Acquisitions – Service Slang
Flying Officer J L Hunt and Lieutenant A G Pringle RA, Service Slang: A First Selection (London: Faber and Faber, 2008[1943])
An interesting book to end up on my bookshelf. It is a collection of slang used in the British Army, Royal Air Force, and Royal Navy. It was compiled by the authors and originally published in 1943, and it is faithfully illustrated. However, my real interest in the book comes from the fact that Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory wrote the forward to this book when he was AOC-in-C of Fighter Command. It represents an interesting contradiction to our usual image of Leigh-Mallory as a masochistic officer with little or no sense of humour. However, it clearly shows that this was not the case. Indeed, in his forward he writes that:
No doubt the hair of the purists will turn grey when they read these pages…I am proud to command men who give every ounce they have in the fight, and when peace is won this book may remind them of many sad and many happy times which helped them coin new words…
Certainly not the usual uncaring view with have of Leigh-Mallory.
Writing and Publishing…
The last couple of weeks have seen me working furiously on a couple of projects that will now come, hopefully, to fruition.
Well it had to happen eventually. I have just signed the contract for my first book. It is an edited collection based on a symposium that I co-organised at the Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham. I am editing it with two friends and colleagues, Stuart Mitchell and Dr Michael LoCicero, who also helped organise the symposium. The book is entitled A Military Transformed? Transformation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792 to 1945. It should be out in 2013 and is being published by Helion and Company. You find more details about it on the Birmingham War Studies blog where we will be blogging our experience of editing the book.
In addition to editing the book, I am also contributing a chapter. This is based on my MPhil thesis and is on the development of command and control and aerial bombardment for Combined Operations. It is entitled, ‘Operation JUBILEE and the Transformation of Air Support for Combined Operations: The Case of Command and Control and Aerial Bombardment’. Here is the abstract:
Operation JUBILEE, the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942, has remained an area of intensive and divisive debate amongst historians. Debate remains over questions relating to the reasons for the operation, authorisation for the raid, and the argument over lessons learnt. One area of the operations that has received scant attention from historians is the question about the performance of the RAF during the operation. What attention has been paid to the role of air power has concentrated on the issue of the lack of air bombardment in support of the raid. Brain Loring Villa has remarked that ‘There was a degree of callousness in Portal’s allowing a largely Canadian force to go in without the bomber support they needed.’ However, this concentration on the issue of bombardment ignores the state of Combined Operations doctrine in the early years of the Second World War, which stressed the importance of ‘Control of the Air’.
However, Operation JUBILEE has been criticised for Mountbatten’s claim over the ‘Lessons Learnt’ from the raid on the impact this had on Operation OVERLORD. Therefore, this essay examines the ‘Lessons Learnt’ thesis with reference to the transformation of air support for Combined Operations. It will contend that JUBILEE formed an important catalyst to changing thoughts over the use of air power in Combined Operations. It will do this by examining the development of Command and Control systems and the use of aerial bombardment. It will illustrate that Dieppe formed an important element of the experience being gained in 1942/43. This essay argues that while there may not be a direct link to Operation OVERLORD in 1944 operations at Dieppe had an impact during 1943 and needs to be considered as one line of development in parallel with those from other theatres of war.
The other project has been a journal article that I am planning to submit to War in History. Again the article is based on research for my MPhil but also incorporates some information I have found for my PhD. The article is entitled, ‘To Control the Air? The Royal Air Force and Combined Operations Doctrine in the Inter-War Period’. I would be interested to hear people thoughts on the process of publishing in an academic journal. Here is the abstract:
John Terraine wrote of the RAF that, ‘It may be said, without straining verity, that bombing was what the RAF was all about…It is chiefly for that reason…that cooperating with the army and navy went right out of fashion between the wars.’[1] This article seeks to challenge that claim by demonstrating that in the field of Combined Operations the RAF was both aware and involved in the development of a coherent doctrine that took account of the impact that air power was having on the conduct of war. Indeed, it was the very question of whether or not Combined Operations could succeed in the face of air power that most vexed the services in the inter-war years. It will show that the RAF’s belief in ‘Control of the Air’ was the right view and subsequently proven by those Combined Operations conducted during the Second World War.
[1] John Terraine ‘Theory and Practice of Air War: The Royal Air Force’ in Horst Boog (Ed.) The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War: An International Comparison (Oxford: Berg, 1992) p. 470
Are you an Air Power Studies MPhil/PhD Student?
[Cross posted from The Aerodrome]
As I have mentioned previously one of my roles is that I am the Student Representative on the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Air Power Group Committee. In order to help me in this role it would be useful to establish a mailing list for postgraudate researchers working in the field of Air Power Studies so that we may discuss issues that may be taken to the committee. I am also interested in finding out who is currently engaged in doctoral research in order to illustrate the diversity of work that is ongoing. The list would also be a useful way of networking and providing you with information of events and publications that may be of interest. You do not need to be a member of RAeS for this, though membership does give you access to the publications such as the Journal of Aeronautical History.
If you wish to be added to the list, please email me at airpowerstudies@gmail.com with the following details:
Name
Working Thesis Title
Institution
Supervisor
Planned Completion Date
I would like to hear from as many scholars as possible. Air Power Studies, as a sub-set of the broader War Studies field, encompasses all aspects of History, Strategic Studies, Economics, Law, Ethics, Philosophy and International Relations.
What can the Royal Aeronauticaal Society do for you?
[Cross posted from The Aerodrome]
One of the many activities I undertake is that I am the Student Representative on the committee of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Air Power Group. The group is one of the specialist groups of the society and ‘it arose from the wish of the then President of the Society to promote interest in the study of air power and to enable the Society to offer views on air power topics.’ One of the great success of the group has been the establishment of the Senior Research Fellow in Air Power Studies at the University of Birmingham, which is held by Air Commodore (ret’d) Dr Peter Gray. This position has seen an expansion in the provision of the academic study of air power with the emergence of an MA in Air Power: History, Theory and Practice and numerous PhD students now studying the topic at Birmingham. Because of this increased provision, I ‘volunteered’ to act as a student representative.
Therefore, what I would like to know from those students at any institution studying air power related topics (this is broadly defined, and encompasses history, law, ethics, and strategic studies related topics) is what can the group do for you? What support can be provided? All ideas are welcomed. I cannot promise anything but I can take the ideas to the committee and raise any concerns or thoughts that you may have.
The Personal Side of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory
We often have a very specific view of historical characters in our mind. This is often down to the role of cultural memory in the formation of our historical consciousness. Leigh-Mallory’s character has been defined by Patrick Wymark’s depiction of him in Guy Hamilton’s 1969 classic The Battle of Britain. In this film, he plays Leigh-Mallory as an un-humorous, stiff and dour group commander who does not have the personal touch that his No. 11 Group counterpart, Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park had. Indeed the appearance of Park in his white overall getting out of his personal Hawker Hurricane is the perfect vehicle to illustrate the difference between the personal touch of each commander. However, how true is this depiction? Does it have a basis in historical fact? I would suggest the picture is perhaps not as simple as has been assumed. To illustrate this here are a couple of vignettes from various pilots who came into contact. First, they illustrate that Leigh-Mallory cared about the men under his command and often visited them to check on them and consider issues of morale. Second, they show that he had a sense of humour. Something, which Wymark’s depiction would lead us to believe that he did not.
The first comes from Wilfred Duncan Smith’s memoir. Duncan Smith served with No. 611 Squadron during the Battle of Britain. He remarks about a prank that the squadron played with furniture prior to a visit from Leigh-Mallory:
It was still there when we gathered for lunch to meet the AOC, who had decided to pay a surprise visit to tell us that he had been appointed to command No. 11 Group. Without once looking up at the balancing act of the settee perched precariously above him he remarked: ‘I’m arranging for 611 Squadron to be moved to Southend shortly. There will be plenty of action and rafters to divert your attendance. Leigh-Mallory, or L-M as he was affectionately known, took great interest in the affairs of his squadrons and was never happier than when he could mix with pilots and ground-crews, listening to opinions and discussing operational problems.[1]
The second comes from Hugh Dundas, who served with No. 616 Squadron, which was initially based in No. 12 Group and then moved to No. 11 Group during the Battle of Britain:
We received a visit a Manston from Air Officer Commanding No. 12 Fighter Group, Air Vice Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory…The words ‘AOC inspection’ were on the lips of every senior NCO in the squadron for forty-eight hours before the visit, but I am glad to say as far as the pilots were concerned no time was wasted on any special spit and polish. I cannot remember any parade of any kind ever being carried out in 616 squadron and the rule was not broken for Leigh-Mallory.
The dinner party which we gave for the AOC in our mess tent that night was a memorable affair. One of our after-dinner games involved climbing up the pole in the middle of the tent, squeezing out through one of the ventilation flaps on the side near the top, clambering over the ridge pole, getting in again through the ventilation flap on the other side and sliding back to earth down the pole you had started from….
After we had drunk a good deal of port on the night of Leigh-Mallory’s visit it was decided that we should play the game. Two or three of us went up and down. Then someone suggested that the AOC should have a go. Very sportingly, he agreed. But he was not really built for that kind of thing. In the course of the passing years his figure had thickened. But he had a terrible job of squeezing through the ventilation flap. We stood below and cheered him on. At last he plopped through and his face, purple with exertion, disappeared out into the night. The tent swayed and the ridge-pole sagged as he struggled across the top. His legs reappeared on the other side. He got half way and stuck.
Shouting with laughter, we urged him on and his legs and buttocks wiggled and waggled as he fought his way through that canvas flap. Someone shinned up the pole and helped him with a few hearty tugs. He came out like a champagne cork, grabbed desperately at the pole and descended from a height of about ten feet in a free fall. Fortunately he was unhurt. He accepted a very large, very dark whisky and soda and left us hurriedly before we started playing something else.[2]
Clearly, here is a picture that does not fit the traditionally narrative of this character and it shows how complicated the analysis of a leader, and their impact on their subordinates, can be when you begin to scratch beneath the orthodox interpretations of their competences.
To Coventrate
I have commented before on the term ‘Coventrate’ before. Indeed Brett Holman has noted its appearance several times over at Airminded. However, I have yet to note, and perhaps Brett will know better than I do, it exact origins. What we do know it that the Germans came up with the term and here some interesting evidence from General der Jagdflieger Aldof Galland as to its origins:
Coventry became a symbol of German night attacks of the period. German propaganda invented and adopted the verb “kiventrieren” – “to Coventrate” – to describe the maximum amount of destruction to be obtained by night attacks.[1]
This comes from an article written by Galland at some point in the late 40s or early 50s while he lived in Argentina and was translated into French and appeared in Forces Aeriennes Francaises before being translated by the Air Historical Branch. The file from which the article comes from comprises of translation of captured enemy documents most of which emanate from the VIII Abteilung of the Luftwaffe’s Air Staff, which was the German Air Historical Branch. It is an interesting view of the Battle of Britain and fits the German interpretation of including the Blitz into its narrative of the battle as a fifth phase whereas for most british historians the battle and the Blitz are two distinct entities.
[1] The National Archives, AIR 20/7707, The Battle of Britain by General Adolf Galland, p. 31.
British Commission for Military History’s New Research in Military History Conference – Registration Details
New Research in Military History: A Conference for Postgraduate and Early-career Historians
18 November 2011
This conference, organised by the British Commission for Military History in association with the History of Warfare Research Group at King’s College London, intends to highlight the breadth and depth of research being undertaken by postgraduate and early career historians in the field of military history.
The British Commission for Military History’s New Research in Military History conference is a recently established forum for those are engaged in research in military history or related disciplines to meet other new and established scholars and to present a paper in a supportive environment. We aim to provide an opportunity for postgraduate and early-career historians to present their work to a wider audience of practising military historians. The British Commission for Military History is the pre-eminent association for professional military historians in the UK, dedicated to the promotion and discussion of military history in its broadest sense. This conference is designed to introduce younger scholars to the Commission, whose members will also be in attendance.
The conference will include a keynote lecture by Brian Holden Reid, Professor of American History and Military Institutions at King’s College London. It will take place at the Strand Campus of King’s College London, in the War Studies Department, King’s Building, room K6.07. Instruction on how to reach the campus and the War Studies department can be found at
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/campuslife/campuses/strand/Strand.aspx
The conference is free to members of the British Commission for Military History. For non-members and interested parties the fee is £10. The fee includes tea, coffee, and sandwich lunch on the day.
If you wish to attend the conference please print out and return the form below, and send it by Monday 14 November 2011 to the address below.
Conference Organisers
Paul Harris
Ross Mahoney
bcmhnewresearchers@gmail.com
Conference Proceedings
08:45 – 09:15: Registration (Room K6.07, War Studies Department, King’s College London)
09:15 – 09:25: Welcome and Introduction by Professor William Philpott (King’s College London) Secretary General of the British Commission for Military History
09:30 – 10:50: Panel A1 – Ancient and Medieval Warfare
Ilya Berkovich (University of Cambridge) ‘The Use of Missile Weapons in the Manipular Legion’
Dr Laura Crombie (Independent Scholar) ‘A ‘French Armada’ or a ‘Brief flirtation’? French plans to invade England in 1385 and 1386’
Dr Robert Jones (University of Leeds) ‘Liveries, Ensigns and Russet-coated Captains: Military Revolution through the lens of Martial Display’
09:30 – 10:50: Panel B1 – The Writing of the History of Warfare
Grace Huxford (University of Warwick) ‘The Reality of Experience: Autobiography and Military History’
Julia Dawson (King’s College London) ‘More than Just Bombing: A Critical Examination of The Official History of the War in the Air 1917-1918’
Dr Lars Peder Haga (Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy) ‘Stalin’s Confused Conquerors: Two Soviet Soldier-Writers on Eastern Europe’
10:50 – 11:10: Coffee
11:10 – 12:30: Panel A2 – Warfare in the Early Modern Age
Marco Giani (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice) ‘Venetian Warfare in the Age of Palmanova: Paolo Paruta’s Discorsi Politici (1599)’
Dr Adam Lyons (University of Birmingham) ‘Rankers for North America: Mass Promotion in the Army of Queen Anne’
Catherine Scheybeler (King’s College London) ‘Jorge Juan y Santacilia’s Mission to London: An example of Eighteenth-Century Naval Espionage’
11:10 – 12:30: Panel B2 – Warfare in the 19th Century
Richard Dunley (King’s College London) ‘The Royal Navy’s Coastal Assault Strategy during the 1878 Straits Crisis and the Development of Offensive Mine Warfare’
Edward Gosling (University of Plymouth) ‘The Advantages of the Army: A Revised Assessment of the Childers Reforms 1880 – c.1905’
Paul Ramsey (University of Calgary) ‘Spenser Wilkinson and British Strategy before the Boer War’
12:30 – 13:15: Lunch
13:15 – 14:35: Panel A3 – The First World War (I)
Jeff Cleverley (King’s College London) ‘Defeated before even a shot had been fired? The planning of the Suvla Bay landings at Gallipoli, August 1915’
Stuart Mitchell (University of Birmingham) ‘Constructive Disobedience: ‘Consent and Evade’ in the Great War’
Rob Schafer (Pennsylvania State University) ‘With Good Cheer and Chocolate: The Role of Everyday Stimulants Amongst Soldiers During the Great War’
13:15 – 14:35: Panel B3 – The Second World War
Benjamin Coombs (University of Kent) ‘“Tanks for Russia”, 1941-1945’
Iain Johnston (University of Cambridge) ‘The British Commonwealth Air Training Schemes in World War Two’
Dr Jonathan Fennell (King’s College London) ‘New Research on the British Army in the Second World War’
14:40 – 15:40: Panel A4 – Fortifications and Terrain in War
Victoria Henshaw (University of Birmingham) ‘Structures of Oppression? Scotland’s Fortifications c.1700-1750’
Neal Dando (University of Plymouth) ‘Gazala, right battle – wrong ground?’ the impact of terrain on Eighth Army’s tactical battle, May-June 1942’
14:40 – 15:40: Panel B4 – War and Society
Nicholas Beeching (University of Birmingham) ‘The Provincial Press & the Outbreak of War: A Unionist View in Worcestershire’
Dr Alan Allport (Syracuse University) ‘The British Working Man in Arms in the Second World War’
15:40 – 16:00: Tea
16:00 – 17:20: Panel A5 – The First World War (II)
Michael LoCicero (University of Birmingham) ‘A Moonlight Massacre: The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2 December 1917’
Simon Justice (University of Birmingham) The Organization of Defeat – BEF Defensive Preparations during the winter of 1917/18
Dennis Williams (University of Birmingham) ‘Forgotten in Flanders: British Second Army in the Hundred Days 1918’
16:00 – 17:20: Panel B5 – Small Wars and Insurgencies
Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis (University of Manchester) ‘Sources of morale among Greek resisters (1941-1945)’
Jacob Stoil (University of Oxford) ‘The Saison de Chasse: Successful Counter Insurgency in Palestine’
Dr James Hudson (Independent Scholar) ‘Operation Allied Force: A Doctrine Dilemma?’
17:30 – 18:15: Keynote Lecture by Professor Brian Holden-Reid (King’s College London)
18:15: Drinks Reception sponsored by the Society for Military History
Has the time come for an Air Force Records Society?
[Cross-posted at The Aerodrome]
A couple of weeks ago I was involved in a panel discussion on the future of Air Power Studies at the Air Power Workshop held at the Centre for War Studies at the University of Birmingham. I was given the task of talking about some of the issues facing students working in the area of Air Power Studies and entitled it, ‘Air Power Students in an Age of Uncertainty’. A couple of the key issues I raised related to the problems of publishing for emerging scholars in the air power field. The first issue related to the demise of the Air Power Studies series that was published by Frank Cass/Routledge and whether or not there is a future in resurrecting a similar series. Hopefully there may well be.
The other issue I raised was whether or not there was a need to start an Air Force Records Society. Both the Army and the Royal Navy has a records society and given that the history of British Air Power is now more than 100 years old has not the time come for such an endeavour? I think it has. The RAF and its predecessors, the RFC and RNAS, have a rich documentary heritage that should be preserved. If we look at the mission of the Army Records Society this could be easily applied to an air force equivalent:
the object of the Army Records Society is to edit and publish manuscripts relating to the Army and to reprint works of military interest
In terms of the manuscript part of this there are plenty of papers that could be reprinted such as the Papers of Major General Sir David Henderson, which would be an interesting first volume. Of course an obvious volume would be on the papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard. With regards to works of interest there is a fascinating memoir written by Air Marshal Sir Edgar Kingston-McCloughry which is a refreshing honest and critical work that was never published and languishes in his paper at the Imperial War Museum. There are also plenty of interesting works that could be republished under the auspicious of the society. Given the both the Army and Navy Records Society only tend to publish one volume a year I do not think there is an issue of critical mass with regards to it only being a short-lived enterprise. The other key issue is whether or not there would be enough interest from interested parties.
So the question remains has the time come try to start such an organisation? Would you be interested? I think it has and we must try to preserve the history of the third service.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Fighting Power as the Arbiter of Leadership Effectiveness
[Cross posted at Birmingham "On War"]
In an era of fourth generation warfare where the achievement of strategic end-goals lay squarely at the feet of politicians, the application of fighting power as a militaries core warfighting capability is being increasingly questioned with a concentration on Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Peacekeeping Support Operations (PSO). For example, Colonel Gian Gentile has lamented on the death of the US Armor Corps as the US Army moves to an infantry-centric force grounded in population centric COIN.[1] This has left it, in Gentile’s opinion, unable to produce effective fighting power. This raises the important question of how fighting power is defined and how it affects of the study of leadership.
In order to analyse the effectiveness of a leader there must be some framework in order to conceptualise the outputs of effective leadership noted above. Ultimately, the indicator for effective leadership must be the key arbiter of war; victory. While there are many other factors that impact on the planning and conduct of war from the grand strategic to the tactical level it is the leaders who wield this power and apply it to what Clausewitz described as being the ultimate objective of war, ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’[2] Historically victory has been achieved through the production of fighting power at the various levels of war, which can be defined as the generation and application of force and strength in the battle space to achieve victory, thus compelling the enemy to do our will. However, this opens the question of how victory is achieved, and as Stephen Biddle has written, ‘Why do the winners win and the losers lose?’[3] Biddle has argued that victory is brought about by the mastery of modern small arms tactics and doctrine.[4] However, this view has been challenged and this author argues that the key marker for victory comes from the human element of war, in particular the role of the commander.[5] Bad commanders do not achieve victory in battle and war. While ‘Great Captains’ are hard to find a good commander, who is able to master the elements of leadership, command and management, will, invariably, in modern warfare achieve victory. Indeed, the argument made by Martin van Creveld that the German Army was able to generate more fighting power than the US Army may have some merit at the tactical and operational levels but it ignores the problems of strategic leadership in the German State and Army that ultimately crippled and dislocated its ability to produce fighting power.[6] In addition, it ignores the strategic context in which the German Army was operating, which distorts his view of fighting power to the abandon of factors such as the application of the US military-industrial complex to modern war.
Current British Defence Doctrine considers fighting power to consist of three key components; conceptual, physical and moral.[7] Each of these has a reciprocal relationship to each other. The conceptual component consists of the principles of war, doctrine and development; the thought process.[8] The physical component consists of issues such as manpower, equipment, logistic and training; the means to fight, or combat power.[9] However, it is the third element, the moral component, that is, arguably, the most important element in defining an armies ability to fight and as Alan Howley has written, ‘It is axiomatic in a military population that fighting power requires appropriate leadership.’[10] Leadership forms an integral part of the moral component, which forms the core of delivering fighting power. Linked to leadership as part of the moral component is moral cohesion, which can be split further into morale and unit cohesion, and motivation. Given that victory is dependent on the application of the physical and the conceptual components of fighting power it is not unreasonable to assert that it is a leader’s application of these elements that is decisive in the production of fighting power. Even van Creveld concedes that leadership, ‘perhaps more than any other, decides the outcome of wars.’[11] Even historically the importance of the leader in war is exemplified by the opening quote from AP 1300’s chapter on leadership that success in war depends more on the moral than the physical.[12] A leader’s ability to inspire subordinates, thus generating morale and motivation, is important in producing the elements of fighting power. This of course raises important question about Leigh-Mallory. For example, the ability of a leader to enunciate the development and production of military doctrine to subordinates will influence its ability to fight. For example, was Leigh-Mallory, as a senior operational level leader for Normandy, able to communicate the strategic directives given to him by Eisenhower, and how was he able to translate this into operational decisions in the lead up to OVERLORD, thus linking the moral to the conceptual component. Similarly, the impact of leadership on training and readiness is important to understand, for example, how Leigh-Mallory prepared No. 12 Group in the lead up to the outbreak of war. Questions need to be answered about how ready was his command for the rigours of war, and how did his preparations fair when the test of battle arrived in the summer of 1940, thus, in this case linking the moral to the physical component. The need to master the moral component of war is of vital importance and impacts on the other components’ of war in a reciprocal manner that defines the effectiveness of any military leader by taking into account their ability to lead, manage and command forces in war.
However, while it is important to note the role leadership plays in the generation of fighting power, external factors cannot be ignored and issues such as strategic context must be consider as an external factor that influenced victory in the Second World War. For example, it has been argued that allied victory in the Normandy Campaign came about because of overwhelming allied superiority in firepower rather than the effective application of fighting power.[13] However, this has come into question and the question of how a leader manages the firepower at their disposal is perhaps more pertinent to a discussion of leadership and fighting power than previous simplistic assertions. Indeed, one of the key elements of Leigh-Mallory’s command competence in the planning for Normandy must be how effectively did he manage the team at AEAF and how that impacted on the production of fighting power. Another key issue that must be kept in mind in the production of fighting power is the problems of leadership in a coalition context. As General Sir Michael Jackson has noted when several nations operate together in an alliance it raises problems of friction as each has a different language, doctrine, training and culture.[14] Each of these factors poses a real issue for the commander in charge, and for Leigh-Mallory, this raised obvious questions of how to work effectively with the Americans, who by this stage of the war were providing the majority of the combat power for future operations. In addition, Leigh-Mallory operated at the cusp of the operational-strategic level and had to interface with numerous groups with varied interests from not only within his own service but also within members of the United Nations. This understanding of cross-cultural issues was perhaps one of the greatest strengths of Eisenhower; Leigh-Mallory’s superior in the Normandy campaign.[15] Another pertinent issue for Leigh-Mallory in the sphere of coalition command is the issue of small nations and their accountability to their national government. For Commonwealth nations, the 1931 Statute of Westminster complicated this situation, and as Paul Dickson has illustrated the senior level, this issue complicated command decisions and it influenced fighting power.[16]
Finally, in considering the issue of fighting power, it is worth returning to the narrative of a given person or event, and this thesis will, through the use of a 360-degree appraisal methodology seeks to re-appraise the narrative surrounding Leigh-Mallory’s command competency. In returning to the sources and considering, the nature and context of these sources it seeks to open up new views of how we conceptualise our views of effectiveness and particularly that of Leigh-Mallory. Overall, we can define the links between leadership and fighting power as:
Effective leadership produces fighting power through the application of the moral component of war to the physical and conceptual components, which can lead to victory in battle.
[1] Gian Gentile, ‘The Death of the Amor Corps’, Small War Journal (April 2010) – http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-death-of-the-armor-corps
[2] Clausewitz, On War, p. 75
[3] Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) p. 1
[4] Biddle, Military Power, passim
[5] For a thought provoking challenge to Biddle’s argument, see the roundtable in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2005). See; Elliot Cohen, ‘Stephen Biddle on Military Power’, Lawrence Freedman, ‘A Theory of Battle or a Theory of War?’, Michael Horovitz and Stephen Rosen, ‘Evolution or Revolution’, Martin van Creveld, ‘Less than Meets the Eye’, and Biddle’s own reply, ‘Military Power: A Reply’
[6] Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983) passim. Creveld views fighting power through the prism of national character, doctrine, command principles, organisation, morale and leadership.
[7] British Defence Doctrine, p. 4-1
[8] Anon, The Application of Force: An Introduction to Army Doctrine and the Conduct of Military Operations (London: The Stationary Office, 2002) p. 27; Anon, British Defence Doctrine, pp. 4-3-4-5
[9] Anon, Application of Force, p. 27; Anon, British Defence Doctrine, pp. 4-8-4-10
[10] Alan Howley, ‘People not Personnel: The Human Dimension of Fighting Power’ in Hew Strachan (Ed.) The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2000)m p. 213
[11] Van Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 127
[12] AP 1300 – War Manual
[13] Ellis, Brute Force
[14] Michael Jackson, ‘The Realities of Multi-National Command: An Informal Commentary’ in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (Eds.) Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Century (Camberley: Strategic Combat Studies Institute, 2000) pp. 86-91
[15] Kerry Irish, ‘Cross-Cultural Leadership: Dwight D. Eisenhower’ in Harry Laver and Jeffrey Matthews (Eds.) The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008) pp. 93-124
[16] Paul Dickson, ‘Colonials and Coalitions: Canadian-British Command Relations between Normandy and the Scheldt’ in Brian Farrell (Ed.) Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Vogel (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004) pp. 235-273. The problems of the relationship between Montgomery and General Henry Crerar have been analysed in Hart, Colossal Cracks, pp. 147-173
A Short Critique of Vincent Orange
[Cross posted at The Aerodrome]
One of the key authors I have to engage with in my PhD is Dr Vincent Orange. What follows is a short critic of his work as it appears in the introduction to my thesis. It may seem that I am being harsh but I feel that are some important structural and historiographical issues with his works. They tend to lean towards the hagiographical and need to be read with care and with an understanding of the context of both the period and of the RAF.
Orange has written several key biographies of RAF airmen. In general, these works have been well received and undeniably, Orange has added valuable accounts to the historiography of the RAF. As Air Commodore (ret’d) Henry Probert, the former head of the RAF’s Air Historical Branch, noted in his review of Orange’s work on Air Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham in 1990 there had been few biographies of RAF commanders.[1] Thus, this work was a welcome addition to the field. This is a situation that to a large degree still exists to this day, though Orange himself has added several important works since writing his Coningham biography; however, it should be noted that works dealing with combat pilots rather than high commanders of the RAF remain an ever-popular genre with the publishing houses.
However, while Orange’s works have been lauded an important issue must be considered when utilising these works. This is the issue of bias that is inherent in all of his works, but notably his biographies of Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park and Air Chief Marshal Baron Dowding. The issue can be described as the ‘Park View of History, in effect his works are biased to the view of Park when viewing contentious events; it should be noted that Orange’s first biography was his work on Park and his affinity to this important airmen is noticeable in his writings. This especially notable in sections of his works that deal with the Battle of Britain but this bias is also inferred in sections of dealing with the issues surrounding the use of air power in the Normandy Campaign. Even in his work on Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, a book that is generally positive about this airmen’s contribution to air power history, we can see this bias emerge where the subject turns to events that include Park or officers involved in the contentious events of 1940. For example, in discussing, the decision to replace Slessor with Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Douglas of Kirtleside at Coastal Command at the start of 1944 Orange describes the RAF’s posting system as random and that it was the wrong decision for the forthcoming role that the command would play in preparations for OVERLORD.[2] However, Orange’s criticism is wrong, as it was not unusual to post officers to new commands in order for them to gain further operational experience. In addition, the change in command for Slessor, and indeed Douglas, did not significantly affect the conduct of the war. In reality, the decision to send Slessor to the Mediterranean aided in the conduct of complex political issues that affected operations in theatre; Slessor undoubtedly had the skills need for dealing with the political of coalition operations.[3] In addition, Douglas fitted in with the command team then being gathered together for OVERLORD through his experience of working with these officers in the Mediterranean in 1942 and 1943. In addition, to argue that he had a lack of experience is to ignore his time as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff where he would have been fully cognizant with the problems facing Coastal Command.[4]
Perhaps Orange’s bias, in particular towards those officers involved in the debates of 1940, can be best summed up by comments made in his review of John Ray’s work The Battle of Britain, New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War in the Journal of Military History.[5] In this review, Orange concludes by noting that ‘Dowding and Park were right, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory were wrong.’[6] This simplistic analysis of the debates of fighter tactics in 1940 and 1941 highlights the partisan nature of Orange’s work. He sees himself as the defender of Park’s, and latterly Dowding’s reputation. In doing so, he has sought to denigrate the role and impact of their contemporaries. In doing this, he ignores the difficulties of fighter operations as a whole but rather concentrates on daylight defensive operations.
[1] Henry Probert, ‘Coningham by Vincent Orange (Book Review)’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 135, No. 2 (Summer: 1990) p. 81
[2] Orange, Slessor, p. 123
[3] For a more positive view of Slessor’s impact both at Coastal Command and the Meditteranean Allied Air Forces see; Corvin Connelly, ‘Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cottesworth Slessor and the Anglo-American Air Power Alliance, 1940-1945’ PhD Thesis (Texas A&M University, 2001) pp. 193-271
[4] Lord Douglas of Kirtleside with Robert Wright, Years of Command: The Second Volume of the Autobiography of Sholto Douglas, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, GCB, MC, DFC (London; Collins, 1966) p. 246
[5] Vincent Orange, ‘The Battle of Britain, New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War by John Ray (Book Review)’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 2 (1995:Apr.) pp.348-349
[6] Orange, ‘The Battle of Britain (Review)’ p. 349
