11th Armoured Division in Normandy

This another one of these pieces from my undergraduate days. An interesting piece which shows the need that Second World War historiography needs to start examinining the operational and tactical level of operation more closely. This has started for the First World War but now needs to begin for the second. I found it on an old post on the World War II forum. It is interesting to view work from this period of my studies and how it compares to today.

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The limitation of doctrine and their operational solutions: Anglo-Canadian armoured divisions in Normandy. A case study: 11^th Armoured Division

Introduction

‘…by 1944 the Tanks had made themselves the prisoners of their own orthodoxy, keener to adhere to the letter of their cherished doctrine than to win the rewards a violation of it might bring’[i]

John Keegan’s statement is representative of the orthodox view of the British during the Normandy campaign. For many years, the British 2^nd Army in Normandy has come in for criticism as being tactically inept when compared to the Germans, and even their American allies. The armoured element has come in for even more criticism, simply stating that the Anglo-Canadians were unable to overcome doctrine and adopt a fluid method of organisation and co-operation in battle as exemplified by the German Kampfgruppe or the American Combat Command. This essay will seek to show that while the Anglo-Canadians’ had failures, which hampered their efforts early in the campaign, by the end in Normandy the Anglo-Canadian armoured forces[ii] were adopting combined arms teams and co-operating with other elements of the army successfully. It will do this by looking at the Anglo-Canadians’ pre-eminent division in Normandy, the 11^th Armoured which, Russell Hart has called one of the, ‘…few well-trained and well-led divisions… [of the campaign]’[iii] It will look at firstly, the training and doctrinal methods pre-Overlord and then secondly, the solutions found in the field to operational problems.

Organisation and Equipment

Britain’s armoured forces at the time of the Normandy campaign were in the main equipped with the US produced M4 Sherman in various guises. There were several exceptions to this; firstly, the 7th Armoured Division and the divisional reconnaissance regiments were equipped with the A27M Cromwell, a British cruiser tank. Secondly, the Army Tank Brigades were equipped with the A22/42 Churchill infantry tank, this tank was heavily armoured and ideally suited to its role. The armoured regiments used the final vehicle, the M3 Stuart, as a light tank. The artillery elements of the armoured divisions were equipped initially with one regiment of the M7 Priest self-propelled gun, though this was replaced with the Sexton SPG, which mounted a 25pdr. The other regiment was equipped with towed 25pdr guns. The divisional anti tank regiments were equipped with the M10 tank destroyer, which was built on the Sherman chassis; this got rearmed with the 17pdr gun, the most effective tank gun in the British and US armies, and made it a very effective anti-tank weapon.This organisation was based on several years of experiments[iv] both in Britain and in operational circumstances and represented the best compromise based upon Britain’s regimental traditions and the needs of modern armoured warfare. The changes were the realisation of the need for more infantry within the divisions.The Sherman has come in for bad press in regards of its capabilities especially those that equipped the British forces as they have often been considered those, ‘…rejected for overseas combat duty by the U.S. Army.’[v] However, as John Keegan has commented it was, ‘…a magnificent expression of American mass-production…’[vi] While it was not as formidable as its contemporary German tanks the Sherman was easily massed produced, 49,000 were produced during the war. However, it did have its defects. They were extremely inflammable, this was due to the dry storage of ammunition, though this was changed to wet storage during the campaign, and gained the nickname ‘Ronson’ by the British after the lighter which always lit first time and ‘Tommy cooker’ from the Germans and it had a high profile making it an easy target for German tanks. Bill Close, a squadron Commander in the 3^rd Royal Tank Regiment comments that in the main the Sherman could not deal with German tanks at ranges over 500 yards, ‘Our ordinary 75mm gun could not knock out either a Tiger or a Panther except at 500 yards range, and in the rear with a bit of luck in the flank!’[vii]However, by the summer of 1944 there was one version, the ‘Firefly’ that was armed with a high velocity 17pdr gun that could compete with the latest German tanks. This became the main tank killer of the tank troops and was preciously guarded by the troops. It was initially issued based on one per troop. Though, the Firefly did still have some shortcomings, most notably it’s high velocity Armour Piercing round kicked up a lot of dust causing problems with aiming and that the new gun made the turret very cramped. The vast number of Sherman’s produced led them to be easily replaced. For example, in Operation Goodwood, the British lost 36 per cent of their tank strength and as Max Hastings comments that, the vast reserve of tanks meant, ‘…that replacements reached almost every armoured division within 36 hours.’[viii] These vast reserves even led to the planning of an operation, Goodwood, which relied heavily on the utilisation of these reserves in order to lower infantry casualties. As Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey commented, ‘…tank reinforcements were pouring into Normandy faster than the rate of tank casualties. So we could afford…to plan an operation in which we could utilise …tanks and economise on infantry.’[ix]

Doctrine and Training

11^th Armoured Division was formed in the fall of 1941 and was one of a series of armoured divisions ordered formed by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in response to Germanys Panzer divisions, which had rampaged through France the previous summer. Its first commander was the tank pioneer Major General Sir Percy Hobart[x]; the division’s insignia is taken from Hobart’s family crest. The doctrine that was used to train the officers and men of 11^th Armoured Division came in several different forms. Firstly, the bulk of information came from the War Offices’ Military Training Pamphlet (MTP) series; these covered the majority of trades in the army and every aspect of fighting from minor tactics to the handling of large formations. The second method for the dissemination of doctrine was the Army Training Memorandum (ATM) series. This series was an inter-war series, which meant to keep troops up to date with recent innovations. In the war years, it was regularly published with notes from the theatres of operations, most notably North Africa. Thirdly, there was the Army Training Instructions (ATI). This was used to fill the gap while MTP’s were published. ATI’s could be published quickly, for example, ATI No. 3 Handling of an Armoured Division, was published two months after a cloth exercise occurred, which attempted to solve the problems relating to the handling of an armoured division.

The final two methods are the most relevant to armoured warfare as it was considered impossible to keep printed doctrine up to date with the most recent developments. This led to the publication of two battle experience publications. Firstly, Notes form Theatres of War (NTW), this was first publicised at the time of the CRUSADER offensive. Secondly, there was Current Reports from Overseas (CRO). This provided a vehicle for the dissemination of ideas down to brigade level, which did not yet have endorsement from the War Office but did not have the same weight as NTW’s. Therefore, it is from these sources that doctrine for 11^th Armoured Division was based and that training from their formation to their landing in Normandy stemmed. As Timothy Harrison Place comments, ‘Between them, Military Training Pamphlets, Army Training Memoranda, Army Training Instructions, Notes from Theatres of War, Current Reports from Overseas…represent the main sources…on doctrine and its evolution up to D-Day.’[xi]

The initial conception of armoured doctrine for the home-based armoured divisions came from ATI No.3 Handling of an Armoured Division.[xii] This publication gave primacy to the tank in operations and that the support group of the division should be used to occupy ground and provide a pivot from whence the tanks could operate. Armour was considered the main striking force and all else was to support this. Co-operation between armour and infantry was considered simply the one handing over to the other. While 1942 saw a significant change in the armoured division structure, one armoured brigade was replaced with an infantry one, at a tactical level little change in the way of co-operation. While a new doctrine was published in 1943, it ascribed much the same role for the infantry brigade as the infantry of the old support group. In actual fact some commanders still saw the role of tanks as that of cavalry as shown when 9th Armoured Brigade charged diagonally across the gun line of the 2^nd Irish Guards during exercises SARUM.[xiii] This tactic would again come back to haunt tank crews during Operation GOODWOOD.

Slowly, news from the North African theatre filtered back to the units via the NTW’s and CRO’s and belatedly doctrine was changed to include at least the motor battalions in action, though the infantry brigade remained firmly in the support role. By the time Hobart relinquished command there had been a realisation that there was a greater need of inter-arm co-operation. However, problems remained. The main problem was how to transport the infantry. It was found early on that transporting them on tanks caused discomfort for the infantry. It was not until the introduction of the White half-track in early 1944 that the situation was resolved. Therefore, the main problem of co-operation that existed was how to keep the infantry up with the tanks. Another problem was what role the infantry should play in supporting the armour. The re-equipping of the divisions with the Sherman in late 1943 led to infantry being reverted to a support role once again. This was due to the Sherman having a good HE[xiv] rounds with which to deal with ‘soft’ targets.

The period of 1942-43 saw the increase in the attempt to co-ordinate armour and infantry. This was intensified when Major-General Roberts[xv] took over the division in early 1944. Roberts with his experience in the desert saw the need to improve co-operation between armour and infantry. Roberts also saw the need to change the tactics used when launching an attack. Prior to his arrival there had been an attempt to use set piece tactics to assault a position, he change this by ordering that upon closing with the enemy the armoured brigade commander send his regiments around the flanks of the enemy. He ordered that regiments keep on the move and that deliberate reconnaissance be abolished. These were some of the advantages conferred on the division with the arrival of a commander with battlefield experience.

Another failure in training was the inability of the division exercises to be realistic. They suffered from being under the guidance of umpires who sought their regiment to be victorious rather than a fair comprehension of the battlefield environment. As Harrison-Place comments about 11^th Armoured’s exercise EAGLE that was, ‘…partial umpiring by umpires whose first loyalty was not to realism but to the interests of their own units.’[xvi]

As has be seen the implementation of these publications and their associated doctrine was patchy and led to mistakes both in training and in operations. While attempts were made, belatedly, to correct the failings in training and doctrine, most notably with the arrival of Roberts from the Mediterranean, the problems encountered in training would come back to haunt the British in the early operations of the Normandy campaign. Had the lesson of North Africa been more forcefully implemented at both division and regimental lesson many mistake could have been avoided.

Operations EPSOM, GOODWOOD, and the failure of doctrine

Operation EPSOM was launched on the 26^th of June under a massive bombardment of 700 guns. The objective of the operation was to gain the high ground of Hill 112 and then breakout into the Odon valley below. The operation was to be carried out by Lieutenant General O’Connor’s[xvii] VIII Corps, which was newly arrived from England. This corps included Robert’s 11^th Armoured Division.[xviii]

The initial attack by the 15^th (Scottish) Infantry Division went well and in the first few hours of the division made an inroad of several miles on a front of three miles. Suddenly German resistance began to stiffen and the failure of the supporting operation of I and XXX Corps meant that VIII Corp was prone to a counter-attack on three sides. This occurred on the 27^th. It was at this point that O’Connor decided to commit the 11^th Armoured to the battle. Eventually the tanks of 29^th Armoured Brigade reached Hill 112 but without an infantry, support they were forced to relinquish the position on the 30^th after II SS Panzer Corps launched a counter attack. The previous day Montgomery had ordered a halt to EPSOM realising, it was going to go no further.

During the operation, 11^th Armoured operated in virtually 2 distinct formation, 29^th Armoured and 159^th Infantry brigades, and conducted operations independent of each other. Initially in the operation, the 159th took Baron sur Odon and encountered heavy fighting there and from there subsequently served under various formations. When this occurred 29^th was ordered to try to fight a way through to achieve a breakthrough from Cheux. This was the first mistake. Instead of using the tanks once a breakthrough had been achieved, O’Connor attempted to use the tanks to achieve the breakthrough. This meant that by the time any sort of gap had been created the armoured unit were too tired and exhausted to exploit it. The other major failure for the division during EPSOM was it lack of co-ordination between infantry and armour. Harrison-Place comments that, ‘…Roberts reached the…conclusion…concerning the need for tank-infantry co-operation within the armoured division.’[xix] Though he was frustrated in his wish for greater co-operation as during the EPSOM operation his infantry brigade served under three commands, 11^th Armoured, 15^th (Scottish) and 53^rd (Welsh) Infantry divisions, which meant that he could not develop co-ordination between his units. Therefore, the only infantry that was supporting the tanks was the mechanised infantry of the 8^th Rifle Brigade, and while they did sterling service, they were too few in number to be of effect. EPSOM, therefore, shows the first major blooding for the division and started to show up the failing in their training especially, as commented above, the lack of effective inter arm co-operation.

11^th Armoured’s next operation was GOODWOOD. This operation was launched on the 18^th July as a precursor to the launch of the Americans operation COBRA. It had many conflicting aims. Montgomery had to up the objectives of the operation in order to gain the support he wanted from the strategic air forces, though he never fully believed the plan could be a breakout. Whereas, the commander of the 2^nd Army, Lieutenant General Dempsey, believed it could achieve a breakout on the eastern flank. The operation has often been compared to the charge of the light brigade as it saw the use of an all armoured corps, VIII Corps[xx], and had very little infantry support.

The operation began under a massive preparatory bombardment by RAF Bomber Command and then the divisions jumped off from their position by the Orne River. 11^th Armoured’s objectives were Bras, Hubert Folie, Verrieres and Fontenay. Moving off without support from the infantry, who were fighting a parallel action, the tanks encountered their first problems, an anti-aircraft battery of 88mm anti-aircraft/tank guns, at Cagny[xxi], which knocked out 16 tanks. The division had only just started to move out. Worse was to come, the only Forward Air Controller was killed and the units behind 11^th Armoured were caught in huge traffic jams. Roberts then ordered Cagny to be masked by the 8^th RB and 23^rd Hussars. This was a mistake because once they moved into position they were in full view of German tanks and the 23^rd Hussars took heavy casualties. For most of the day, units received flank attacks to their exposed positions. As Bill Close comments on the losses received by the 3^rd Royal Tank Regiment, ‘We had received a considerable number of casualties with seven tanks knocked out from my squadron and a similar number from B and C squadron.’[xxii]

The 19^th would see much the same problems as the previous day. 3^rd RTR attempted to take Bras. The major problem in attacking Bras and Hubert Folie was the 3000 yards of open country between them and the divisions start line. In this area were many dug 88’s and infantry armed with Panzerfausts who took a great heavy toll on the tank units, who had limited infantry support to deal with the positions. Though by the end of the day their was an attempt at forming battle groups, for example, one was made up of the 4^th KSLI, 3^rd Mons and 23^rd Hussars while they attempted to hold onto Hubert Folie.

Operation GOODWOOD has attracted much criticism, some quite rightly so. It was ill conceived to send in an all armoured attack into country that was perfect for German anti-tank guns that had the range to knock out all Allied tanks with ease. There is also a sense of bad luck for the forward units of 11^th Armoured to of had their FAC knocked out so early on in the operation. The biggest failure in doctrine though was the distinct lack of co-operation between the armour and infantry. Once again, O’Connor forced 11^th Armoured to fight as two separate entities. Roberts to his credit was dismayed by this fact, after seeing its effect in EPSOM, but when he attempted to change it, he was threatened with his division loosing the lead in the operation. Therefore, despite attempts pre-invasion to train the divisions to operate with infantry in GOODWOOD they were denied that opportunity and as Harrison Place comments, ‘Their deployment disregarded the doctrine in which they had been trained. No wonder that few successes came their way.’[xxiii] Bill Close also comments that, ‘Goodwood was a shambles, but only because our method of advance was forced upon us without infantry…’[xxiv]

Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD had shown failings in the British armoured division not just at tactical level but also their employment at a higher level. They had shown failings and proven once and for all that tanks could not, and should not operate without infantry and also that they were a fine instrument for exploitation not a blunt one with which to take and hold ground. Thankfully, the armoured units’ reputation would be regained in their final operation, BLUECOAT, where 11^th Armoured would lead the way.

Operation BLUECOAT and success

BLUECOAT was to see the coming of age for Britain’s armoured divisions. In the operation they would use combined armour-infantry teams to deal with the problems the bocage country gave them. This was especially apparent in 11^th Armoured who led the way with the tactics and they were finally being run along the lines suggested in the training documents of 1942-44.Even the planning of the operation was done in a new fashion; it was left to the divisional commander to formulate the orders and movements of his units. For Roberts this meant complete freedom to organise his units into combined armour-infantry groups. For the operation, he formed four battle groups from his division. By this time the armoured reconnaissance regiment was being used as a fourth armoured regiment as the division had the 2^nd Household Cavalry attached. This use of battle group was the first success for the doctrine, which had been attempted to be laid down in Britain in the years 1942-44.The operation opened on the 30^th July with VIII Corps heading for Vire and XXX Corps launching an assault against Mont Pincon. The division was ordered to march for Le Beny Bocage. Before it could do this, it had to take St Martin-des-Besaces. Initial movement on the first day was slow but by the second, the German front began to crumble in front of VIII Corps. On the morning of 31^st St Martin was attacked by the battle group of the 2^nd Fife and Forfarshire Yeomanry and 4^th KSLI. It was during this attack that a gap in the lines was found by the 2^nd Household Cavalry, who were attached to 11^th Armoured, at what is now known as Bull Bridge over the Souleuvre River. This was an opportunity for the division to shift its weight of advance and gain an advantage, which it duly did by the end of the second day. The cause of this gap was uncertainty of the two German divisions in the area over who was to blow the bridge. By realising, there was a gap the battle group of the 3^rd Mons and 23^rd Hussars were ordered to concentrate there and strike out. As Major J J How comments, ‘…Roberts saw his chance and seized it.’[xxv] This small action early on in the operation shows the flexibility that could occur when an armoured division and its commander were given the opportunity. By controlling the battle himself and not always checking with his Corps commander Roberts was able to take the opportunity and seize a vital crossing over the river that would help speed up his advance.By being given, the freedom to plan his own operations and fully direct his division’s operations Roberts was able to advance quickly and eventually seized Perriers ridge. This created a salient in the front as Guards and the Americans on either side were advancing much slower. This led to a halt in operations and to hold the ground that had already been seized. The 6^th August the division, two brigade boxes on the ridge came under a counter attack by the 10^th SS Panzer Division. The division by utilizing combined operation from all elements were able to hold their position but it was close run thing as the historian of the 23^rd Hussars confidently comments, ‘General Eberbach had reported to von Kluge that 10th SS Panzer had captured Hill 224 – not true!’[xxvi]Operation BLUECOAT shows several elements of how to make the best use of an armoured division. Initially by allowing Roberts to plan his own operations he could tailor his division to the mission it was given. Secondly, the operations that occurred around St Martin and Bull Bridge show is a good example of what should happen when an opportunity arises and how to exploit it. By being able, to exploit the situation at hand Roberts managed to get a head start on his advance and was eventually ahead of XXX Corps who were supposed to be leading BLUECOAT but whose attacks had become bogged down. The final example of the actions on Hill 224 show that when used to good effect and supported by infantry, armour could hold a static position against determined counterattack.

Conclusion

As has been seen the 11^th Armoured in Normandy went through many problems that stemmed from areas of their training and doctrine and regimental system.  During their training period, there was a distinct failure to disseminate the information coming back from the front. While these did come back in the form of NTW’s and CRO’s they were never fully formed into official doctrine and therefore, not fully disseminated. The other major problem facing the force in its early years was the problems of inter-arm service co-operation that was enshrined in regimental tradition, as Russell Hart comments, ‘…traditionalism enshrined in…regimental system…continued to retard development of the interarm and interservice co-ordination…’[xxvii] For example, officers of the RTR were adamant that the tank had primacy in warfare and sought to see the survival of their Corps. They also based much of their theories on the work of Basil Liddell Hart and Major General Fuller who also sought to protect the Corps and the role of the tank. This is most notable with Hobart, a disciple of the work of the former, who sought to use the tanks of 11^th Armoured as the main weapon of the division, whereas, Roberts, with his experience, saw the importance of co-operation between the various services of the division. Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD showed the fatality of the use of the early theories of armoured warfare and the realisation that what was trying to be taught, greater inter-arm co-operation, was the way forward. This is something that Roberts knew. BLUECOAT showed that his efforts to improve inter-arm co-operation after taking command had not been in vain once he was given the opportunity to exercise command of his division fully.The divisions in Normandy initially threw away anything they had been taught from their experiences in the field. It took them making several mistakes early in the campaign to bring around a realisation that tanks could not operate effectively without some form of infantry support. This throwing away of the training book was in part to preserve infantry casualties, as by 1944 21^st Army Group was a wasting asset. Therefore, there was an attempt to use what the army had a lot of and that was tanks. This was a costly error, which eventually led to the formation a battle groups and the realisation of the doctrine of 1942-44. As Russell hart comments, ‘…in Normandy British ground forces enhanced their capabilities in…combined arms co-operation.’[xxviii]While this essay has shown that 11^th Armoured were able to realise the limitation in their training and the control from higher command most of the other Anglo-Canadian armoured divisions had a similar learning curve in the Normandy campaign. Another example of where the Anglo-Canadian forces managed to overcome the limitation in their doctrine was during operation TOTALISE/TRACTABLE. In the early stages Canadian II Corps failed to use, it has armoured forces effectively and use them to find weak points in the German defences and seek exploitation. Instead, they became bogged down in fighting. However, by the start of TRACTABLE the armoured division were, like 11^th Armoured, operating in battle groups and seeking operational manoeuvre against the enemy. The 1^st Polish Armoured Divisions action around Trun was very similar to those that happened to 11^th Armoured around Hill 224, therefore, the Anglo Canadian armoured division were as flexible as their allies and enemies armoured formation by the end of the campaign.

Therefore, it can be said that the problems faced in Normandy were down to failure to disseminate doctrine properly and the limitation to implement at the right level and therefore, train the units effectively. As Harrison Place comments that, the problems faced could be, ‘…traced to doctrinal error, consequent training error and incompatibility…with official doctrine.’[xxix]

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[i] Keegan J (1994) Six Armies in Normandy, p. 197

[ii] Anglo-Canadian Armoured forces in Normandy comprised the following: Guards, 7th, 11th, 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Division, 4th, 8th, 27th, 33rd and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades and the 6th Guards, 31st and 34th Tank Brigades.

[iii] Hart R (2001) Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy, p. 304

[iv] To see the changes made in the structure of the Anglo-Canadian Armoured Division see Harrison Place T (2000) Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day, p. 98-100

[v] Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg. 309

[vi] Keegan J (1994) Loc Cit, Pg. 197

[vii] Cited in Delaforce P (1993) The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division, p. 13. Bill Close is also the author of Panzer Bait and had no fewer than 11 tanks knocked out from under him in the northwest Europe campaign.

[viii] Hastings M (1984) Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, p. 279

[ix] Cited in D’este C (1994) Decision in Normandy, p. 355. Taken from the paper ‘Operation Goodwood’ by Basil Liddell Hart. In 1952, Liddell Hart persuaded Dempsey to talk at length about Operation Goodwood.

[x] For a Biography of this early pioneer in Britain’s armoured forces see - Macksey K (1967) Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart

[xi] Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, p. 14

[xii] This was published on the 19th May 1941.

[xiii] This exercise took place in July 1942. Unfortunately, for the Irish Guards, the umpires deemed 9th Armoured to far away to do damage with their 2pdr gun. 9^th Armoured were subsequently criticised by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke for their charge. For details of this incident see Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, p. 108

[xiv] HE – High Explosive rounds. This type of round was used to destroy targets such as trucks and artillery. Previously the armoured units had been equipped with British cruiser tanks that were armed with 6pdr that did not have an effective HE round.

[xv] Previously Roberts had commanded an armoured regiment in the desert before being command of 23^rd Armoured Brigade in Tunisia under the 1^st Army. He also had the distinction of being the youngest Major General in the British Army.

[xvi] Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, p. 26

[xvii] O’Connor was a veteran of the North African campaign and had been captured during Operation Battleaxe but escaped from his Italian prisoner and on his return to England was given command of VIII Corps.

[xviii] Other divisions in the corps included the 15^th (Scottish) Infantry Division and 43^rd (Wessex) Infantry Division

[xix] Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, p. 156

[xx] This consisted of 7^th, 11^th and Guards Armoured Divisions.

[xxi] Apparently, this Luftwaffe battery was ordered by Colonel Hans Von Luck of the 21^st Panzer Division to turn the guns on the tanks. He initially objected but Luck managed to persuade him. See Hastings M (1984) Op Cit, p. 276

[xxii] Close MC Major B (199 A View From the Turret: A History of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War, Pg. 121

[xxiii] Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, p. 159

[xxiv] Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, p. 68

[xxv] How MC Major J J (1981) Normandy: The British Breakout, p. 54

[xxvi] Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, p. 94

[xxvii] Hart R (2001) Op Cit, p.304

[xxviii] Hart R (2001) Op Cit, p. 320

[xxix] Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, p. 167

RAF Historical Society Journal - Online

In Britain one of the leading societies dealing with the history of air power is the Royal Air Force Historical Society.

The society aims to:

…to mount three annual events, two seminars, usually hosted by the RAF Museum at Hendon (although other venues are used occasionally), and an AGM held in London. Each seminar explores a specific theme and takes the form of papers read by interested parties, ranging from academic historians to veterans recalling their personal experiences. It is some indication of the calibre of speakers that the society can attract that participants have included serving and former Chiefs of the Air Staff, Lord Healey, Sir Michael Quinlan, Dr Alfred Price, Air Cdre Henry Probert (a former Head of the AHB) and Prof Peter Hennessy.

Its journal, which is produced three times a year is full of useful information on RAF airpower and should be read by anyone interested in the history of the RAF. They have started putting back issues of their journal up on the RAF museum website. There is a lot of interesting information contained in these volumes. Topics in the journal range from intelligence in war to leadership. Some very useful stuff for any serious air power historian.

Defence of Britain Project

I was reading Dan Todman’s blog, Trench Fever, and he noted an interest in the Defence of Britain Project. I had heard about this some time back and remember the archaeological project that was associated with it. I decided to have a bit of a play with it and low and behold across from my college in Penzance there is a Nuclear Command Centre in the council grounds. As to why it is there I am not sure but I think I may be making a few further enquiries about it. I am about to start teaching a course on the Cold War so it would be interesting to see what is left and take the student see it.  I remember a program on the project where it detailed the defences that were prepared in anticipation of an expected German invasion in 1940, the GHQ line and such. Apparently we pass many remnants of it everyday. Therefore, on my trips around on train to Birmingham and London and have keep an eye out for what may by bits of the defences. I am sure I have spotted a few.

Museum Visits

While doing research over the past few months I been able to visit both sites of the RAF Museum at Hendon and Cosford. Hendon was for research and Cosford was a day out at Christmas. I have posted a load of photos here. While in some academic circles interest in the weapons of war is frowned upon I have to admit to having a very keen interest in the development of military technology. It is Trotsky who commented that ‘War is the locomotive of history.’ it is because of the necessity of was that we now have technology such as the computer. Personally, it is looking at pieces such as this as a young boy when I lived 10 miles from the Tank Museum, Bovington that sparked my interest in military history. There is also some interesting history amongst some very important aircraft and the political decision surrounding their cancellation such as the TSR2 and the Avro CF-105 Arrow. So they should be fully understood not just in their technological context but also in their political context, why were they developed. Think about why the Spitfire was developed and what might have been had it not.

Combined Operations

Another aspect of my thesis that has required explaining is what is meant by the term Combined Operations as its meaning has change din the years since the Second World War. 

Combined Operations in modern military parlance does not equate to how it was viewed in the inter-war period and during the Second World War. RAF doctrine of the 21^st century, AP 3000, defines combined operations as, ‘Military operations in which elements of two or more Allied nations participate.’[1] This definition is akin to coalition warfare and is not what is meant by the term combined operations as will be used throughout this thesis. RAF doctrine of the Second World War era, AP 1300, defines combined operation as:

‘…the term to de-scribe those forms of operations where naval, military or air forces in any combination are co-operating with each other, working separately under their respective commanders, but with a common aim.’[2] 

Thus, with this definition we are closer to what is meant by combined operations during the Second World War. If combined operation were to be discussed in the modern military the vernacular to be used would be one of jointness where operations take place ‘…in which elements of more than one service of the same nations participates.’[3] Therefore, combined operations in this context involves more than one service operating together to achieve a common aim. However, the definition can be taken further, as does the doctrinal manuals of the time, AP 1300 and the Manual of Combined Operations,[4] do, as there are several forms of combined operations which can be taken into consideration, such as raids, invasion, demonstrations and withdrawals.[5] By the time the revised Manual of Combined Operations had been published in 1938 the definition had been modified to:‘…forms of operations where, naval, military, or air forces in combination are co-operating with each other, working independently under their respective commanders, but with a common strategical object.’[6] 

While this definition does not offer a satisfactory definition for the topic of this thesis it is what the British military understood by the term as they went into the Second World War. It does, despite several salient shortcomings, provide a sound basis as to what combined operations are. Within the context of this thesis a combined operations can be defined as a raid against a hostile shore utilising forces from each of the three services operating independently under the command of their respective service chiefs but with common tactical, operational and strategic aim as laid down by the supreme commander, in this case the Chief of Combined Operations, Mountbatten. This contains the key tenants of the 1938 definition under which Mountbatten and his force commanders, including AVM Leigh-Mallory, were operating.

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[1] Anon AP 3000: British Air Power Doctrine, 3^rd Edition (London: HMSO, 1999) p. 3.13.3

[2] TNA, AIR 10/1910 ‘Royal Air Force War Manual Part I – Chapter 13: Combined Operations’ p. 1. AP 1300 was originally published in 1928 and subsequently republished in 1935 and 1940. A useful online version of the manual is available at http://ww2airfronts.org/doctrine/raf/warmanual1/warmanual1-0.html

[3] Anon, AP 1300, P. 3.13.6

[4] TNA, DEFE 2/709 ‘Manual of Combined Operations, 1938’. This manual is a revision of the 1925 and 1931 manual that was born out of exercise at the three service staff colleges.

[5] Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck Amphibious Warfare: The Theory and Practice of Amphibious Operations in the 20^th Century (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001) p.

[6] Cited in Kenneth Clifford Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1940 – 1940 (New York: Edgewood, 1983) p. 1

Outline of Operation JUBILEE

I have been doing more work on my thesis recently as as part of the introduction I felt it prudent to outline to basics of the operation and below is what I have done so far. Any comments are welcome as it is in its draft form and I may well re-write it at some point. I have missed some reference off as it has been written on the go and I need to insert them at some pint. 

At 0445 on 19 August 1942, the first forces landed on the French coast at Berneval approximately six miles from Dieppe.[1] This was the first wave of a raid in force on the French town of Dieppe. The operational orders for JUBILEE stated that the purpose of the operation was:

Operation JUBILEE is a raid on Jubilee with limited military and air objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences, power stations, harbour installations, rolling stock, etc., in Jubilee, the capture of prisoners, the destruction of an eardrum near the town and the capture and removal of German invasion barges and other craft in the harbour.[2] 

Operation JUBILEE was the culmination of two years of raiding by the Combined Operation Headquarters (COHQ) and was largest attempted to date. The major part of the raiding force was comprised of troops from the 2^nd Canadian Infantry Division. The British provided additional troops in the form of No. 3 and 4 Commando from the Army and ‘A’ Commando from the Royal Marines (RM). There was also a small detachment of French and US personnel, the most prominent of which were the fifty US Rangers attached to No. 3 and 4 Commando. The military forces involved in the operation came under the ground force commander Major General J H Roberts, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 2^nd Canadian Infantry Division. Roberts was a curious choice for such a prestigious and difficult mission, as he had not actually seen battlefield command in the war and, therefore, like most of his soldiers were untrained and untested in combat.[3] 

The Royal Air Force (RAF) supplied substantial forces in the support of JUBILEE. In total fifty-six day fighter squadrons were involved, fifty of these were in the cover role and six were designated for close support roles. There was also two squadrons of day bombers and two squadrons Hawker Hurricane Squadrons that were tasked for the bomber role. Three squadrons of Douglas Boston light bomber were in place to supply smoke cover for the raid. Finally, there were four army co-operation squadrons in place to provide tactical reconnaissance throughout the raid.[4] The air commander on the day was Air Vice Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, a man who would go on and command the Allied air forces during Operation Overlord. In later years, a great deal of controversy would surround his role in the ‘Big Wing’ controversy of 1940 and his choice as commander of the tactical air forces for OVERLORD that has clouded any reasonable analysis of his effectiveness as a leader.[5] RAF operation during JUBILEE can be divided into five distinct phases with operation starting at 0445 and the last air operation finishing at approximately 2245.[6] The first phase, from 0445 to 0550, saw the RAF preparing the beaches for the landing by the dropping of smoke to mask the bomber aircraft of Bomber and Army Co-operation Command, these aircraft were escorted in by fighters.[7] At the same time intruder, operations were carried out against the gun batteries on the flanks on Dieppe. Hurricane Fighter-bombers and Spitfire fighters performed this.[8]

During the period of the second phase of operations, 0550 to 0730, fighter covered was maintained of the raid area and continued attempts were made to support the landing. For example, at 0645, the Rommel battery at Puys behind Blue Beach was casing problem for the Royal Regiment of Canada, Therefore, orders were sent to the Boston’s on No. 88 Squadron to attack the battery.[9] Within an hour, the squadron was en route when a recall order was received.[10] As the unit was too far to come back, the attack went in suffering heavy casualties from attacking German fighters.[11] 

The third phase, 0730 to 1030, was were the RAF was tasked primarily with providing air cover for the withdrawal of the forces to the beaches and this in the main consisted of counter air patrols against Luftwaffe aircraft that were encroaching over the battlespace. Leigh-Mallory’s states that this was the period of greatest activity by the enemy with ‘20 to 30 fighters being seen continuously in the area…’[12] There were also calls made for ground support as the units were withdrawn to the beaches.

The penultimate phase, 1050 to 1410, saw the RAF providing cover for the withdrawal of forces from the beaches similar calls were made on the RAF to provide air cover and close support as forces were taken of the beaches.[13] It was also during this phase that Luftwaffe tactics changed and larger formation were seen coming to Dieppe. These formations not only contained fighters but also fighter-bombers and bombers tasked with attempting to attack the raiding force and the naval forces offshore.[14] The final phase, 1410 to 2245, saw the RAF providing fighter cover for the forces that were returning to Britain. By the latter part of the evening deteriorating weather put a halt o any further operation by both the RAF and Luftwaffe.[15]  

The Royal Navy (RN), whose military head, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, was deeply suspicious of such operations, only provided paltry forces for the support of the operations. The heaviest ships involved in the operation were destroyers of which eight were used. In total, there were two hundred thirty seven vessels in various roles for the operation.[16] All of these ships came under the command of Captain J Hughes Hallett.  

The operation began, as it was to go on. No. 3 Commando, the first unit to land, at Berneval came under intense fire and of their twenty-three landing craft, only six made it to shore. Most of these men themselves became casualties, but despite this, the commando managed to keep the battery quite though they did not actually take it out as the plan called for.[17] The next units to land were the Royal Regiment of Canada and the Black Watch of Canada at Blue beach at Puys. Of the approximately five hundred men who landed, only six returned unscathed. The reason for this was that they landed fifteen minutes behind schedule and eight after the Germans had sounded the alarm. 

Next to come was the frontal assault on Dieppe itself, White and Red beaches. This was led Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, White beach, and the Essex Scottish, Red beach. Initially things looked good for the unit as Hurricane fighter-bombers had attacked German position and the defenders appeared dazed. This eventually passed and the defenders started pouring machine gun and mortar fire into the area. As Lieutenant Fred Woodcock of the Royal Hamilton’s, who was caught in a landing craft that was filled with Bangalore torpedoes and hit by a mortar bomb, comments he could ‘…only remember the sound, because I was blinded. The boat filled with water and I was soon up to my neck.’[18] 

The assault on Dieppe was to be supported by twenty-nine[19] Churchill MkIII tanks from Calgary Tank Regiment.[20] However, from the start of the operation things deteriorated. The LCT’s were fifteen minutes late arriving at the beaches and as has been commented this had ‘…unfortunate results for the general fortunes of the operation on the main beaches.’[21] Eventually all of the tanks were destroyed and only three made it onto the esplanade.[22]  

At 0630, approximately an hour and half after the main landing, Major-General Roberts decided that the situation was ready to land his floating reserve. This consisted on the Fusiliers Mont Royal. Roberts gives his reasons as follows, ‘About one hour after touch down, information received indicated that “Red” Beach was sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve.’[23] In this decision Roberts was wrong as Red Beach had not been cleared and was not ready, the RHLI were pinned against the beach wall. In addition, the FMR were landed at the wrong place. 

It had been initially planned to land RM ‘A’ Commando in the harbour and cut out enemy craft to take back to England. However, it was soon found that this was not possible. Therefore, they became part of the floating reserve. At 0800, Roberts, having been deceived by intelligence again, decided to commit them to White beach to force a breakthrough. This necessitated a quick rethink on the way into the beach and as Lieutenant M. Buist, RN comments it soon became clear that this was to be a ‘…sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade.’[24] The commando came under a hail of artillery fire and its intended effect became negligible. 

The next attack was at Green beach by the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada on the inner western flank. Initially there was success but eventually things started to go wrong. It was intended for the SSR to land at zero hour, 0450, and the QOCHC to land an hour and a half later and pass through them capture the high ground and proceed to Dieppe. The SSR quickly entered Pourville and became involved in fire fights with groups of Germans. The SSR attempted to subdue them with fire from the supporting destroyers and 3-inch mortars, but to no avail and they became bogged down. The QOCHC then landed at 0520 and were to link up with the tanks of the Calgary and capture a nearby airfield. This proved fruitless as the tanks were destroyed mostly on the beaches. By this time, everything was going wrong and both regiments attempted form a cordon until ordered to withdrawal.  

At the western end of the raid, No. 4 Commando landed at 0454 and their objectives were to take out the German battery at Vasterival. This was Operation CAULDRON and this has often been considered the most successful aspect of the JUBILEE operation.[25] However, it must be noted that there was a degree of luck involved as the Hess battery was blown up by one mortar round that landed in pit of open artillery shells that had been laid out for the battery. This does not, however, take anything away from the action that was the model of efficiency and became the basis of a Military Training Pamphlet that outlined attacks on fortified gun batteries.[26] As an official report comments this operation was ‘…a model of bold action and successful synchronization.’[27]  

By 0930, it became clear to everyone that the operation was a failure and landing craft started taking the wounded off the beach. At the same time both the Military Commander, Roberts, and the Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallet, contended that withdrawal was necessary and that it should begin at 1100.[28] By 1250, all troops that could be evacuated had been removed from the beaches. Thus ended one of the bloodiest days in Commonwealth military history. The casualty rate for the ground force reached almost sixty percent. As one historian has commented, it was a cruel fate for a country, Canada, who had waited:‘…over two and a half years for combat and be  killed, maimed, or captured within a single morning one of the undeniable tragedies of the Second World War’[29]

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[1] All times given are in British Summer Time. In the German War Diaries, all times were given in Continental time, which is one hour ahead.

[2] Quoted in Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 83 ‘Preliminary Report on Operation “Jubilee” (The Raid on Dieppe), 19 Aug 42’ 19 Sept 1942, p. A-1. From here on this report will be referred to as CMHQ No. 83. The reoccurrence of the word Jubilee is in reference to Dieppe and was used in an attempt to keep the target from German agents. However, in an accident of war on the final page of the operational orders the map reference for the target, Dieppe, was given.

[3] The process of choosing both the Canadians as the main assaulting force and decision to choose Roberts as the ground force commander is dealt with in Brain Loring Villa Unauthorized Action, Specifically his chapter…

[4] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander on the Combined Operation against Dieppe – August 19^th 1942’ 5 September 1942, p. 2. The numbers of squadrons involved in the operation has produced some confusion with John Terraine citing sixty-one and the RAF’s official history quotes fifty-six, the right figures for the fighter forces. John Terraine The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945 (London: Wordsworth, 1997) p. 560, Denis Richards and Hillary St George Saunders Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Volume 2: The Fight Avails (London: HMSO, 1953) p. 143

[5] The only biography of Leigh-Mallory is one produced by his great nephew, Bill Newton Dunn, Liberal Democrat MEP for the East Midlands. Unfortunately the book has many factual inaccuracies and is often defensive about the criticism made of Leigh-Mallory; Bill Newton Dunn Big Wing: A Biography of ACM Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Airlife, 1992)

[6] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ pp. 6 – 10

[7] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 6

[8] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 6

[9] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 7, Norman Franks The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 9^th August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1992), p. 70

[10] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 8

[11] Norman Franks The Greatest Air Battle pp. 70 – 71

[12] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 8

[13] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 9

[14] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 9

[15] TNA, AIR 20/586 ‘Report by the Air Force Commander’ p. 10

[16] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) History of the Second World War: The War at Sea Volume II, p. 243

[17] No. 3 Commando’s action and the problems they suffered are dealt with in Brereton Greenhous…

[18] Quoted in Atkin R (1980) Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster, p. 153

[19] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 108 ‘Operation “Jubilee”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches.’ 17 Dec 43 Amended on 12 Jul 1950. Paragraph 137 From here on CMHQ 108 

[20] This unit was official known in the Canadian organisation as the 14^th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)

[21] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraph 80.

[22] CMHQ 108 Op Cit Paragraph 84-88. Hugh Henry has dealt with the failure of the Calgary Tanks in…

[23]  CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 142

[24] Quoted in CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 174

[25] See for example Will Fowler…

[26] MTP…IWM

[27] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 101 ‘Operation “Jubilee”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks.’ 11 Aug 1943 p. 21. From here on CMHQ 101

[28] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraphs 225-230

[29] Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. p. 2

Cited on Wikipedia!

I have been transferring posts from my old blog to this one over the past few months and work has gotten in the way of me doing much posting. However, one of the first posts that I re-posted here was one on the decision to use the atomic bomb and due to work commitments I have not been paying much attention but when I re-logged into my wordpress account and I looked at the stats page I saw a link to Wikipedia. Low and behold when I looked at the link there in their main article on the Cold War is a footnote citing my blog. Well at least I can’t moan about their accuracy issues!!

War Cemetries

On a recent trip to Northern France with the RAF I got the opportunity to visit a German Military Cemetery. This is something, which I have not had the chance to do before and the difference between British, American and German cemeteries of the Second World War is quite stark. I think that the design and layout of these cemeteries tend to reflect our national opinion on the war itself.

American cemeteries are managed by the American Battle Monument Commission and there are only 24 cemeteries worldwide. The reason for this is that the American policy is to place as many dead soldiers in one big cemetery as exemplified by the Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial. This is extremely triumphalist in design. Not only is it large with 9387 graves but there is a grand memorial to the war. To me this represents the American image of their war and their victory and that they wish to celebrate it as much as possible, similar to how the Second World War is portrayed in Hollywood films. While this is no bad thing I do believe it is representative of the American image of the Second World War.

British war graves are maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and certainly in terms of the Second World War the British policy is to bury soldiers as near to where they fell as possible this has lead to there being 116 graves in the Calvados region. Many of these cemeteries are quite small. The biggest is Bayeux with over 3000 graves. To me this shows the understated nature of British remembrance to the Second World War. It represents the idea that it was a war we had to fight but not one that was any good for the nation. There are no grand monuments to the war. Yes there are some monuments but nothing that is similar to the American cemetery over Omaha.

 

The most stark example of the national attitude to the war must come from the few German cemeteries in France. When in Normandy I had opportunity to visit the cemetery at Maringy. It was very sombre and understated with the cemetery itself encased in trees so that it can not be seen from the road. There is nothing triumphalist about this in the least. It almost says to the visit that we are sorry that we are here and to that end the cemetery tries to make as little impact upon the landscape as possible as the photos show of the grave stone. It was quite an experience. 

 

 

 

This is an interesting topic, which I think needs to be explored more. Quite a lot has been written on the subject with reference to the First Worlds War but I do think that memory and memorialising needs to be examined in the context of the Second World War.

Commonwealth War Graves Commission - www.cwgc.org

American Battle Monuments Commission - www.abmc.gov

German War Graves Commission (Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge) - http://www.volksbund.de/