Was there an alternative to the Atomic Bomb?

Counterfactual history has in recent years become an increasingly popular area of historical study with numerous books having been released over the last few years. These books have been produced by well known authors such as Robert Cowley, Niall Ferguson, Erik Durschmied and Dennis Showalter. Counterfactual history offers the historian a unique tool into why some decision were made and why other were not and as Robert Fogel has noted ‘…counterfactual propositions are implicit in many historical judgements…’ Thus, counterfactuals offer the historian insights into what might have been had the chosen course not been selected.

One of the greatest counterfactuals in military history and also the history of the twentieth century is President Truman’s decision in 1945 to order the deployment and use of the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The question of what if the bomb had not been used it offers several counterfactuals for the subsequent course and development of the war. There are several possibilities, which could be investigated with this counterfactual. Firstly, there is the planned US invasion of the Japanese home islands, Operation DOWNFALL. Secondly, the outcome of the continued strategic bombing campaign and maritime blockade of the home islands, which is cited by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) as being able to win the war without the use of the atomic bombs. Thirdly, there is the Soviet card, whom entered the war against Japan on 9 August 1945, and their planned operations in Manchuria and in Korea, an operation which Hatano Sumio comments ‘…had a greater effect on the decision by Japanese leaders to end the Pacific war…than the…atomic bombs…’ Finally, there is one aspect which is often forgotten about when thinking about the end of the war in the Far East and that is British and Commonwealth operations in the vital theatre of South-East Asia, an area that would become a melting pot in the immediate post war period, especially French-Indochina.

The first area of this What If to be considered is the planned US invasion of the Japanese home islands. Operation DOWNFALL was planned to go ahead in two distinct phases. The first phase was to be Operation OLYMPIC, the invasion and occupation of the Japanese islands of Kyushu. This operation was to be launched on November 1 1945. After this Operation CORONET, was to land larger invasion forces on the Kanto plain of Honshu and occupy Japan’s political and industrial heartland of Tokyo and Yokohama. CORONET was to be launched in March 1946. The planned forces for the operation were to be massive in size. OLYMPIC would be larger than the invasion of Europe, OVERLORD, and CORONET would be larger still. In terms of lands forces there would be four distinct armies involved in both operations. These were the Sixth, Eight and Tenth armies which were already in Pacific Theatre of Operations (PTO) and the First army, which was due to be redeployed from the European Theatre of Operations (ETO). In total there would be somewhere in the region of five million men involved in DOWNFALL. The vast majority of these forces would be American, though Britain and the Commonwealth would be contributing a small force of three divisions, one each from Britain, Canada and Australia, the British Pacific Fleet, then serving with Admiral Halsey’s Fifth Fleet and some squadrons from the Royal Air Force. This was a massive force with a single purpose, the occupation and subjugation of the Japanese home islands. As paragraph one of the Strategic plans for DOWNFALL comments the ‘…Strategic Plan constitutes the basis for directives for operations to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by seizure of vital objectives in the Japanese Archipelago.’

While American plans for DOWNFALL continued the Japanese too planned for a possible invasion of their home islands. Their counter operation for American incursion of their home islands was codenamed Operation KETSU – GO. The plan called for massive strikes against the invading forces. It has for many years been estimated that by 1945 Japanese forces and industry were on the verge of complete and utter destruction, and while this is to some extent true, the Japanese army itself was able to mobilise a vast amount of men and material to meet any invasion of the home islands. The Japanese army was able to amass nearly two and a half million men organised into fifty three infantry divisions and twenty five brigades. On top of this there were two armoured division, seven armoured brigades and four anti-aircraft divisions. A not too inconsequential force with which to repel the invaders. They were organised into four area armies to guard the home islands. In addition to this there were approximately twenty eight million men in the National Volunteer Force, a Home Guard of sorts. In addition there were numerous Kamikaze units ready to repel the invaders. It is approximated that the Kamikaze forces had amassed somewhere in the region of five thousand aircraft and one thousand suicide craft with which to barrage the invasion fleets anchored of the islands of Japan. It was these forces that would have created the greatest worry for the invading forces.

US estimates of casualties for the invasion of Japan were based on their preceding campaigns on the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa and the recapture of the Philippines. For example, during the campaign for Okinawa US forces had suffered heavily. There were 7613 soldiers killed and 31,807 wounded. This works out as a casualty rate of approximately twenty three percent of the forces committed to the battle. The naval forces involved also suffered heavily losing thirty six warships. Based on these casualties it was estimated by some in the US War Office that in the initial invasion period the Americans would lose somewhere in the region of half a million men killed and wounded. However, it is possible that it may not have been this high because the closer US forces got to Japan the more the war took its toll on the Japanese military. The Japanese military ethos on the eve of World War II related to honour and obedience and fighting, literally, to the last soldier. For example, during the fighting for Tarawa in 1943 only one hundred and forty six Imperial Japanese Marines surrendered out of a force four and a half thousand. However, this ethos had changed by the time of the assault on Okinawa when as many as seven thousand men surrendered. As such the Japanese militaries combat efficiency had declined; therefore, it could be argued that by the time of DOWNFALL Japanese resistance would not have been what it was during the early campaigns of the Pacific war. Thus, an invasion of Japan may well have been easier than had been previously thought, though on the other hand it may have been just as bloody as predicted.

However, it may never have had to come to invasion due to the second what if. After the capture of the Marianas in 1944, the last island, Guam, fell in August of that year, US strategic bombers came into effective range of the Japanese home islands and could launch an air war with which to disrupt Japan’s war production and command and control networks. The reduction of Japan was left the US 20th Army Air Force, which operated off the island of Tinian in the Marianas. When the USSBS reported its findings it claimed that Japan would have surrendered by November 1945, the projected date for Operation OLYMPIC, from the weight of the strategic bombing campaign. As the USSBS comments, ‘Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.’

The report argued that if the bombing of Japan’s cities and industrial targets had continued then she would have had to of surrendered by late 1945. The conventional strategic bombing campaign is best typified by the fire bombing of Tokyo. The raid, launched on the 9/10 March 1945, caused massive damage to Tokyo’s infrastructure destroying up to twenty industrial targets and causing up to eighty five thousand Japanese casualties. The continuation of the firebombing campaign coupled with the US Navy’s blockade of Japan’s important sea lanes through the use of submarine warfare caused the crippling of Japan’s ability to continue the war. America’s strategic bombing force in the Pacific would have been, by the latter part of 1945, significantly reinforced by units from the ETO. It was planned the US 8th Air Force with it Boeing B17’s Flying Fortresses would redeploy to the PTO. This would add approximately two thousand airframes to the already significant force of Boeing B29 Superfortresses of the 20th Air Force. The Royal Air Force also planned to deploy three bomber groups to the Far Eat under the auspicious of ‘Tiger Force’ This force would have been equipped with Avro Lancaster MkX and the new Avro Lincoln, both long range bombers with significant payload capacity’s. Had this campaign been allowed to continue with all of its added weight it would have arguably brought Japan to its knees without the use of the atomic bombs or the need for an invasion. As Robert Paper has argued in Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War the strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese was the most successful case of military coercion through the use of air power and even without the atomic bombs its still stands out as an immensely successful campaign.

Another aspect of the alternative decisions for the end of World War II is the role of the Soviet Union in the Far East. It had been a constant in allied planning that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan. At the Yalta Conference, ARGONAUT, in February 1945 it was agreed that in return for Soviet entry against Japan there would be status quo in Mongolia and the acquisition of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. With this agreement and the end of the war in Europe, Soviet units were gradually transferred to the Far East via the trans-Siberian railway. In the space of two months Marshal Vasilevsky’s Far Eastern Command had doubled from forty to eighty divisions and on 9 August the Soviet’s launched a massive assault on the Japanese Kwantung army based in Manchuria. By the end of hostilities on and about August 20 the Red Army had destroyed the Kwantung army causing more than 80,000 casualties. This operation was but a precursor for what had been planned by the Soviets. They had planned a continued advance into Korea and an invasion of the Japanese home island of Hokkaido at about the same time as the first US planned invasion, Operation OLYMPIC, in November 1945. If this planned invasion had gone ahead it may well have had huge effects on the post-war nature of Japan and the Far East. It can easily be surmised that Japan would have been occupied in a similar manner a Germany was with three zones of occupation, US, Britain/Commonwealth and Soviet, rather than just being occupied by America. Tokyo would, therefore, had become the Berlin of the Far East but in the Allied zone rather than Soviet zone as Berlin was. It would have, therefore, been a useful counterweight to Soviet demands over the status of Berlin in 1948. As such it can be seen that while Soviet entry would have helped in the destruction and downfall of Japan it may well have added another aspect to the Cold War with Japan becoming America’s counterweight to Soviet power in central Europe. However, it must also be kept in mind that with Stalin having a say in Japanese politics there may well have been a shift in American post - war policy in the Pacific too. This was because in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War, Japan was used as a logistics springboard with which to launch their campaigns.

While the actual fate of Japan has been considered by many historians with respect to the use of the atomic bomb and any other possible alternatives, one area which has often been left out of these considerations is the fate of South East Asia in the final months of the war. With the launch of Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA, Field Marshal the Viscount Slim, commander of the British 14th Army and subsequently land commander for South East Asia, launched the liberation of Burma. DRACULA was the culmination of many years of hard fighting and saw the re-capture of Rangoon. With this act Burma was liberated and planning was underway for the liberation of all former British colonies in the region. The British had planned to send forces from Germany to Burma in order to facilitate further advances and in preparation General Stopford formed the 12th Army which would eventually be handed over to General Sir Miles Dempsey, former commander of the 2nd Army in North West Europe. Under this command structure, headed by Slim, who was by now Allied Land Force Commander South East Asia, the British/Commonwealth forces had planned the liberation of Malaya, Operation ZIPPER, Sumatra, Operation CULVERIN and the capture of the Andaman Islands, Operation BUCCANEER. This combined with the Australians coming up from Borneo was designed to clear the Japanese from all colonial possessions. Had the war continued and Britain ‘liberated’ these countries the communist insurgent forces which had resisted the Japanese and then turned against the British post war may not have been able to draw on the popular support which they did after the war. If this had occurred Britain’s position in South East Asia may well have been much stronger and any subsequent retreat from the Empire may well have been far less bloody and these countries transition to democracy may well have been smoother.

While in the British colonies this may have been possible, French colonies would have been a much greater problem as they had no forces in the region, the first French troops did not arrive until December 1945, thus it may have been harder to assume a position of the liberator without the support of Britain. Though this may have been true, the crumbling of Japanese resistance may have seen increased pressure from the Viet Minh and Chinese Communist forces and such given them a much stronger position against the French colonial administrators when or if they returned. This may well have led to a united Vietnam thirty year earlier and without the bloodshed of two subsequent wars.

In conclusion it can be seen that there are many what ifs concerning the ending of the war in pacific, many of them involve important decisions on the state of the post war world in the Far East and South East Asia. For example, if the Soviet Union had invaded Japan would it have become a powder keg like Berlin was in Europe or would it become a counterweight to Stalin policies in Europe. A vast amount of literature has been written on the subject, a vast amount of it dealing with the planned US invasion, this has stemmed from an attempt to explain the eventual use of the atomic bomb and whether it was morally right to use it when there were other alternatives to the planner of the war but had they been used would the war have been better of than if the bomb was used. That is an argument that will undoubtedly go on as we do not know as that is the point of a counterfactual, we are surmising on event that did not happen and as Richad Franck has noted because of the prevailing Soviet posture, the ‘war had to end when it did’, which may well have been best for all involved.

Why did Truman drop the Bomb?

One of the key issues to come out of the end of the Second World War is why did President Truman decide to use the atomic bombs. There has been continuing debate over its use and the implications of its use. This is just some of my thoughts on this most interesting and complex question.

The dropping of the atomic bombs ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man’ over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 respectively, represented a major turning point in human history, as it was the culmination of science and war coming together as one, a process, which had been taking place since the start of the Industrial Revolution. While the dropping of the bomb eventually saw the ending of World War II with the defeat of Imperial Japan, it is the decision to drop them, which has come in for much criticism years after the event and it may well be one debate that will never be fully agreed upon.

The main criticism of the decision to use the bombs is that the actual target was not Japan but much rather the Soviet Union. Many revisionist historians’, spurned on by the work of Gar Alperovitz on the subject, see their use as a method of forestalling Soviet ambition in both the Far East and in Western Europe and as Martin Sherwin has commented that, ‘The shock of the bombs…would not only be felt in Tokyo, American leaders calculated that it would be noted in Moscow.’ The main basis for this thesis has been the re-examination of the primary sources from the period. Many of which have opened up holes in the original claims of the United States government and orthodox historians alike.

The orthodox argument is based around the assertion that the bombs were dropped in order to end the war as quickly as was feasible with as few casualties as possible. One historian, Alonzo Hamby, has even gone as far as suggesting it was Harry Truman’s experience with the American Expeditionary Force in the First World War, were he served as an artillery officer, which led to his decision to use the bombs. Hamby comments that, ‘Truman, the old artilleryman…understood…the hopes and fears of the…young combat officers dreaming of families and futures…’ Therefore, the argument comes down to a case of military expediency, the saving of American lives, the orthodox view, against political realities, forestalling Soviet ambition, the revisionist view. This forms the basis of the debate as to why the bombs were dropped.

When examining the decisions to use the bomb one ‘myth’ already becomes readily apparent to the reader and this is the strange myth of a half a million American lives saved by the use of the bombs. This argument is a reference to the planned Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands, Operations Olympic and Coronet, which were to be started in November 1945, Olympic, which was to be the attack on Kyushu, and then in early 1946, Coronet, the invasion on the main island of Honshu. Within this context of planning for the invasion orthodox historians have argued that the bomb was used to save countless American, and Allied, lives from a bloody campaign in Japan. This myth first gained credence in President Truman’s memoirs when he commented that the invasion would have cost half a million lives. Though this may have been the case it is now widely known that the Japanese, feeling the effects of bombing and blockade, wanted peace, and were seeking it through their ambassador in Moscow. While it is true that the Soviets may well have kept this from the Americans in the hope that they would be able to share in the spoils of the war in the Far East it is now obvious that the Japanese were willing to seek peace and that the only obstacle in the way was unconditional surrender and the issue of the Emperor. This in itself would have saved American lives. A comment a revisionist historian is all too willing to make. As will be noted later a continued blockade and strategic bombing campaign may well have also saved American lives, but it is the invasion itself that must be analysed. The main issue is Truman’s definition of casualties; Truman insinuates that the casualties equate to combat deaths. However, the estimates that had been given to the President related to casualties, that is to say wounded as well as dead. In this respect the dropping of the bomb would not have saved half a million lives as they did not need saving but as one historians comment it would surely not have saved ‘…more than 20,000 and probably less than 15,000…’ Thus, the myth has been built up through the literature as saving half American deaths when in actual fact in terms of fatalities the figures would have been significantly smaller.

The main argument that the bombs were dropped for military reason has become heavily steeped in mystery as J R Miles makes clear ‘By the time historians were given access to…secret files…the myth…had achieved the status of accepted history.’ As commented earlier some historians’ see it as Truman’s disgust at seeing the countless lives of American soldiers being lost in an invasion of Japan. This may well have been born out of his experience of WWI but does not give the historian a realistic vision of the whole picture. For example, when looking at the official bombing order there is no mention of the intended targets being primarily military in nature, as such, the cities were to be the targets themselves. Therefore, it must be considered whether or not they were legitimate targets for such a weapon whose usage not based upon accurate bombing. In terms of Just War Theory it would appear that Truman and his administration were indeed acting outside the confines of morality, however, given the overall violent nature of the Second World War this may well have been considered justified by the administration, for example, for comparison consider the treatment by the Japanese of Allied Prisoners of War and the infamous Rape of Nanking. Truman does, however, comment in his diary for the 25th July that the targets were indeed to be ‘…military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children.’ Therefore, touching on the moral aspects, which in civilized war must always exist if it is to subsist within the domain of civilised human behaviour, we must consider the Presidents actions within the realms of conducting a war or setting the scene for the peace. Consequently, the question remerges to what was the target for this weapon; was the intended targets military or another possible target, the Soviet Union. This duplicitous nature of the bombing order and its wording feeds well into the revisionist argument because if the targets were to be military in nature then why not state this, therefore it can be argued that the intended target, as seen by the wording of the bombing order, was the cities themselves, therefore it is reasonable to assume that this was a show of force, possibly designed to scare the Soviet Union.

Another document, which sheds light on the military aspects of the decision use the bomb, is the Franck Report of June 11 1945. In this report a panel of seven members of the Manhattan Project suggested that a demonstration of the bomb destructive power on a remote island would be much more useful than using it on a specific target. They believed America should take a moral high ground and as the report comments that, ‘…America would be able to say to the world, “You see what weapon we had but did not use.”…’ They suggested this because as in their own words the use of the bombs could ‘…precipitate the race of armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.’ This is of course the situation that occurred when the Soviet Union finally tested their bomb in 1949. While the majority of the report was rejected it was agreed that the Soviets should be informed of it. The fact that this did not happen when the report suggested it is due to a conversation between Winston Churchill, Stimson and Truman in which details of the bomb should be kept secret, though Stalin should be notified of a new ‘weapon’. Therefore, this report can be seen in two distinct lights. Firstly, there did seem to be an intention to tell the Soviets of its existence. When viewed from this point of view it may well be considered that the bomb had a military purpose, most notably Truman’s wish to use it to save lives. Secondly, the fact that Churchill and Stimson easily swayed Truman shows both theirs and Truman’s fear of the Soviets and their intention in the Far East. Therefore, when Stalin was informed of the weapons nothing was mentioned about the words ‘atomic’ or ‘nuclear’ and as Gar Alperovitz comments this was in order to strengthen ‘…American diplomacy only after it was demonstrated in combat…’

The incident of when Truman mentioned a weapon of immense power to Stalin is extremely interesting in the history of the use of the bomb. As pointed out above the words ‘nuclear’ or ‘atomic’ were not used and when Truman casually mentioned it on July 24 at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin is remarked to have been unimpressed, however, based on the recollections of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov this was not the case as he commented in his memoirs that, ‘In actual fact, on returning to his quarters after this meeting Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted almost immediately. “Let them. We’ll have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up.”…’ This obviously refers to the Soviet Union’s own effort at developing an atomic weapon, much of which was based upon espionage of the Manhattan Project that Stalin had been well aware of due to the projects infiltration by the NKVD. This event has often been interpretated by revisionists as an attempt to intimidate Stalin, an attempt, which based on contemporary recollections, was unsuccessful. As James Byrnes, US Secretary of State commented, ‘Stalin’s only reply was to say that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it. I was surprised at Stalin’s lack of interest. I concluded that he had not grasped the importance of the discovery.’ If the use of the bomb and its announcement to Stalin was designed to be an attempt to intimidate the Soviets it was an attempt that was made against the advice of several of Truman’s senior military aides, in particular General of the Army Marshall and Admiral Leahy. Both of who believed that the war with Japan was over and that an attempt to outsmart and intimidate the Soviets with ‘atomic diplomacy’ would fail to check Stalin ambitions in the Far East and Europe.

One of the most interesting documents relating the use of the bomb is the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The report was written early after the end of the war in an attempt to assess the success of the strategic bombing campaign which the US Army Air Forces had conducted over Germany and Japan, however, it must be born in mind that the report was conducted by a service of the US Army seeking its independent in the post – war years. The report has often been used in an attempt to argue that the war could have been ended by conventional means and as such the Atomic Bombs were not a necessary measure. As such the maritime blockade and aerial campaign over the Japanese home islands have been considered one of the most successful campaigns of military coercion in history as the report comments that ‘General Takashima, when asked by the Survey as to his reaction to the Imperial Rescript, stated that surrender had become unavoidable; the Army, even should it repel invasion, could no longer protect the Japanese people from extermination.’ Thus, the argument that has been given by some historians is that the atomic bombs were not needed to force Japan’s surrender as the conventional strategic bombing campaign would have done this by November at the earliest possibly December by the latest. Thus, the decision to use the bombs early and hope to end the war can be seen as supporting the revisionists claim as Alperovitz, the chief revisionist, claims the USSBS concluded ‘…that Japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing, without a Soviet declaration of war…’ However, the report does go on to comment that the atomic bombs did have a role in Japan’s surrender and thus, did save the spilling of anymore blood both on the allied side as well as the Japanese side, both military and civilian, because as the report comments, ‘The role of the atomic bomb in the surrender must be considered along with all the other forces which bore upon that question with Japan.’ However, when reading the survey it does lend credence to the argument that the both the dropping of the atomic bombs and the planned invasions of the home islands were not necessary due to the success of the naval blockade and conventional strategic bombing campaign.. As such one of the most important reasons for the use of the bomb, saving of American lives, was not needed because the report concludes that this would have been possible by the application of strategic air power alone and would have forced Japan’s surrender by November 1945 at the latest. Thus, why was the bomb used early, well as commented before it may well have been used to forestall Soviet ambition in the Far East and prevent a divided Japan and a similar situation to which was building up in central Europe.

It appears when looking at the many primary sources that exist there were many people who wished to see that the bomb was not used. That Truman and his advisors did use it can be taken as an act of, as Alperovitz called it, atomic diplomacy. For example, the Bard memorandum, which was written by the Under - Secretary for the Navy Ralph Bard and given to Stimson suggested that the bomb did not need to be used and that the Japanese themselves were looking for a way out of the war, as commented earlier the Japanese were attempting to use their ambassador in Moscow in order to help seek favourable terms with the allies. As the memorandum comments the Japanese were seeking surrender and that this was the ‘…the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.’ The major stumbling block to Japanese surrender was the role of the Emperor but if this could have been solved peace could have been attained and the bomb would not have been necessary. The comments made by Bard were supported by several other top officers, as commented above both Marshall and Leahy had their reservations over its use. While they all believed it may have forced Japanese surrender, though Bard argued that this was not even needed, it would have no effect on Soviet ambitions if that was it’s intended target as has been supposed by the revisionists. So then it must be considered what was its point, if Japan would surrender with some negotiations over the Emperor’s role and it would not forestall Soviet ambition then the dropping of these to weapons must be seen as one of the greatest misjudgements in history as it precipitated an arms race with the Soviet Union that was to have huge consequences for the twentieth century.

Therefore, it can be seen that the decision to use the atomic bomb was indeed a complex, and indeed sometimes a muddled, judgment that had concerns over ending the war quickly, with as few casualties as possible and forestalling Soviet ambitions in the region. Many of the primary documents in some way tend to lend themselves to either school of interpretation and it comes down to a choice of which sources are used to support a thesis. Historians’ could accept what has been written by Truman, Stimson et al and agree that it was used for purely military reasons or they could be cynical and argue that there must be something more to it and that, for example, Truman would not possibly write about it in his memoirs. The primary sources, such as the USSBS, again lend themselves to both interpretations. While the USSBS states that Japan could have been defeated as quickly as possible without the bomb, thus supporting the ideas of revisionist historians, it does concede that it forced Japan to end the war quicker than had been anticipated, thus supporting the writings of orthodox historians. Whether a historian chooses to believe one argument or another comes down to their attitude on international affairs. However, by accepting the revisionist reasoning, a historian would be accepting that the US Government was acting to forestall Soviet ambition, and in doing this they are agreeing to ideal that government acted with some other intent in the arena international affairs. While this may be true it relies on certain assumptions, which may never be proved due, and the possible release of documents that have been classified and may well never be released in our lifetime and as John Buckley has commented about the use of the bombs and its political considerations that, ‘This is not to argue that political considerations did not flow from that decision, but there is no effective evidence to support the contention that it prompted it.’ Thus, while there may have been considerations the overriding aim based on sources must be the saving of American lives. The orthodox reasoning is heavily based upon what has been given to the public and assumes the infallibility of that nation’s government in its policies. Therefore, there must be some middle ground and in reality the use of the bombs was quite possibly related to both aspects of the reason given and that Truman wished to end the war quickly for whichever reason. Thus the argument over the use of the bomb may well be one that will probably never be reconciled and will go on for years to come. One thing is agreed upon though, the use of the bomb launched the world into a new and uncertain world in mutually assured destruction (MAD) became a byword and a worry for all concerned in the later half of the twentieth century.

Victory throught Coalition

Elizabeth Greenhalgh Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War Cambridge Military Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) XVI + 304 pp. ISBN 0-521-85384-2 

Over the past twenty years the study of Britain’s role in the First World War has to a large degree been turned on its head by a new school of historians attempting to overturn what one can only describe as the ‘Blackadder’ school of thought. Up until recently this new school of thought has squarely concentrated its attention on the lower echelon of the war. The leading proponent has been Paddy Griffith with his notable work Battle Tactics of the Western Front, which looked at the development of lower level battle tactics in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). With the impetus created by this revisionism we have seen in the last few years the attention turn back to the role of the General Headquarters of the BEF in the fighting of the First World War with several studies looking at the generals and command and control of the BEF. We have even recently seen a new edition of Sir Douglas Haig’s War Diaries which has added to the debate on his role in the war. However, up until now there had only been one major study on the nature of the Allied war effort but this has changed with Elizabeth Greenhalgh’s new study. Elizabeth Greenhalgh has recently become well known for her analysis of the higher direction of the Allied war effort during the First World War and the nature of Coalition Warfare in this period. Most notable amongst her recent work was a debate in the journal War in History with Dr William Philpott of Kings College, London, who is another notable exponent on the nature of Coalition Warfare during the First World War. This debate in itself showed up the differences inherent in the use of sources by these two historians. As Greenhalgh herself comments in the bibliographical essay in the book, Philpott over relies on British based sources and concentrates on the first two years of the war (p. 287). This inherent structural weakness in Philpott’s analysis has left open an area for an in depth and illuminating study of Anglo – French coalition warfare and this is a gap which Greenhalgh’s work most ably fits into.

The book itself is split into eleven chapters dealing with various aspects of the nature and development of coalition warfare between the countries. It does not however only deal with the war on the land but also includes a chapter on the how the Allies responded to the threat of unrestricted U-Boat warfare by the Germans in 1917. The first area gives us a preamble to the book and the early development of the command relationship between the British and French not only at a national level but also between the military’s of the two countries. In this sections the author enlightens the reader to one of the major problems which would dog the coalition in the first two years of the war, and too some extent for the rest of it; that of communications. As Greenhalgh points out communication at a personal level, be it with a fellow Commander in Chief or Liaison Officer, has to be effective in order for operations to go smoothly. However, this was not the case for the either armies, for example, out of 488 graduating officers from St Cyr between 1889 and the beginning of the war only 106 spoke English with the majority speaking German (p. 9). Thus as the author quite rightly notes in the face of this statistic it is no wonder that problems occurred in the first few month of the war.

The next important area, which Greenhalgh looks at, is the important period of 1914 – 15, a period when France was putting the majority of effort in to the war while Kitchener’s New Armies were built up. This period is important in the understanding of the development of the partnership of Britain and France as it is the period when the two countries moved from entente to coalition. We see in this section an informative discussion of the effect which both the personalities of Field Marshal Sir John French and Marshal of France Joffre had upon the nature of the command issues, which were at the heart of the coalition moving forward in the war with Germany. The major issue identified by Greenhalgh is that neither C-in-C had any confidence in the other and that led to an inability or unwillingness to communicate, which would lead to extreme pressures being place upon the coalition over the year. Despite this problem there does appear to be a glimmer of hope for effective co-ordination amongst the allies. This came from the politicians rather than the generals in the form of Briand, Mitterand, Kitchener, Asquith and Esher. A system had been put in place for conferences between them in order to develop policy, and an overriding political body to oversee its direction. However, despite Briand’s plea of ‘Unite de front’, this body was not to come into being due certain extraneous factors (p. 39). However, Greenhalgh rightly points out that despite the problems encountered by both Britain and France in creating some form of unifying body the basis of what would come later in the war (pp. 35 – 40).

The next few chapters of the book deal with the one subject which has become a quagmire for historians to explain, the Battle of the Somme. As with her article in War in History Greenhalgh has attempted to examine the reasons why the British were there and what was the contribution the campaign of 1916. It is this section, where she is most critical of the coalition and much of this argument was seen previously in her debate with William Philpot. She clings to the argument that the New Armies were not on the Somme to help the French. This is an interpretation, which has been vehemently defended elsewhere, but none the less is an interesting thesis, which holds some merit and can not be dismissed too easily.

Greenhalgh then moves on to the problems of 1917, which were of particular interest to this author. She pays particular attention to the problems outside of the sphere of the Western Front and looks at the issue of the war against Germany’s U – Boat’s. This is a most enlightening chapter where we see Greenhalgh comment that the formation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council was one of the few successes of the year and that despite problems and pressures from all sides ‘…greater allied cooperation over the allocation of scare shipping resources enabled a more efficient use of the ships that had escaped the submarine.’(p. 30) This is turn then lead to the successful re – supply of the armies from both Britain and America, which allowed the armies to move into the successful phases of the war in 1918.

This is where Greenhalgh next moves her attention to by looking at the failures of the Allied High Command structure as became highlighted during the German offensive of early 1918. Here she argues that changes came about because of a crisis in command and that to a large extent this crisis was the fault of the politicians who felt the war was not being run effectively and wished a degree of control. However, what was born was a system, which improved co – operation between the military’s, but did not create the general reserve, which had been hoped for. This was mainly because the generals of both Britain and France united in fighting their politicians and curbing their control of the war effort. Thus the Supreme War Council simply became an official ‘…talking shop…’(p. 185), which certified private agreements, which General came too. Notable in this is agreement between both Haig and Petain. Greenhalgh then shows that the formation of the council proved useful during the German offensives and allowed Foch to stabilise the Western Front and then proved functional in the Allied counter – attacks from August onwards.

Greenhalgh’s work is a constructive addition to the literature on the higher command of the war and to some degree Greenhalgh shows that in spite of problems the coalition gained the final victory. What does come across is that the Generals felt they won in spite of the interference of the Politicians, this is especially noted by the role Lloyd George played. One reviewer has commented that it was the shock of the crises of 1917 and early 1918 which led to the formalisation of the coalition. However, it is the opinion of this reviewer that Greenhalgh has shown that despite certain cultural and diplomatic problems, the French and British army commanders formulated an effective ad – hoc solution that worked to some degree and was only modified because of the interference of politicians and the need to co – ordinate such large forces as were present on the Western Front. The best epitaph to be given comes in Greenhalgh’s conclusion where it states that:
it must be said that the Franco – British coalition, for all its defective mechanism, was effective enough to defeat one of the five perfect institutions that Europe…produce(p. 285)

Greenhalgh’s employment of French sources also helps in understanding the issues that were at hand. A major issue, which Greenhalgh herself alluded too, with previous works on the subject was the lack of French sources and the over reliance upon the diaries and memoirs of the principal players. However, Greenhalgh too can maybe be accused of relying too much on French sources and it maybe some time till a balanced picture of the higher direction of the war is produced. This work does, however, distinctly adds to our understand or the nature of the Allies coalition war and that it was indeed won because of co – operation despite various minor and major issues, which were thrown up in the course of the war. It would be recommended that it indeed be read in conjunction with Philpott’s work and is recommended to all with an interest in the nature of coalition warfare and the First World War.

Pendulum of War

Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (London: Pimilico, 2005) ISBN 0-7126-6827-6, RRP £9.99

The battles of El Alamein has in previous years has been hotly contested ground, not just between the protagonists themselves but also by the many authors who have tried to describe and analyse the battle. The conflicting views have centered primarily on the British conduct of the battle and who planned the success that eventually came at the end of Operation SUPERCHARGE. Effectively the analysis fall into two camps, firstly, there are those who argue that much of the success was laid by the planning of General Sir Claude Auchinleck who took over from Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie after the disaster that was Operation CRUSADER. This group is most notable represented by Corelli Barnett and his work The Desert Generals. At the opposing end of the scale, as represented by Field Marshal Lord Carver in his work El Alamein, we have the argument that it was the taking over of the Eighth Army by Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery and the effect he had on the morale of the British forces in the desert, which swung the battle in Britain’s favour.

However, with this new work from Niall Barr, a lecturer at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, we have a new and invigorating analysis of the battle. The first thing you notice about this book is that Barr labels El Alamein as the three battles. This is as far as I am aware a first. Traditionally it has been seen that if there were three battles these were First Alamein, Alam Halfa and Second Alamein. However, Barr re-categorises this and argues that the Battle for Egypt, the retreat after CRUSADER, was in actual fact the First Battle of El Alamein and Barr argues that the battles around the El Alamein position started on 1 July 1942. This is both refreshing and interesting.

Not only does Barr offer a refreshing view of the battle dealing with the issues facing all the major protagonists on both sides he also offers excellent analysis of the effect of air power of the battles and how the Western Desert Air Forces campaign against Axis supply lines. This campaign effectively cut Generalfeldmarshal Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika off from its supply’s, which had to cross the Mediterranean. The Western Desert Air Force was able in this interdiction campaign to dislocate the Axis forces and remove their one major advantages from the battlefield, that of mobility. Without the ability to manoeuvre Rommel’s forces were not able to counter attack in the way they had previously and thus, this campaign allowed the Eighth Army to fight to its strength and wear down the Axis forces to the point were they had no other option than to retreat. Barr offers excellent discussion of the role of air power and is to be commended on this as no truly effective analysis of the Western Desert Air Forces’ contribution to Allied victory in North Africa and the Western Desert exists.

The author has provided the reader with an excellent up to date analysis of the battle and he weaves through the myriad of sources and debates in such a way that you are left fully understanding the complexity of this decisive battle and how it was not only important in terms of being one of the turning point of the war but also that it was crucial for Britain and Churchill who at the time of the battle was facing at vote of not confidence in the House of Commons. Overall if you are interested in the desert war or the persona of Montgomery I would recommend this book. As the Richard Holmes noted in his review of the hardback version this book, ‘Deserves to become the standard work on the desert war in 1942.’