 1943

Post-Blogging the Battle of the Mareth Line – Introduction

Inspired by Brett Holman’s experiment of post-blogging the Sudeten Crisis I have decided to have a go at some thing similar, albeit over a much smaller time frame.

I am going to post about the experience of No. 2 Squadron SAAF during the Battle for the Mareth Line in late March 1942. I am doing this by using their Operations Record Book. The ORB is effectively a daily record of events with a squadrons. It is the RAF’s version of a Regimental War Diary or a Ships Log. They tend to be variable in quality. However, for some inexplicable reasons No. 2 Squadron appear to have had an administrative officer who revelled in detail. As such the ORB give a very good outline of air operations in and around Marethduring the period of the battle. The post will start on 20 March as this was the day that the main attacks by XXX Corps went in against the Mareth Line. Aerial operations had actually begun almost a week earlier and some ground operation had taken place in the few day before the main attack with the intention of clearing the outpost of the Mareth Line. However, we are dealing with the two main operations of the battle, Operations PUGILIST and SUPERCHARGE II.

This series of posts has come our of a paper I delivered last year at a conference on Allied military effectiveness during the war in the Mediterranean. My paper dealt with the Army-Air Force Cooperation during the Battle of the Mareth Line. I am in the process of writing the paper up for publication, which is due out in 2010. However, the detail from the ORB would never make it into the paper in full, hence, why it is going on here.